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Western Michigan University 
Governance is a multidimensional concept that involves the tra-
ditions and institutions under which political authority in a country 
is exercised. Governance includes the process by which rulers are 
selected, monitored, and replaced, and it entails the capacity of gov-
ernments to effectively formulate and implement sound and inclusive 
policies. Through these means, good governance fosters the ability of a 
government to earn the respect of its citizens as well as the cooperation 
of the institutions that determine its economic and social policies, which 
influence interaction among citizens. Sustainable development requires 
good governance that is predictable, open, enlightened, accountable, 
inclusive of all citizens, and operates under the rule of law. Good gov-
ernance is desirable as a goal in its own right, beyond being an impor-
tant means of sustainable development. According to the World Bank, 
good governance involves six aspects: 1) voice and accountability, 
2) political stability and the absence of violence, 3) government effec-
tiveness, 4) regulatory quality, 5) rule of law, and 6) control of corrup-
tion. The data the World Bank generates for indicators of governance 
for all countries around the world are available at www.govindicators 
.org. The criteria the World Bank uses include consideration of the 
aforementioned processes in good governance (Kaufmann 2010). 
CHAPTER HIGHLIGHTS 
This introductory chapter outlines the general points of good gov-
ernance and its challenges, which will be explored in further detail 
throughout the book. Subsequent chapters consider how governance 
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2 Asefa and Huang 
relates to performance management, the influence of political parties, 
education and health issues in developing countries, and the effects of 
climate on poverty. Key examples will be drawn from countries in east-
ern Europe, Asia, and Africa. 
Chapter 2, titled “The Role of Performance Management in Good 
Governance,” comes from Carolyn J. Heinrich, Sid Richardson Profes-
sor of Public Affairs and director of the Center for Health and Social 
Policy at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University 
of Texas at Austin. She defines “governance” as consisting of “regimes 
of laws, rules, judicial decisions and administrative practices that con-
strain, prescribe and enable the provision of publicly supported goods 
and services.” Her focus is on performance management originating 
from public administration and policy. 
Heinrich notes that the twenty-first century is an era of governance 
by performance management. This approach has long roots in economics 
and business management, with a focus on four issues: 1) performance 
management, its origin, and how it contributes to good governance; 
2) the challenges and complexity of designing appropriate performance 
management in a democracy; 3) application of agency theory, or the 
notion that seeks to align citizens’ objectives with agent incentives to 
achieve principled results; and 4) lessons that have been learned for 
improving future performance management.
Agency theory, which is rooted in economics and management, is 
difficult to implement in practice because of the complexity of values 
and goals among citizens and legislators. Heinrich gives the example 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (commonly 
called the Affordable Care Act [ACA] or Obamacare), which has sev-
eral goals and tries to achieve potentially conflicting objectives such as 
affordable health care for all Americans, increased quality and efficiency 
of providing health care, and improved access to innovative medical 
therapies. But once the law has been fully implemented, it may have 
unintended consequences that distort its performance. She gives another 
example, from Michigan’s Wayne County (i.e., metro Detroit), of chil-
dren’s service agencies that use performance-based contracts: children 
in this system were less likely to be reunited with their families and 
more likely to enter foster homes. The end result was that children and 
families received fewer in-agency health services. Performance-based 
contract agencies may also influence the way workers deliver services: 








rather than drawing motivation from an ethos of public service, work-
ers may find that their self-interest in such cases does not square with 
the priorities of the services they are delivering. Conversely, employees 
are more likely to take principled actions if they feel their agency and 
employment goals are aligned with the best interests of the public. 
In another example of the relation of performance management to 
good governance in the United States, Heinrich asserts that poor-quality 
public education can jeopardize economic progress, even in a developed 
nation. Her case study of performance management in education, which 
starts with the 1983 K–12 report titled “A Nation at Risk” and continues 
to the present, shows that dropout rates remain high and achievement 
has not kept pace with other nations. Neither the nearly $600 billion 
spent annually on K–12 nor three decades of program reform have kept 
the United States from lagging further behind, she notes. 
The author questions how spending, research, and reform could fail 
to improve education. She notes there are many factors contributing 
to this, one of which is that there are too many cooks in the kitchen, 
including the federal government, the statehouse, the local district, 
the individual, and the school itself, and of course parents or guard-
ians. National monitoring of education through testing and standards 
has been controversial. The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), imple-
mented by Congress in 2001, defines school success based on snapshots 
of student proficiency through standardized tests. Many have called this 
a factory-model approach, traced its roots to early twentieth-century 
manufacturing policies, and criticized its lack of emphasis on overall 
growth in student achievement. In fact, some argue that implement-
ing such rigid definitions of accountability has backfired, in that it has 
led to a narrow emphasis on test preparation at the expense of deeper 
learning. Withdrawal and lower graduation rates leave behind some of 
the neediest students the law was designed to help. More-value-added 
models have since been proposed to account for factors outside the con-
trol of teachers and schools. Heinrich relates the experiments of others 
who sought to improve performance management through the use of 
multiple measures. These measures consist of diagnostic performance 
tools in which resources and rewards follow improved incremental out-
comes. One such tool would be to reward measured outcomes deter-
mined by clearly defined learning goals tailored to the students’ current 
performance and future employment needs. 
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In summary, there is no magic bullet. Neither more monetary invest-
ment nor strict adherence to testing performance has cured the ailments 
of the school systems in the United States. Heinrich notes the complexi-
ties of achieving a good performance outcome even in a wealthy nation, 
and she cautions that better guidance through governing systems can 
only be attained through confronting these complexities, with the goals 
of achieving desired learning outcomes and teaching effectiveness. 
In Chapter 3, “Political Parties, Democracy, and ‘Good Gover-
nance,’” by John Ishiyama, University Distinguished Research Pro-
fessor of Political Science at the University of North Texas, Ishiyama 
offers an analysis of the influence of political parties on democratiza-
tion in developing countries. He begins by acknowledging the histori-
cally negative public sentiments directed toward the very existence of 
political parties. He points out that none other than George Washington, 
the nation’s first president, considered political parties to be factions 
motivated by self-promotion at the expense of the public good. How-
ever, most scholars have described political parties in a representative 
democracy as a necessary feature of that system, since parties offer 
political choices. On the other hand, a one-party state, while it cannot be 
a democracy, may still have good governance in specific areas. China, 
for example, succeeded in dramatically reducing poverty in the rela-
tively short time span of about 30 years, or since reforms began in 1978. 
Yet China’s one-party rule, and hence its lack of political competition, 
has made it difficult to solve problems in other areas, such as environ-
mental maintenance, pollution control, and concern for human rights. 
In Ishiyama’s view, political parties are necessary to perform vital 
functions in the practice of democracy, such as interest articulation, 
political communication, candidate nomination, and stimulation of 
political participation. Encouraging these factors increases the poten-
tial for sustainable and accountable governments, including checks and 
balances. However, political parties can be so divisive that good gov-
ernance is compromised; in developing countries this may even lead 
to violence. The shutdown of the U.S. federal government in 2013 by 
Republicans in the House of Representatives in defiance of the Obama 
administration is one example of political gridlock and extremism. 
One-party dominance can cause an increase in corruption, since the 
dominant party attempts to maintain power by distributing patronage 
and using manipulation. Ishiyama holds that one can measure quality 





of governance, including levels of effectiveness and corruption. “Effec-
tiveness” refers to the quality of public service and policy formation, 
implementation, credibility, and legitimacy of governments, used to 
promote inclusive polices. “Corruption” reflects the extent to which 
political power is used for private gain. It comprises both petty and 
grand corruption, as well as overall “capture” of the state by private 
interests. Both “effectiveness” and “corruption” utilize a scale rang-
ing from −2.5 to +2.5. The World Bank makes the data available for 
parties in countries around the world, thus providing comparative data 
on levels of corruption. Using the same scale, political stability is also 
assessed. “Stability” is determined by the perception of the likelihood 
that a government will be overthrown through violent or unconstitu-
tional means. 
A recent case of a political uprising occurred during the Arab Spring 
of 2011, with the removal of President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt after 
30 years of rule and the subsequent election of the Islamic Brotherhood 
party, which put Mohamed Morsi in power as president. This was not 
a stable environment, as demonstrated by Morsi’s subsequent ousting 
by opposition leaders and the military because Egyptians perceived his 
regime as being exclusive of other groups. Many Egyptians were upset 
by his party’s undermining of the role of women in Egyptian society 
as well as the injection of religion into politics. Egyptians may have 
been afraid that Morsi would create a religious autocracy analogous to 
the Iranian religious autocracy that emerged in 1979 when a popular 
uprising removed the monarchial form of government headed by Shah 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. 
Ishiyama discusses the use of an empirical study that takes into 
account gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization (a measure of ethnic diversity). He employs several 
measures—party fractionalization, number of parties, party volatility, 
control variables such as GDP, and other aspects—to attempt to quan-
tify an average for how well corruption is under control, especially as it 
relates to political-party attributes. 
The author stresses the importance of future research that explores 
what party characteristics can be determined to promote better under-
standing of governance. He also cites the need for better use of panel 
data, as well as improved model specification, to create more effective 
research assessments. 
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While the research into how to measure the effects of political par-
ties continues, it remains clear that those parties created along the lines 
of ethnic and/or religious divisions cannot promote democratic good 
governance. By failing to be inclusive, they highlight divisions, exacer-
bate ethnic and religious tensions, and risk continued political instabil-
ity. A mature, liberal, pluralistic representative democracy that respects 
individual human rights has the best chance of managing ethnic and 
religious diversity, compared to an autocratic regime. Social science 
studies of the relationship between governance and ethnic diversity 
show that multiparty democracies outperform autocratic regimes in the 
long run, especially in promoting citizens’ rights, human rights, and the 
rights of minority groups. 
Chapter 4, “Good Governance in Transition Economies: A Com-
parative Analysis,” comes from Susan J. Linz, professor of econom-
ics at Michigan State University. Her contribution looks at metrics 
that draw a connection between governance and economic growth in 
the transition economies that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991. She discusses issues relating to the process of transition 
and to the measures of governance. Linz compares central and eastern 
European transition economies from the perspectives of both experts 
and business firms. She views governance as the traditions and institu-
tions by which authority is exercised at the local, regional, national, and 
international levels. As such, she says, governance possesses political, 
economic, and social dimensions. 
According to Linz, a state with good governance is participatory, 
consensus-oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, politically 
stable, effective, efficient, inclusive, and equitable. It also follows the 
rule of law, controls corruption, enforces regulatory quality, and offers 
its citizens not only a choice but a voice. Linz identifies several mea-
sures of governance beyond the six indicators of the World Bank, such 
as Freedom House’s country ratings of political rights and civil lib-
erties, the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) produced by Transpar-
ency International, and the indicators of the Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS). 
Linz considers these measures in comparing several factors that 
have affected variation across former Soviet Union (FSU) and central 
and eastern European (CEE) transition economies following the col-
lapse of the former Soviet state in 1991. 







These variations include culture, kinship, path dependency, finan-
cial and legal institutions, regulatory differences, and the role of for-
eign direct investment (FDI) on governance in each transition state. The 
FSU countries studied comprised Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Esto-
nia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, 
Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan (15 states). 
Among the CEE nations discussed were Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia (14 
states), for a total of 29 states. For those states, governance indicators 
such as CPI and the Freedom House Index (FHI) were used to assess 
political stability, accountability, and rule of law. From a business fi rm’s 
perspective, she describes the influence of both macro- and microlevel 
policies on corruption, state capture and intervention, bribery, and kick-
backs. She further discusses the effects of what are called “time taxes,” 
a term that refers to time costs spent on bureaucracy—for instance, the 
amount of time that management personnel spend dealing with regula-
tions, or, say, the average number of days it takes to complete business 
services such as import licenses, electrical and water connections, oper-
ating licenses, or construction permits. 
Linz’s general conclusions are that these transition states, with some 
variation, are plagued by persistent bad governance and corruption at 
levels from business firms to local and national governments. These 
indicators of bad governance were higher for FSU countries than for 
CEE countries. However, the perception of how many firms are tainted 
by corruption is higher in CEE than in FSU countries, even though 
transaction costs or time taxes are lower in CEE countries compared to 
FSU countries. 
Chapter 5, “Governance Challenges in Education and Health Care
in Developing Countries,” comes from Seema Jayachandran, associ-
ate professor of economics and director of the Center for the Study of 
Development Economics at Northwestern University. Jayachandran’s 
focus concerns the impact of governance on human capital in develop-
ing countries, with an emphasis on education and health issues. She 
argues that good governance is more critical in developing states than in 
mature democracies like the United States. For example, in Uganda, it is 
estimated that ruling politicians steal 20 percent of the money intended 
for education and health, which has a corresponding detrimental effect 
Asefa & Huang.indb 8    5/21/2015 10:07:40 AM     
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on the population. Teachers are compelled because of their low salaries 
to extract bribes and other services in kind from students and parents. In 
Bangalore, India, it is estimated that approximately 51 percent of com-
munity members have paid bribes, with some bribes for health services 
amounting to as much as 89 percent of the nominal service costs for 
hospitals and doctors. In addition, staff absenteeism in clinics and other 
health facilities runs as high as 56 percent. Worse, she notes, about 82 
percent of health care workers do not have the appropriate documented 
training in the areas in which they serve. 
The education sector makes up another area that does not offer 
much hope for success in developing nations with poor governance. 
In these nations, low-quality schools and universities abound. In some 
cases, teachers may be present for teaching duties only about 45 percent 
of the time. Eighteen percent of teachers are absent from class simply 
because of a lack of monitoring and supervision. Perversely, the low 
wages they are paid can provide teachers with an incentive to take on 
tutoring jobs while neglecting their regular teaching duties. A combina-
tion of lack of effective management and low teacher salaries prevents 
students in these areas from receiving the education the state claims to 
provide. In short, the educational problems of poorly governed coun-
tries cannot be alleviated without addressing the limited resources of 
local communities, insuffi cient school infrastructure, and the large, ill-
equipped classes that result. 
Jayachandran concludes by offering general recommendations for 
how to improve both health care and education. She proposes the fol-
lowing three remedies: 1) link pay and bonuses to real performance; 
2) use digital technology such as cameras to monitor teaching and to 
supervise staff, including using cell phones and radio to improve moni-
toring and supervision; 3) empower local citizens, especially women, 
who are culturally more connected to children. Countries like Uganda 
and Kenya can use positive incentives such as hiring teachers through 
contracts that provide rewards and bonuses for positively monitored 
performance. 
Chapter 6 is titled “Governance Problems and Priorities for Local 
Climate Adaptation and Poverty Alleviation”; its author, Stephen C. 
Smith, is a professor of economics and international affairs and directs 
the Research Program in Poverty, Development, and Globalization 
Asefa & Huang.indb 9    5/21/2015 10:07:40 AM     
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at George Washington University. Smith’s concern is the interaction 
between poverty, the environment, and climate change. 
Smith maintains that while there have been encouraging signs of 
reduction in poverty globally, much work remains to be done. Although 
improvements have been made, poverty traps persist, making it impos-
sible to eliminate absolute and chronic poverty. He argues that climate 
change has the potential to exacerbate some causes of poverty cycles 
and that the negative consequences of climate change are carried dis-
proportionately by the poorest two billion people on the global income 
ladder. As natural resources such as land, forests, and access to water 
become more scarce, the poor use more resources in an effort to survive. 
In doing so they often increase degradation of the land, resources, and 
soil, and they contribute to deforestation and water depletion. However, 
it is possible to instill planned and autonomous adaptation in local com-
munities to alleviate natural resource depletion. Smith asserts that good 
governance can assist communities in climate adaptation and minimize 
the risk of environmental decline as climate change continues to alter 
weather cycles. Climate change is driven by both human and natural 
factors, and the human factors stem in large part from policies of unsus-
tainable development rooted in a lack of good governance. Moreover, 
high-quality governance may prevent some climate-driven confl ict that 
arises in impoverished areas. 
On a positive note, Smith does point to some recent progress being 
made on poverty reduction. For example, since 1980, the fraction of the 
population earning below $1 a day (adjusted to $1.25 a day for inflation) 
has fallen from about 40 percent to just above 20 percent worldwide, 
and the World Bank reports that the goal of halving overall poverty by 
2015 is being met in some countries of Asia. Even in Africa, 6 of the 10 
fastest-growing economies have experienced impressive improvement 
in most health and education indicators, even though quality remains a 
concern. 
In addition, there has been progress in the spread of democracy and 
transparency globally, even though all of the eight Millennium Devel-
opment Goals (MDGs) outlined by the United Nations may not have 
been achieved. Unfortunately, climate change may jeopardize some of 
this progress. Challenges remain, as there is a growing concentration 
of poverty in fragile and failing states. These fragile economies tend 
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to occur in environments where threats to the natural resource–based 
livelihoods of the poor are most dire. 
Smith quotes the former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, who 
characterized extreme poverty as “a poverty that kills.” While there has 
been much progress, Annan says, the scale of preventable loss of human 
life driven by human actions remains horrifying in some countries such 
as Afghanistan, Chad, the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, and 
Sierra Leone, where about one-fifth of all children die before age five 
from preventable causes. 
Indeed, despite improvement in some measures of poverty, health 
outcomes in impoverished nations continue to lag. At present, life 
expectancy in sub-Saharan Africa is only 53 years. In South Asia, nearly 
1 child in 12 dies before age five. In low-income countries, the under-
five mortality rate is 118 per 1,000. In middle-income states, the rate is 
51 per 1,000, while in high-income countries, the under-five mortality 
rate is only 7 per 1,000 (Todaro and Smith 2014). Every day, nearly 
21,000 children in developing countries die from preventable causes— 
over seven million in 2013 alone. There are many other severe health 
deprivations. Women with nutritional deficiencies are more likely to 
deliver smaller babies at risk of poor growth and development. Mal-
nutrition alone affects nearly two billion people. Many children face 
lifelong disabilities. In many poor countries, parasites are pervasive and 
a woman dies during childbirth nearly every minute. It has been esti-
mated that nearly 3,000 children in Africa die from malaria each day. 
Smith poses the question of why it is so difficult for the poorest of the 
poor to make further progress. 
He determines that poverty traps, exacerbated by poor governance, 
make it difficult to break the cycle of poverty and hunger. Poverty traps 
include malnutrition, poor health, inadequate housing, high fertility, 
illiteracy, low skills, and low capital. Smith proposes further research 
on multidimensional areas of good governance for reducing poverty and 
promoting environmental progress. 
Chapter 7, the final chapter, titled “The Challenges of Good Gov-
ernance and Leadership in Developing Countries: Cases from Africa 
and China,” comes from my coeditor, Wei-Chiao Huang, and me, Sisay 
Asefa; both of us are professors of economics at Western Michigan Uni-
versity. We explore the following five topics: 1) understanding and mea-
suring good governance for sustainable development; 2) governance, 








development, and multidimensional poverty index (MPI) relationships; 
3) the role of governance in sustainable development and poverty reduc-
tion; 4) methods of addressing poverty traps; and 5) poor governance 
as the driver of conflict, poverty, and corruption traps. We also discuss 
how regional and global engagement can assist states in achieving goals 
through monetary policy, global investment, and foreign aid. By consid-
ering such policies, political and economic institutions can be encour-
aged to use good governance practices to fight the effects of endemic 
poverty. 
We define sustainable development as a multidimensional process 
of socioeconomic and political transformation aimed at enhancing 
human progress in all its dimensions, including the freedom of political 
and economic choice. We propose that a program on good governance, 
peace, political education, and conflict transformation should be insti-
tuted across schools, colleges, and universities to teach citizenship, civil 
society, and responsible ethical conduct. Without good governance and 
its guiding principles, the well-being of a country’s citizens is at risk. 
In the book, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and 
Poverty, written by Massachusetts Institute of Technology economics 
professors Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, the authors illus-
trate how exclusive political and economic institutions drive inequality 
and conflict, leading to the failure of nations. For instance, although the 
two Koreas contain populations, cultures, and environments that are 
homogenous in many attributes, the people of North Korea experience 
a very different governance outcome from those in South Korea. 
The people of North Korea are among the poorest on earth, near 
starvation, while South Korea is among the richest and most dynamic 
states in Asia. On the one hand, South Korea forged a society that cre-
ated positive incentives, rewarded effort and innovation, and allowed 
freedom for its citizens to participate in economic opportunities. At the 
same time, North Korea endured decades of famine under repressive 
rulers from one family assisted by institutional repression, with no end 
in sight (Acemoglu and Robinson 2011). Along with other such exam-
ples from history, the MIT authors’ research yields explanations for col-
lapses of the Roman Empire, Ottoman Empire, Soviet Union, and other 
historic empires. The book also offers insights as to why an African 
state like Botswana can succeed while its neighbor Zimbabwe is failing. 
For example, in the 1980s, a decade in which most African economies 
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were failing, Botswana scored economic growth that surpassed Asian 
tiger economies such as Hong Kong and Taiwan, while other African 
states experienced negative growth. 
Moving forward, policymakers can learn from historic and present-
day examples both of nations with good governance and of those with 
failed and failing states. With better institutional planning, as well as 
more effective domestic and foreign relations, the implementation of 
good governance can be encouraged worldwide. 
For instance, the book imparts suggestions for the United States and 
China on how to build sustainable, inclusive, more equitable and egali-
tarian political and economic institutions. This objective would also 
have strong policy implications for Ethiopia and other African states 
(Asefa 2013). 
In this regard, Huang and I consider the case of China and reconcile 
a puzzling contradiction between China’s impressive governance out-
comes and its one-party authoritarian system, a mode of government 
that seems to violate the commonly perceived recipe for good gover-
nance, especially in the areas of voice, accountability, and the rule of 
law. But a closer examination of China’s governance model reveals that 
China actually practices economic, political, and legal accountability 
(and, to that extent, rule of law). 
In addition, China’s neodemocratic centralism and collective 
decision-making process may have some advantage in enhancing effi-
ciency and good governance—as a case in point, there is the Third Ple-
num’s decision in 2013 to deepen reforms. However, it is important to 
consider that China has a long history of civilization and a relatively 
less diverse population ethnically and linguistically compared to Afri-
can states, which comprise over a thousand languages and ethnic groups 
scattered among 54 states. Most of these states were formed by Euro-
pean colonial powers, primarily Britain and France. The exceptions are 
Ethiopia and Egypt, both of which, like China, have a long history of 
civilization (Asefa 2013). 
Economic development does not have a secret formula, Huang 
and I posit: success in economic development requires only good and 
accountable governance of a country’s citizens. Examples where good 
governance leads to better outcomes for citizens include countries 
in Europe, North America, East Asia, and a few in Africa. Neverthe-
less, many countries in Africa have failed to fully utilize their natural-






resource and human potential. Most African states that suffer from pov-
erty have made intended or unintended governance choices to continue 
long-ruling repressive regimes and to prevent honest dialogue and free-
dom of expression, including peaceful constitutional transition of power. 
They refuse to learn from positive lessons illustrated both from their 
own past and from comparative experiences of well-governed countries 
around the world. We conclude by expressing the hope that African 
political leaders and governments will make a different, positive choice 
toward building inclusive economic, political, and social institutions in 
the twenty-first century. This inclusive, democratic approach to good 
governance can take Africa and other regions, such as the Middle East 
and South Asia, out of poverty and conflict. Democratic good gover-
nance would positively affect all sectors of the economy and lead to 
progress for the twenty-fi rst century. 
CONCLUSION 
In this volume, The Political Economy of Good Governance, the six 
chapters that follow this introduction capture several of the key dimen-
sions of good governance, as well as what deleterious and negative 
consequences may arise in its absence. The authors draw analysis and 
solutions from diverse sectors such as economics, public administra-
tion, management, and political science, in order to treat some of the 
most pressing societal issues of our time. They connect the importance 
of education, health, climate change, and poverty to address the chal-
lenges of creating a world where more countries embrace good gov-
ernance policies to benefit their peoples. We invite readers to further 
explore the authors’ ideas in the following chapters. 
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The Role of Performance 
Management in Good Governance 
Carolyn J. Heinrich 
University of Texas at Austin 
What the people want is less government and more governance. 
—Harlan Cleveland.1 
In the social sciences literature, the word “governance” has become 
ubiquitous. Avinash Dixit (2002) describes an explosion of the term 
“governance” in the economics literature based on his search of the 
EconLit database, which showed just five occurrences of the word in 
the 1970s, 112 references in the 1980s, 3,825 in the 1990s, and, in the 
five years from 2000–2005, 7,948 instances. 
In broad terms, Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2001, p. 7) have described 
governance as “regimes of laws, rules, judicial decisions and adminis-
trative practices that constrain, prescribe and enable the provision of 
publicly supported goods and services.” Ultimately, governance deter-
mines government performance. Correspondingly, the goal or role of 
performance management is to determine how public sector regimes, 
agencies, programs, and activities can be authorized, organized, and 
managed to perform at the highest levels in achieving public purposes 
and desired outcomes. Or, in the “reinventing government” conceptual-
ization of it, performance management is one tool or means for bring-
ing about more productive and efficient allocations of public sector 
resources (i.e., more efficient, results-oriented, and responsive gover-
nance). 
In The Dynamics of Performance Management, Donald Moynihan 
(2008, pp. 4–5) describes the beginning of the twenty-first century as 
an “era of governance by performance management.” He asks, “How 
important are performance management reforms to the actual manage-
ment of government?” and answers his own question: “It is only a slight 
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exaggeration to say that we are betting the future of governance on the 
use of performance information.” 
In fact, performance management may be one of the longest-
enduring reform movements in public administration, with origins that 
go back to the nineteenth-century writings of Woodrow Wilson (1887). 
Wilson proposed a “scientific” and more “business-like” approach to 
public administration, which was later picked up and expanded in the 
scientific management movement of the early 1900s. Scientific man-
agement promoted the careful analysis of workers’ tasks and work 
arrangements, with the objective of maximizing efficiency by planning 
work procedures according to a technical logic, setting standards, and 
exercising controls to ensure conformity with standards (Taylor 1911). 
Paul Light’s (1997) classic work The Tides of Reform: Making Gov-
ernment Work, 1945–1995 compared the philosophies, movements, and 
other management strategies that come and go to tides which ebb and 
flow, overlapping as one comes in and another goes out—a conceptu-
alization that aptly describes performance management since the late 
1800s. Performance management has been coming in and going out 
of fashion, or ebbing and flowing, for more than a century, although 
some suggest it returned in tidal-wave proportions in the late twentieth 
century. Indeed, a mantra of the early 1990s, “reinventing government,” 
proposed reforming government so that it would operate more like a 
business—focused on efficiency and getting results. 
This intensified focus on “getting results” motivates a central ques-
tion of this chapter: how can performance management contribute to 
good governance and improved government performance (as defined 
by public preferences for the means and ends of governance)? This 
chapter will address four key issues concerning the role of performance 
management in good governance: 
1) Our history with performance management—the effort to 
improve the efficiency and effective functioning of govern-
ment—is long, and its origins in economics and business are 
reflected in the design of our performance management sys-
tems today. 
2) Even in fairly simple and amenable contexts, designing an 
appropriate performance management system is challeng-
ing; the complexities of the public sector and our multi-
layered, representative government system greatly compound 
the challenges. 
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3) What is the result of applying a promising governance tool in 
a rather blunt form that skirts the complexities of the public 
sector? 
4) If we are, in fact, betting the future of governance on perfor-
mance management, what are the lessons that we have learned 
to date that can be used to improve its effectiveness? 
THE ORIGINS OF PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
To understand how performance management is viewed and con-
ducted today, it is helpful to look back at the origins of performance 
management. It is largely recognized, in the works of political scientists 
as well as economists, that the roots of performance management lie in 
agency theory, as first developed in economics and business manage-
ment (Wood 2010). The typical early performance-measurement system 
debuted in a factory production setting and was based largely on scien-
tific management principles—i.e., its work processes were guided by 
technical analysis, and it established production controls and standards 
to maximize efficiency. In the agency-theory framework, the owner 
hires managers and workers to generate profits (with the owner or man-
ager acting as principal, and the workers as agents). A key objective of 
the principal is to then design a contract that aligns principal and agent 
incentives and achieves the production objectives of the principal. This 
is made challenging, however, by the fact that these relationships are 
frequently typified by conflicts in goals and values, as well as privately 
held information or information asymmetries. 
It is here that a role for performance management enters in—both 
in monitoring worker actions, outputs, and outcomes and in develop-
ing an incentive scheme with rewards or sanctions that align principal 
and agent interests—in essence, a contractual relationship with perfor-
mance expectations and credible provisions for enforcing them. How-
ever, even in a simple production system that assumes 
• organizational goals and production tasks that are known to 
both sides, 
• a linear relationship between efforts and outputs, 








• verifiable employee efforts, 
• the dominance of self-interest, and 
• a relatively small number of variables for managers to control, 
an enforceable contract is difficult to achieve. In fact, in economics and 
business management, it has long been acknowledged that the richer 
(more complex) “real world” circumstances hardly ever correspond to 
the strict conditions of a simple linear incentive scheme (Holmstrom 
and Milgrom 1987). 
There are two main challenges presented by agency theory that 
complicate efforts to establish viable performance-based contracts 
(Holmstrom 1982). One is the well-known problem of adverse selec-
tion, where employees’ true motivations or capabilities for produc-
ing a desired outcome are unknown to employers (i.e., there is hidden 
information). The second is moral hazard and unobservability, in which 
employees’ efforts or actions are not observable or readily measured; 
this creates conditions that can lead to shirking or distorted results. 
Recent headlines reporting cheating scandals in K–12 schools—which 
are under pressure to meet performance targets on standardized tests set 
by the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act—have illuminated a textbook 
case of how these problems can undermine performance management 
efforts (Rich 2013). 
Yet many contracts and performance management systems still 
incorporate basic linear (or “straight-line”) incentive schemes, largely 
because of their perceived simplicity and the significant costs associ-
ated with establishing a more intricate contract or system of incen-
tives for inducing work and responsible management. A straight-line 
approach typically defines a required (linear) rate of performance 
improvement from an initial score or target level, and it may also spec-
ify an ending value corresponding to a maximum performance level, 
such as NCLB’s goal of 100 percent proficiency in mathematics for 
public school students by 2014 (see Figure 2.1). No Child Left Behind 
is also an example, however, of an important shortcoming of straight-
line models for establishing performance expectations: they are seldom 
constructed using empirical data or other evidence that would generate 
realistic expectations for performance (Koretz and Hamilton 2006). In 
fact, the U.S. Department of Education has made it clear that it is aware 
that the performance management system under NCLB is not working. 
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Figure 2.1  Annual Expectations Set by the No Child Left Behind Act for
Increased Performance among Students in Grades K–8 Tested 
in Math, 2002–2014 (% that must be met of students testing 
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NOTE: Figure shows the expected percentage of students each year that should achieve 
a rating of “proficient” in testing for math under the legislation. The bar for 2002, the 
first year the law was in effect, shows the actual percentage of students who tested as 
proficient in math that year, and no improvement was required for the first year fol-
lowing that. But thereafter, increasing percentages of proficiency were set for each 
year, culminating in 2014, when 100 percent of kindergarteners through eighth grad-
ers were expected to be proficient in math. (The exception was 2006, when the expec-
tations were not raised from 2005.) 
SOURCE: Author’s compilation. 
As Secretary of Education Arne Duncan testified before the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions some two years 
ago, “The closer we have gotten to 2014, the more NCLB has changed 
from an instrument of reform into a barrier to reform. And, the kids who 
have lost the most from that change are . . . students with disabilities, 
low-income and minority students, and English learners” (U.S. Depart-
ment of Education 2013, p. 1). 






ADDED COMPLEXITIES OF PERFORMANCE 
MANAGEMENT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
As a matter of fact, from the start, the application of agency theory 
to the design of performance management systems in the public sec-
tor has been considerably more complex than many anticipated. First, 
just who is the principal in a given governance setting? Governance 
in the public sector is multilayered (or hierarchical) and dynamic. In 
the “logic of governance” model that Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2001) 
describe, actors can be identified as the principal in one relationship and 
the agent in another (as shown by the repetition of the lettered catego-
ries in the progression below). Or, one might characterize a relationship 
as having multiple principals, depending on the level of focus. Lynn, 
Heinrich, and Hill’s model specifies a hierarchy of governance relation-
ships between 
(a) citizen preferences and interests expressed politically and (b) 
legislative choice, 
(b) legislator preferences in enacted legislation and (c) formally 
authorized structures and processes in public agencies, 
(c) structure of formal authority and (d) de facto organization and 
management of agencies and programs and their activities, 
(d) organization and administration or management of agencies 
and (e) primary work of public agencies, 
(e) primary work of public agencies generates output or results that 
are subject to (f) stakeholder/citizen assessments of public sec-
tor performance, and 
(f) stakeholder/citizen assessments expressed politically and (g) 
public and legislative interests and preferences. 
In addition, consensus or clarity on goals is often lacking among 
citizens, and sometimes in originating legislation as well. Consider, 
for, example, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
of 2010. There are nine titles or goals of the ACA, but discord at both 
the federal and state levels since its passage reflects a lack of consensus 
about how we will implement the law and simultaneously achieve a 
number of its core goals, including 
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• affordable health care for all Americans, 
• increased quality and efficiency of health care, and 
• improved access to innovative medical therapies. 
Furthermore, the implementation of the ACA is not only requiring 
cooperation across multiple levels of governance, but also the creation 
of new governing structures (e.g., health care insurance exchanges and 
other new forms of public-private partnerships for health care adminis-
tration) that may add new layers of governance relationships. 
The public sector is also distinctive in that its primary work or pro-
duction technologies typically involve complex, nonmanual work, char-
acterized by multitasking and multilevel interactions and public-private 
sector partnerships and coordination, such as in the delivery of publicly 
funded health care, education, and social services. Nonstandardized 
outputs make the accurate measurement of performance and the con-
struction of performance benchmarks both more challenging and more 
costly. In addition, in designing performance management systems and 
incentives in new contexts, we often begin with an imperfect under-
standing of agents’ means for influencing performance and their likely 
responses to incentives. The potential for unintended consequences 
as performance management and the use of performance-based con-
tracts expand into unchartered public-sector territory is high (Koning 
and Heinrich 2013). 
For example, market-based incentives were developed and 
employed in child welfare agencies in Wayne County, Michigan (the 
Detroit metropolitan area), with the objective of improving reunifica-
tion rates and other permanency outcomes for children in the child wel-
fare system. The performance incentive system was designed to provide 
a lower per-diem rate, with an initial lump sum payment to agencies 
for the provision of services and financial bonuses for the movement 
of foster children into permanent placements (and for sustaining them). 
McBeath and Meezan (2010) explain that it was expected that the per-
formance bonuses would provide incentives to improve performance 
and would generate costs savings along a number of dimensions, 
including 
• the rates at which reunification and adoption were secured, 
• the time needed to achieve permanency in placements, 









• rates of recidivism upon exit from agency care, and 
• the number of youth in foster care. 
In turn, the mechanisms by which managers might influence these child 
welfare outcomes included the services provided to children and fami-
lies in foster care and in moving children into permanent placements 
(e.g., case management, supervised parent-child visits, and special-
ized services in the community), as well as the structural and technical 
aspects of service provision, such as agency staffing and caseloads per 
worker, worker training, service coordination, and supervision. 
In their empirical analysis, McBeath and Meezan (2010) fi nd that 
children served by Wayne County agencies under performance-based 
contracts were less likely to be reunified and were more likely to 
enter kinship foster homes, and that these children and their families 
received fewer in-agency therapeutic and nontherapeutic services and 
community services. In other words, the performance-based contracting 
system generated mostly unintended consequences. Although several 
explanations are plausible, it appears that incentives to reduce service 
costs and speed up the identification of potential permanency options 
for children dominated agency and worker responses, which led to 
reductions in important within-agency services. These reductions may 
have subsequently decreased performance on the desired outcomes. 
Finally, the public sector is also distinct from the private sector in 
the extent to which political influences may be brought to bear at many 
different levels. Goals and priorities can change swiftly, and entire 
agencies or authority structures can be reorganized, as well as the foci 
of primary work.2 This ensures that any performance management or 
incentive systems in public agencies will be dynamic. In addition, prin-
cipals may also choose to change or replace performance measures over 
time, as agents (employees) learn how to (strategically) manipulate 
performance measures to increase measured performance in ways that 
do not necessarily improve outcomes (Heinrich and Marschke 2010). 
Widespread reports of teaching to the test, manipulating who takes 
standardized tests, and other means for inflating test scores in K–12 
public education are just one example of gaming the system in public-
sector performance management, and one that is motivating debate 
among education policymakers and spurring ongoing efforts to improve 
education performance measures and accountability systems. 
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APPLYING PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 
BLUNTLY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 
Having considered the role of performance management in good 
governance from a more theoretical or abstract perspective, it is useful 
to work through some of the challenges in greater depth with a concrete 
policy application for an important, publicly provided service: K–12 
public education. In 1983, an infl uential report, A Nation at Risk: The 
Imperative for Educational Reform, first warned that U.S. educational 
institutions were losing sight of their basic goals and high expecta-
tions and putting the economic well-being and security of the nation in 
jeopardy. The report set off alarm bells by pointing out that, when sev-
eral educational measures were tallied among peer nations, the United 
States came in seventh. 
Today, we are spending close to $600 billion annually on our public 
elementary and secondary school system, and the public is demanding 
greater accountability and results. Yet 20 countries now have higher 
graduation rates than the United States. Almost three decades of educa-
tional reform efforts appear to have left the country even further behind, 
and dropout rates have remained stubbornly high. Furthermore, public 
and private stakeholders in education are increasingly at odds over what 
types of interventions and incentives are needed to turn these trends 
around. 
Indeed, public education today is characterized by elaborate but 
chaotic governing structures, widely varying views on appropriate 
means and ends for improving education and how trade-offs among 
goals should be managed, an increasingly complex technology with 
nonstandardized outputs (which we subject to standardized measures of 
outcomes), and political influences that interject their agendas at many 
levels. As Finn and Petrilli (2013) describe it, there are 
too many cooks in the education kitchen and nobody really in 
charge. We bow to the mantra of “local control” yet, in fact, nearly 
every major decision affecting the education of our children is 
shaped (and misshaped) by at least four separate levels of gover-
nance: Washington, the state capitol, the local district, and the indi-
vidual school building itself. And that’s without even considering 
intermediate units (such as the regional education-service centers 





seen in Texas, New York, Ohio, and elsewhere), the courts (which 
exert enormous influence on our schools), or parents and guard-
ians, and the degree to which all of their decisions influence the 
nature and quality of a child’s schooling. (p. 21) 
Drawing education governance into the “logic of governance” 
model outlined earlier, the complexities of multiple layers of education 
governance and the various actors (both principals and agents) at each 
level are apparent, as shown below: 
(a) citizen preferences and interests expressed politically and (b) 
legislative choice (Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
[ESEA] and pending reauthorization of the 2002 ESEA that 
created No Child Left Behind); 
(b) legislator preferences in enacted legislation and (c) formally 
authorized structures and processes in public agencies (the U.S. 
Department of Education and state and local educational agen-
cies—SEAs and LEAs—with governing authority); 
(c) structure of formal authority and (d) de facto organization 
and management of agencies and programs and their activi-
ties (a complex division of responsibilities between SEAs and 
LEAs, with the added challenge of constrained authority under 
NCLB); 
(d) organization and administration or management of agencies and 
(e) the primary work of public agencies (the primary work of 
education is changing—it is no longer just about giving class-
room lessons; services provided in schools and needs for them 
range widely and are compounded by unfunded mandates); 
(e) the primary work of public agencies generates output or results 
that are subject to (f) stakeholder/citizen assessments of public 
sector performance (standardized achievement test scores are 
limited measures, especially when used to determine whether 
students have met proficiency standards under NCLB); and 
(f) stakeholder/citizen assessments expressed politically and (g) 
public and legislative interests and preferences (pending re-
authorization of the ESEA and waivers granted to a majority of 
states under NCLB). 
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Our current governing structures in K–12 education consist of 
deeply layered and overlapping levels of decision making, which open 
more potential avenues for influence by different groups at varying lev-
els and with differing ideas and interests. At the same time, the lack of 
coherent management or clear lines of accountability is an ongoing, 
central problem in public education. As Hill (2013, p. 332) describes it, 
“Though every rule was made for a reason, no one carefully considered 
whether individual rules conflict with one another.”  Could the use of 
performance management potentially bring some clarity and coherence 
to K–12 education governance? 
Despite the many complexities in this sector, we have, in fact, pro-
ceeded full speed ahead with regimes for performance management 
and accountability in education that include strong incentives and high-
stakes consequences for many stakeholders. NCLB marked the begin-
ning of an assertive federal role in directing state and local practices 
to meet student performance standards. Unlike the ESEA’s first-phase 
focus on distributing resources to the targeted populations, the sec-
ond phase sharpened the federal focus on student performance—what 
Wong (2013) has described as the emergence of “performance-based 
federalism.” The federal government holds states, districts, and schools 
accountable for a comprehensive set of standards, including annual aca-
demic progress, teacher quality, and achievement gaps, and for devel-
oping assessments of student performance relative to those standards. 
Still, NCLB defines educational success primarily based on stan-
dardized testing snapshots of students’ performance, rather than on 
individual students’ growth, and current funding and accountability sys-
tems presume “same-age cohorts of students proceeding in lockstep,” 
says Wilson (2013, p. 96). As is consistent with the origins of perfor-
mance management discussed above, Linda Darling-Hammond (2002, 
p. 6) of Stanford University describes how our test-based accountability 
system reflects a “factory-model approach” to education (as developed 
by early twentieth-century scientific managers such as Frederick Taylor 
and Franklin Bobbit), in which schools are organized “to process large 
batches of students in assembly-line fashion rather than to ensure that 
students are well-known by their teachers and treated as serious learn-
ers.” She notes that urban high schools 
typically hold at least 2,000 to 3,000 students, who may see six 
or eight teachers each year for 45 minutes apiece. In cities such 






as Los Angeles, teachers daily see 180 to 200 students, who cycle 
through the classroom to be stamped with a lesson as if they were 
on a conveyer belt. Teachers are asked to individualize curriculum 
for the needs of every learner when they have no way of coming 
to know their students well. Furthermore, the group of learners 
is much more diverse than at any other time in our history. Thus, 
the conditions for achieving high standards are lacking in many 
schools in the United States. (Darling-Hammond 2002, p. 6) 
Recently, recognition of the limitations of proficiency measures 
under NCLB has propelled alternative approaches to measuring educa-
tional performance, particularly value-added measures. A basic value-
added model compares the individual growth of a group of students 
(e.g., in a given classroom or school) to average growth of the popu-
lation of interest (e.g., growth among all students in the state). Some 
value-added models are also constructed to account for factors out-
side the control of teachers or schools in estimating growth in student 
achievement over time. Although these are (arguably) better measures 
of performance than proficiency levels, should society be ratcheting up 
the stakes that it attaches to them, as we have recently seen in some 
large, urban school districts? 
One of the most controversial recent developments in performance 
management in education has been the high-profi le, public dissemina-
tion of value-added measures of teacher performance in large school 
districts, including those in Los Angeles and New York. Calculated by 
third parties (outside the district), the value-added measures associ-
ated with specific teachers were published in the Los Angeles Times
(latimes.com 2011a) and by the New York City Department of Educa-
tion (Santos 2012). The objective was to get the performance informa-
tion directly to the citizen (parent) stakeholders, who could use this 
information and their political power to drive public-sector perfor-
mance improvements. 
However, in New York City, the margin of error in value-added 
measures was so wide that the average confidence interval around each 
rating spanned 35 percentiles in math and 53 percentiles in English, 
the city said. Some teachers were judged on as few as 10 students. In 
publishing the Los Angeles numbers, the L.A. Times acknowledged that 
value-added measures “do not capture everything about a teacher or 
school’s performance.”  The L.A. Times also published comments from 
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teachers in response to the publication of their ratings. The following is 
an example of a typical teacher comment (or protest) of the value-added 
ratings: 
Please note that these ratings are based on inaccurate data. Dur-
ing my time at Westwood Charter Elementary, I have only taught 
Kindergarten (where students at that grade level do NOT take the 
California Standards Test). I have also never taught 3rd Grade in 
my teaching career. (latimes.com 2011b) 
A study by Mathematica Policy Research (Schochet and Chiang 
2010) found that the error rate for value-added scores (based on three 
years of data) was 25 percent. Therefore, a three-year model would rate 
one out of every four teachers incorrectly, and when only one year of 
data was analyzed, the error rate jumped to 35 percent. 
It is widely known that tests are limited measures of student knowl-
edge and learning, and that there is inevitably human and statistical 
error that enters into their administration. In addition, there are well-
documented negative, unintended consequences to high-stakes test-
ing—overly narrow and excessive test preparation, gaming the sys-
tem, reduced effort and withdrawal on the part of students, and lower 
graduation rates—particularly for low-performing subgroups (National 
Research Council 2011). 
Thus, a major concern with the direction we are currently taking 
with performance management in public education is that we appear to 
be treating test-based accountability like a magic bullet. Education per-
formance assessments (via student testing) are just one tool for improv-
ing governance and accountability to the public for outcomes, and such 
testing will be a tool of limited use if we do not address the variety of 
governance challenges that plague our K–12 education system. 
LESSONS FOR IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN CONTRIBUTING 
TO GOOD GOVERNANCE 
Primarily, this chapter highlights one policy area (education) where 
we have encountered challenges in designing performance manage-





ment systems to improve governance and performance. The lessons 
that follow—regarding what we have learned about the role of perfor-
mance management in contributing to good governance and improv-
ing government outcomes—could be applied to workforce investment, 
welfare-to-work programs, health care, child welfare systems, environ-
mental protection, and other areas where we have ventured forth (and, 
at times, retraced our steps) in performance management. What are 
some of these common lessons? 
First, the effective use of performance management demands not 
only clarity of goals but also their translation into empirical measures 
that accurately and adequately characterize our ends (or intended out-
comes). Where we fail on either of these requisite components, the per-
formance management system may risk doing more harm than good. In 
many cases, the data available simply are not up to the task. We have 
also learned that short-term, readily available performance measures 
often do not correlate with longer-term impacts (Heckman, Heinrich, 
and Smith 2002). 
In light of these limitations, and recognizing that performance 
management in the public sector often grapples with multiple goals 
and complex production, we may be better off with multidimensional 
(or multiple) measures of performance to guide core agency work. A
number of school districts and states are now developing these types of 
multipurpose, multiple-indicator performance management systems for 
K–12 education, including the New York City Department of Education, 
which is using multiple indicators to measure student progress, student 
performance, and the school environment (New York City Department 
of Education 2014). A potential trade-off, of course, is that a more intri-
cate or complicated system and set of incentives would likely place a 
greater demand on public capacities for managing such a system. 
A second lesson is that we often begin with imperfect measures 
of performance and then learn about how employees or stakeholders 
respond to them in implementation, including their weaknesses and 
how they might be gamed. We may less often get a performance mea-
sure or incentive system “right” on the first try (as occurred in the case 
of child welfare agencies in Michigan), but that does not imply that 
further efforts should be abandoned.  For the many reasons highlighted 
in this chapter, public sector performance management systems will 
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necessarily be dynamic, and we should expect to replace performance 
measures or revise system incentives and other features over time. 
In addition, caution should also be exercised in attaching high stakes 
(or serious consequences) to performance results, given the known 
challenges and imperfections of our performance measures (such as the 
teacher value-added measures that have recently been publicly dissemi-
nated). The awarding of performance bonuses, “naming and shaming” 
(as in the publication of teacher value-added ratings), termination of 
contracts, or retractions of program funding would best be backed or 
verified by multiple sources of quantitative and qualitative evidence 
before going forward. A counterargument frequently offered against 
eliminating high stakes altogether is that the performance management 
and incentive systems would lose their “teeth” and purpose. Evidence 
to date, however, suggests that individuals and organizations are highly 
responsive to performance standards, even when the rewards are mini-
mal, such as peer recognition (Bevan and Hood 2006; Heinrich 2007). 
Another important lesson that we are increasingly coming to under-
stand is that performance management systems are likely to be more 
effective tools of governance if we focus more on their use for diagnos-
tic purposes. That is, resources and rewards should follow their effective 
use in improving government and program outcomes, rather than for 
hitting performance targets. In the public education example, schools or 
teachers would be rewarded for using information on students’ perfor-
mance to help increase their learning, ideally measured in terms of their 
individual growth (i.e., not just based on test score levels or gains). 
This would likely be a more appropriate outcome to report publicly (for 
the sake of transparency), and, if measured sufficiently well, it would 
also be rewarding the right types of efforts to increase performance 
(i.e., not success in increasing test-taking skills but rather effective use 
of performance information to help students succeed academically). 
One well-known example of effective use of performance manage-
ment information to diagnose and address performance problems is the 
CompStat/CitiStat model, which has been widely used in policing, and 
in other public service sectors as well. Four basic principles underlie 
the model: 
1) accurate, timely intelligence 
2) rapid deployment 









3) effective tactics 
4) relentless follow-up and assessment 
CompStat starts with collecting data, analyzing them, and present-
ing them in visual form, but the key to the apparent success of this sys-
tem is how those data or statistics are subsequently used. When the data 
are presented in graphic form to organizational leaders and employees, 
questions are raised and solutions are discussed. But it is not a one-
time exercise—employees in the agencies or departments continually 
return to the same indicators and reevaluate performance. They also 
reflect on the decisions that they make based on the data, with the goal 
of improving performance over time. To date, this CompStat approach 
appears to have worked effectively for the “meat and potatoes” of gov-
ernment—e.g., refuse collection, filling potholes, police and emergency 
response—but can it be expanded to more complex areas of government 
intervention, such as improving health care and education outcomes or 
reducing domestic violence? 
And finally, why continue at all with performance management in 
the public sector, given the significant challenges, risks, costs, and the 
politics and messiness of governance? That might be best answered 
with another question: In its absence, how do we better guide our gov-
erning systems to perform at higher levels and more efficiently and 
effectively achieve public purposes and desired outcomes? 
Notes 
1. Harlan Cleveland was the founding dean of the University of Minnesota’s Hubert 
H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs in 1972. He also served as President 
Lyndon Johnson’s U.S. ambassador to NATO from 1965 to 1969 and, earlier, as 
U.S. assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs, from 1961 
to 1965. 
2. A well-known example of rapid agency restructuring occurred when President 
Ronald Reagan appointed Anne Gorsuch to head the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) in 1981. Gorsuch came into her role with the view that the EPA
was overregulating business and that the agency was too large and ineffi cient. As 
she sharply shifted the agency’s mission, numerous career bureaucrats were re-
assigned, demoted, or pressured to resign, in an attempt to align employees with 
the agency’s revised goals.  However, EPA employees who identified with the for-
mer EPA goals, acting as “organizational stewards,” ultimately thwarted Gorsuch’s 
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efforts, which they did not perceive to be in the best interests of the public, and she 
departed from the agency after 22 months.
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Political Parties, Democracy, 
and “Good Governance” 
John Ishiyama 
University of North Texas 
What is the relationship between political parties and “good 
governance”? The role that political parties have played is rather con-
troversial in the literature. On the one hand, there are those who express 
very negative sentiments with regard to political parties. Indeed, pop-
ular sentiment is often negative about parties and the role they play 
in democracies. George Washington cautioned against parties as “fac-
tions” motivated by the “spirit of revenge” and by self promotion at 
the expense of the public good. Currently, political parties are almost 
universally viewed as the most corrupt of the political institutions in 
modern democracies. Parties can participate in corrupt practices in vari-
ous ways—by “buying” votes, receiving illegal donations, and “selling” 
public decisions. The image of political parties as nests of corruption is 
often connected to the low trust in parties as political institutions and 
even to the low trust in democracy itself (Kopecký and Spirova 2011) 
On the other hand, many scholars have argued that parties are indis-
pensable to the operation of modern democracy. For instance, E. E. 
Schattschneider, in his work Party Government, advanced the thesis 
“that the political parties created democracy and that modern democracy 
is unthinkable save in terms of parties” (Schattschneider 1942, p. 1).1 
Although Schattschneider perhaps overstates the case, there is indeed 
a general consensus in the scholarly literature that parties are essential 
entities in the building and consolidation of competitive democracy. The 
notion of the indispensability of parties is rooted in the idea that they per-
form essential democratic functions, and that while these functions may 
not be the exclusive domain of political parties, they are thought to per-
form these functions better than any other type of organization (Dalton 
and Wattenberg 2000; Diamond and Gunther 2001; Diamond and Linz 
1989; Webb, Farrell, and Holliday 2002; Webb and White 2007). 
35 




These functions essentially involve six primary political-party 
functions. (That number is more or less consistent with other catego-
rization schemes; see, for instance, Diamond and Gunther [2001] and 
Webb [2007].) These functions are listed in Table 3.1, below. 
However, much of the concern with political parties in systems 
in transition is that they do not perform their ascribed functions very 
well. Parties in new democracies often lack coherent ideological pro-
grams and are unable to offer voters clear sets of choices. The programs 
that are offered are largely detached from citizens’ concerns (Ishiyama 
and Shafqat 2000; Kitschelt and Smyth 2002), and corruption is seen 
as widespread in such parties (Basedau, Erdmann, and Mehler 2007; 
Holmes 2006; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Salih 2003). Parties in transitional 
systems are also seen as not being sufficiently rooted in society, resulting 
in high levels of electoral volatility as voters and politicians continu-
ally switch parties (Kuenzi and Lambright 2005; Mainwaring 1998; 
Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Shabad and Slomczynski 2004; Thames 
Table 3.1  Six Primary Party Functions 
Interest articulation Interest aggregation 
Receiving and accepting public 
demands and determining the 
process of placing issues on the 
political agenda 
Political communication 
Communicating political information, 
including structuring choices among 
competing groups along different 
issue dimensions 
Recruiting/nomination 
Establishing the electoral rules of the 
game, especially the procedures for 
determining who gets nominated 
Aggregating demands into coherent 
programmatic packages in democratic 
contexts 
Stimulating political participation 
Promoting political participation, 
including party membership, but also 
partisanship among voters, and the 
political mobilization and electoral 
activities of parties 
Governance 
Forming and sustaining accountable 
and effective governments 
SOURCE: Adapted from Gunther and Diamond (2003). 
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2007a,b; Zielinski, Slomczynski, and Shabad 2005). Such parties have 
also been unable to monopolize the channels of leadership recruitment; 
hence they fail to perform the primary function of recruiting leaders 
(Hale 2006; Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Leongó mez 2006). In short, as 
Thomas Carothers (2006, p. 66) laments, political parties in countries 
in transition tend to be “top-down, leader-centric, organizationally thin, 
corrupt, patrimonial, and ideologically vague.” 
Furthermore, party systems in many new democratic systems are 
one of two things: 1) They are either fractionalized, unstable systems, 
where government is paralyzed by a highly fragmented composi-
tion, resulting in weak coalition governments (“feckless pluralism,” 
as Carothers [2006], characterizes such systems), or 2) they emerge 
as corrupt, patronage-based systems with a single or dominant party 
(Kopecký and Sprirova 2011; Tanzi 1998). 
Parties are also seen as not being sufficiently rooted in society, 
resulting in high levels of electoral volatility as voters and politicians 
continually switch parties. This leads to poor government effective-
ness (Kuenzi and Lambright 2005; Mainwaring 1998; Mainwaring 
and Scully 1995; Shabad and Slomczynski 2004; Thames 2007a,b; 
Zielinski, Slomczynski, and Shabad 2005). 
Thus it has been suggested in the literature that fractionalized and 
volatile systems are “bad” for democracy. This is because such systems 
are not really institutionalized. Institutionalized party systems are better 
able to promote stable democracy than less institutionalized systems, 
for a couple of reasons:
• First, more-institutionalized party systems enjoy considerable 
stability—generally, systems where the major parties appear 
and disappear, or move from major parties to minor parties and 
vice versa, are weakly institutionalized. 
• Second, institutionalized systems have strong roots in society 
and bind parties and citizens together. In a less institutionalized 
system there is less regularity for voters in the articulation and 
aggregation of their interests, and hence parties are less able to 
perform the aggregation function which is vital for the func-
tioning of democracy. 
Three aspects of party systems’ institutionalization are particularly 
important for the purposes of this chapter. The fi rst is party fragmenta-




tion. Indeed, party fragmentation makes effective governance quite dif-
ficult (Duverger 1954). Many small parties in a system often create the 
conditions for weak coalition governments, which are particularly prob-
lematic during times of political or economic duress or crisis (which is 
often the case in the developing world). An often-cited example of the 
negative effects of party system fragmentation is the Weimar Republic 
in Germany in the 1920s, which had a highly fragmented (and ideologi-
cally polarized) party system. 
Another aspect of party systems that is posited as having a negative 
effect on governance is party system volatility. Party system volatil-
ity refers to the extent to which voters are lacking a stable set of party 
competitors over time. Party systems that are characterized by many 
changes in terms of vote share or composition are volatile systems. It 
has been argued that volatile systems do not promote effective gover-
nance, for a variety of reasons. First, party system volatility reduces 
accountability. When partisan actors come and go, it does not provide 
the opportunity for voters to “throw the rascals out” in case they have 
made poor policy choices, because the rascals no longer occupy office 
(Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Furthermore, volatility signifi cantly in-
creases uncertainty, hampering the ability of politicians and voters to 
engage in strategically driven coordination and formulate coherent pol-
icies. Finally, it raises the stakes of the electoral game. This may have 
the consequence of weakening the democratic commitment of politi-
cians, who may seek other ways to insure themselves against possible 
political loss at the next election—such as through corrupt actions or, 
even worse, vote-rigging and electoral violence. 
A third pathology of party system development is the emergence 
of a dominant party system. One-party dominance has not necessar-
ily been associated with ineffective governance in the literature, but it 
has been associated with the promotion of corruption. A major cause 
of corruption is political parties seeking to gain political resources by 
selling off access to office to the highest bidder (Katz and Mair 1995). 
One-party dominance leads to more corruption, as the dominant party 
keeps power by distribution of patronage and other manipulations 
(Tanzi 1998). Thus, one-party or dominant-party rule is seen as gener-
ally inimical to good governance, and it is especially associated with 
higher levels of corruption than more competitive systems. 
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Although the ills associated with party systems have often been sug-
gested in the scholarly work, there has been remarkably little empirical 
literature that directly assesses the relationship between characteristics 
of the party system and levels of good governance. What are the ef-
fects of fragmentation, volatility, and one-party dominance on aspects 
of good governance? 
The above literature suggests the following three hypotheses: 
• Hypothesis 1: Party systems’ fragmentation is negatively related 
to government effectiveness. 
• Hypothesis 2: Party volatility is negatively related to govern-
ment effectiveness. 
• Hypothesis 3: One-party-dominant regimes are negatively 
related to control of corruption (i.e., positively related to 
corruption). 
DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
The following analysis is a first attempt at trying to assess the rela-
tionship between characteristics of party systems and good governance. 
The sample of countries used in this study includes 92 developing states 
that have had at least three “competitive” legislative elections during 
the period 1975–2006 and that are also classified as middle- to low-
income countries by the World Bank. These countries were also not 
completely controlled by the governing party (and so would qualify as 
having a “party system,” which suggests the existence of more than one 
party). In other words, countries entered the data set if the opposition 
controlled at least some seats in the legislature. (Thus, countries like 
North Korea are not included in the data set.) The time period cov-
ered begins with 1975, which coincides with what Samuel Huntington 
(1991) labeled the beginning of the “third wave” of democratization, 
and goes until 2006, the last year in which all data are available. 
The dependent variables in this study include three of the World 
Bank's six Worldwide Governance Indicators, all measured from 2003 
to 2010. The argument here is that characteristics of the party system 












from 1975 to 2006 should affect government performance in the more 
recent period from 2003 to 2010. 
• The first dependent variable, government effectiveness, is con-
ceptualized as comprising the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s com-
mitment to such policies. The values range from −2.5 to +2.5, 
with negative scores indicating less effective government and 
positive values indicating more effective government. 
• The second dependent variable, control of corruption, is also 
scored from −2.5 to +2.5 and reflects perceptions of the extent 
to which public power is exercised for private gain, including 
both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” 
of the state by elites and private interests. In this case, negative 
scores indicate less effective control of corruption, whereas 
positive scores indicate relatively higher levels of control of 
government corruption. 
• The third dependent variable for this study, political stability,
is likewise scored from −2.5 to +2.5, and is conceptualized as 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be de-
stabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including politically motivated violence and terrorism. Positive 
scores on this measure indicate higher levels of political stabil-
ity, and negative values mean lower levels of political stability. 
Two of the primary independent variables, party systems fragmen-
tation and party systems volatility, are measured by two commonly 
employed measures in the literature. The first, measuring the extent 
to which a party system is fragmented, is the “effective number of 
political parties” (ENP) measure. This index proposes the use of the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl concentration index to measure the fragmenta-
tion of a party system based on vote shares in the election or seat shares 
in the legislature. Using vote or seat shares in the computation of the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index and taking the inverse gives us the ENP.2 
I include the average number of effective political parties for a given 
number of elections, ranging from a minimum of the first three to a 
maximum of the first five legislative elections after 1975. This, again, is 
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to examine how earlier levels of party fragmentation affect later levels 
of good governance. 
Second, to measure party systems’ volatility, I use Pedersen’s index 
of electoral volatility to calculate legislative volatility. Pedersen’s index 
measures the net change in each party’s seat share in the lower house 
of the legislature from election to election. It is calculated by summing 
the net changes in the percentage of seats won or lost by each of the 
parties from election to election and dividing by two (see Kuenzi and 
Lambright 2001; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; and Mozaffar, Scarritt, 
and Galaich 2003). This is written as 
V = Σ |c  – c | / Σ c  + Σ ci,t +1 i,t i,t +1 i,t , 
where V is volatility, ci,t is the vote share of continuous party i at the first 
election (t), and c  is the vote share of continuous party i at the secondi,t+1 
election (t + 1). 
The resulting score for each country is an average score across each 
of the legislative periods. Again, I use the first three to five elections 
after 1975 to examine how earlier levels of party systems’ volatility 
affect later levels of effective governance, control of corruption, and 
political stability. 
Finally, I examine the effects of a dominant party on measures of 
governance. For my purposes, I use the definition of a dominant party 
system taken from Van de Walle and Butler (1999), who define a domi-
nant party as a party that wins at least 60 percent of the seats in the 
lower house of the legislature for the first three consecutive elections 
following the introduction of competitive elections. 
In addition to the primary independent variables, I also include 
a number of control variables in the analysis that can affect levels of 
government effectiveness, control of corruption, and political stability. 
These include 
• economic growth rates measured in terms of gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita; 
• average growth rate over the posttransition period; 
• a measure of wealth (GDP per capita average over the post-
transition period); and 






• the level of ethnolinguistic fragmentation (ELF), a commonly 
used measure of the extent of ethnic heterogeneity in a country.
 In addition, I examine whether or not the country had experienced 
a civil war (given that such countries often face challenges in terms of 
good governance) and a measure of democracy as indicated by the aver-
age Polity2 score (a commonly used measure of the level of democracy)
over the entirety of the posttransition period. 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Tables 3.2 through  3.4 provide the results of the analysis. Given the 
continuous nature of the dependent variable, I employ a simple ordinary 
least squares (OLS) procedure. Coefficient estimates are reported as 
well as collinearity diagnostic statistics and the variance infl ation factor 
scores. Table 3.2 reports the results of regressing the dependent variable 
of the government effectiveness score against the list of independent 
variables. 
As indicated in the table, party fragmentation does not affect govern-
ment effectiveness, which is contrary to what was expected. However, 
both the emergence of a dominant party and party system volatility in 
earlier years led to less government effectiveness later. In part this may 
be due to the transformation of initially very volatile party systems into 
dominant party systems later (such as the case of the Russian Federa-
tion since the 1990s). Furthermore, this result would call into question 
the commonly held sentiment that political systems that exhibit a “firm 
hand” are more effective and efficient. The evidence clearly does not 
support this contention. 
One interesting thing to note is that post–civil war states are signifi-
cantly less effective (in terms of their effective governance scores) than 
other states in the sample. This is not a surprising result, given that civil 
wars often undermine state capacity, but it is noteworthy nonetheless. 
Table 3.3 regresses the second dependent variable, average con-
trol of corruption, against the list of independent variables. The results 
demonstrate that none of the primary independent variables are related 
to the control of corruption. These results call into question the notion 
that dominant party systems tend to promote corruption more than other 
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Table 3.2  Coefficient Estimates and Collinearity Statistics. Dependent 
Variable: Average Governmental Effectiveness, 2003–2010 
Variable Coefficient VIF 
Average effective number of parties over fi rst three −0.025 
elections after 1975 (0.023) 
Existence of dominant party over first three elections −0.358** 
Party systems’ volatility over first three elections 
Average GDP per capita growth rate over 
posttransition period 
Average GDP per capita over posttransition period 
Ethnolinguistic fragmentation index 
Post–civil war state 
Average polity score over posttransition period 
N = 92 






















NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** signifi cant at 
the 0.01 level. “VIF” = “variance inflation factor”; “GDP” = “gross domestic product.” 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
types of party systems. This is clearly not indicated by the results re-
ported in Table 3.3. 
Furthermore, as in Table 3.2, which shows that post–civil war states 
have less government effectiveness, so too in Table 3.3, post–civil war 
states are significantly less able to control corruption. Again, this is 
probably due to the weakened capacity of such states as a result of civil 
war. 
Finally, Table 3.4 reports the results of regressing the dependent 
variable of political stability against the independent variables. Inter-
estingly, none of the primary independent variables (average effective 
number of parties over first three elections after transition, existence 
of dominant party over first three elections, and party system volatility 
over first three elections) has any bearing at all on the level of political 
stability later. 









Table 3.3  Coefficient Estimates and Collinearity Statistics. Dependent 
Variable: Average Control of Corruption, 2003–2010 
Variable Coefficient VIF 
Average effective number of parties over fi rst three 









Party system’s volatility over first three elections −0.004 
(0.004) 
1.077 





Average GDP per capita over transition period 0.0003** 
(0.000) 
1.392 
Ethnolinguistic fragmentation index −0.115 
(0.299) 
1.193 
Post–civil war state −0.328** 1.139 
(0.130) 
Average polity score over posttransition period 0.011 
(0.017) 
1.358 
N = 92 
Adjusted R-squared = 0.188 
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** signifi cant at 
the 0.01 level. “VIF” = “variance inflation factor”; “GDP” = “gross domestic product.” 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
Again, as was the case with government effectiveness and corrup-
tion, post–civil war states are inherently less stable than other states. It 
should be noted that in all of the models, the variance inflation scores 
did not exceed 2, so there are no problems indicated with multicol-
linearity in the analysis. 
Thus, in sum, the above findings do not suggest support for the 
initial supposition that party fragmentation would be negatively re-
lated to government effectiveness. Indeed, the number of parties (in 
cases where there are more than one) is unrelated to the extent to which 
governments are effective. However, party system volatility and the 
emergence of dominant party systems are negatively related to gov-
ernment effectiveness. Dominant parties are not particularly effective 
at government administration, and neither are highly volatile systems 
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Table 3.4  Coefficient Estimates and Collinearity Statistics. Dependent 
Variable: Average Political Stability Score, 2003–2010 
Variable  Coefficient VIF 
Average effective number of parties over fi rst three 




Existence of dominant party over first three elections −0.106 
(0.160) 
1.540 
Party system’s volatility over first three elections −0.000 
(0.004) 
1.077 





Average GDP per capita over transition period 0.0005** 
(0.000) 
1.392 
Ethnolinguistic fragmentation index −0.158 
(0.301) 
1.193 
Post–civil war state −0.938*** 1.139 
(0.137) 
Average polity score over posttransition period 0.017 
(0.017) 
1.358 
N = 92 
Adjusted R-squared = 0.486 
NOTE: * significant at the 0.10 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** signifi cant at 
the 0.01 level. “VIF” = “variance inflation factor”; “GDP” = “gross domestic product.” 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
where there is substantial turnover in the political actors involved in 
the game. However, these variables are not related to corruption and 
political stability, which might suggest, among other things, that the 
relationship between corruption and dominant parties is overstated. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has been essentially a suggestive piece, with the use of 
data to illustrate the relationship between party system characteristics 
and three aspects of good governance—namely, 1) effective governance, 




2) control of corruption, and 3) political stability. Generally, the results 
indicate that either dominant party systems or volatile party systems are 
associated with lower levels of effective governance. However, neither 
of these party system characteristics are related to the control of corrup-
tion and political stability. This would suggest that if one conceives of 
“good governance” in terms of effective governance, then promoting a 
stable set of competitive political parties is probably a good way to go. 
This would add support for programs such as those sponsored by the 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which seeks to 
promote the development of stable party systems in many new democ-
racies throughout the world. 
On the other hand, party system characteristics have little to do with 
either the control of corruption or the promotion of political stability. 
This would counter some of the existing literature that suggests that 
dominant party systems are more corrupt, and that stable party systems 
would lead to political stability. As to the former, one can imagine a 
situation (as in the case of many competitive party systems in Western 
democracies in their earlier periods of development) where competitive 
politics bred corruption such as vote rigging, multiple voting, patron-
age, and the like. Certainly this has been part of the history of political 
parties in the United States, as well as in other Western countries, so it 
is no wonder that competitive party systems are just as likely to fail to 
control corruption as dominant party systems. 
It is also not particularly surprising that volatility is unrelated to 
political stability (at least as conceived of in terms of the likelihood of 
violent overthrow). Indeed, in several cases in the West, most notably in 
post–World War II Italy, party system fragmentation and volatility led 
to governmental instability but did not threaten the political stability of 
the country. In part, this political stability was supported by a continu-
ous group of political leaders. In other words, governments and parties 
may have come and gone in Italy, but the leadership elite remained in-
tact, thus contributing to the continuance of political stability (in terms 
of absence of violence), albeit not government stability (in terms of 
the stability of coalition governments). Thus, at least in Italy, it is not 
particularly surprising that party system characteristics are unrelated to 
political stability as well. 
These main findings of this chapter are, of course, somewhat ten-
tative. There are a number of areas for improvement in the analysis. 
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For instance, perhaps the key variable affecting good governance is not 
the party system, but party organization characteristics. In other words, 
parties that are more internally democratic may be more effective than 
parties that are less internally democratic, for instance. Second, it would 
be preferable to use panel data rather than a simple set of cross-sectional 
data (albeit with a lagged set of independent variables). Third, there 
may be individual country effects that would need to be controlled for 
by a fixed-effects model. Finally, in terms of the political stability anal-
ysis, a future paper might examine the relationship between political 
party systems and state failure—perhaps by using some form of hazard 
analysis instead of the World Bank’s measure equating stability with no 
violence. Whatever the case, understanding the relationship between 
party system characteristics and good governance will remain a fruitful 
topic for future research. 
Notes 
1. Although, historically, there has been debate over the definition of a political party 
in the scholarly literature, we use the classic definition of the political party as 
offered by Anthony Downs (1957, p. 25): a political party is “a team seeking to 
control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election.” 
See also Epstein (1967), Janda (1980), and Sartori (1976). For an alternative and 
stricter definition of party, see LaPalombara and Weiner (1966). For the debate 
over the definition of parties, see Ishiyama and Breuning (1998). 
2. ENP = 1/∑pi 
2, where pi denotes the ith party’s fraction of the seats (or vote shares). 
See Laakso and Taagepera (1979) and Taagepera and Shugart (1989); see also 
variations of the fragmentation index: Dunleavy and Boucek (2003), Molinar 
(1991), and Rae (1967). 
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Good Governance in 
Transition Economies 
A Comparative Analysis 
Susan J. Linz 
Michigan State University 
Do transition economies—countries that transformed from social-
ism to capitalism in the 1990s—exhibit good governance? If so, is the 
incidence or degree of good governance the same across these former 
socialist economies? Answers to these questions illuminate conditions 
that affect a society’s well-being; the quality of a country’s governance 
system is an important determinant of sustainable economic and social 
development.1 Indeed, some argue that the benefits of promoting good 
governance are so important that doing so has become both an objec-
tive and a condition of development assistance (Santiso 2001; Weiss 
2000). Here, the objective is to document the nature and scope of good 
governance among transition economies, and to explore explanations 
for variation across these countries. 
Why does it matter if formerly socialist economies exhibit good 
governance? In transition economies, the process of transforming from 
socialism (where planners’ preferences for investing in heavy industry 
dominated) to capitalism (where consumer sovereignty rules) involved 
a significant restructuring of the economy. In many of these countries, 
not only was there a need to develop previously unavailable service sec-
tors (financial, legal, retail, and repair, for example) but also to engage 
in extensive renovation of infrastructure and production facilities. 
Moreover, just as the transition process put a relatively large portion of 
the population at risk in terms of economic and social well-being, the 
dismantling of existing institutions limited the availability of domestic 
resources with which to provide an adequate social safety net. Conse-
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quently, transition economies required assistance, and assistance tends 
to require that certain conditions be met.2 
Transition economies received international financial and technical 
assistance not only to facilitate the transformation process (decentral-
izing and liberalizing economic activities), but also to reduce adverse 
consequences to households and firms associated with the socio-
economic changes (macroeconomic stabilization). Many of the condi-
tions upon which transition assistance was contingent were governance-
related (Brӓutigam 2000; Santiso 2001; Weiss 2000). For example, 
one of the foundations for establishing a market-oriented economy is 
allowing for widespread private-property ownership and, correspond-
ingly, the protection of private-property rights. At the beginning of the 
transition process, when property rights were not protected and bank-
ing institutions and regulations were not fully developed, these coun-
tries were not forthcoming with the investment expenditures needed in 
the transition economies to renovate industry or develop new sectors.3 
Improved financial, economic, and social regulatory quality and rule of 
law were necessary to facilitate the type of institutional developments 
that promote investment. Indeed, Baniak, Cukrowski, and Herczyñski 
(2005); Bevan and Estrin (2004); Bevan, Estrin, and Meyer (2004); 
Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer (2000); and others identify an extensive set of 
governance-related factors contributing to the receipt of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) among transition economies. International assistance 
became contingent upon successfully addressing these factors because 
they would improve the environment for investment (both domestic and 
FDI), which in turn would contribute to the successful completion of 
the transition process (Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann 2002). 
Promoting or establishing good governance in transition economies 
was also important because the ability to distribute assistance to indi-
viduals and organizations in need appears to depend upon the “quality” 
of a country’s political, economic, and social institutions. In particu-
lar, the effectiveness and enforcement of rules that permit participation 
and call for accountability, and the absence of corruption in interactions 
within and between the government, civil society, and the private sec-
tor, not only promote good governance but also act to enhance the trans-
formation to a market-oriented economy. Documenting the transition 
process from the governance perspective further illuminates linkages 
between governance and development.4 
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Finally, because transition economies encompass a relatively large 
number of countries and represent a significant and growing share of 
the international market, promoting good governance in these countries 
was linked to promoting global economic security and political stabil-
ity. Without efforts to promote good governance in transition econo-
mies, the initial chaotic and economically devastating impact of the 
transformation process could have escalated into a more widespread 
and sustained barrier to global efforts to reduce poverty and promote a 
better quality of life. For these reasons, evaluating the level and varia-
tion in good governance among transition economies enhances under-
standing of the link between governance and development. 
Good Governance as a Process 
Introduced in a 1989 World Bank report as an objective (Santiso 
2001), good governance is best conceived of as a process. Gover-
nance, generally, is the process not only of decision making, but also 
of decision implementation—a process that takes place at international, 
national, regional/local, and firm levels, involving both formal and 
informal agents and institutions. The governance process encompasses 
political, economic, and social dimensions, such as selecting, monitor-
ing, and replacing individuals who hold positions of authority; develop-
ing and implementing policies to manage natural, physical, financial, 
and human resources; and promoting social cohesion, thus enabling 
vulnerable individuals and groups to experience inclusion and social 
protection (Kaufmann 2005). 
Good governance, a normative concept, requires that a number of 
conditions are satisfied: that is, that the processes of decision making 
and implementation are transparent, accountable, participatory, respon-
sive, consensus-oriented, equitable, effective, and follow the rule of 
law (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón 1999). Good governance 
means that sufficient information is readily available to determine 
whether decisions are made and implemented following existing rules 
and regulations; that consequences can be imposed on those deciding or 
implementing policy; that all individuals have opportunities to express 
their opinions or cast their “vote”; that affected individuals’ concerns 
or needs are specifically addressed; that different views of the best 
interest of the “community” over an extended time frame are explicitly 










considered; that no one individual or group has an inherent advantage 
in the process or outcome; that the adopted policies do not preclude 
or impede resources (physical, financial, human) from going to their 
highest-valued use; and that the legal system not only enforces the laws 
impartially, but also with an eye toward fully protecting human rights 
(United Nations 2013). 
Changing Perception of Good Governance  
While much of the governance literature focuses on the link between 
governance and development, there has clearly been a change in the 
perception of good governance since the late 1990s. Before the global 
financial crisis in 1998, the “Washington consensus” (Williamson 1990) 
dominated development thinking. Policymakers were persuaded that a 
limited role by the state was most influential in promoting economic 
growth. Indeed, a widespread belief that open trade, deregulation, 
privatization, and fiscal restraint enhanced development contributed to 
the result that these elements became conditions for international aid 
(Santiso 2001). 
As events unfolded after 1998, however, the governance literature 
began to reflect a growing understanding that legal, economic, political, 
and social institutions that promote participation, strengthen account-
ability, regulate financial markets, enhance the rule of law, and provide 
social safety nets are important in the development process (Craig and 
Porter 2006). Rather than seeking to limit state intervention, as was 
called for by the “Washington consensus,” there emerged in the litera-
ture a commitment to strengthening leadership at the national, local, 
and firm levels. As Santiso (2001) points out, the “targets” or conditions 
required of aid recipients rose from 10 in the 1980s to more than 25 
in the 1990s; Kyrgyzstan faced nearly 100 governance-related condi-
tions in 1999. It is worth noting that conditionality does not eliminate 
the situation where promises are made by an aid recipient to undertake 
changes and adopt policies consistent with good governance but then 
those promises are reneged on by the recipient. 
To document the nature and scope of good governance in transi-
tion economies and explore explanations for variation across these 
countries, the next section, “Governance Measures,” briefly reviews 
the issues involved in evaluating good governance and the governance 
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measures most widely used. The third section, “Comparing Transition 
Economies,” explains why transition economies typically are grouped 
into two categories. Section Four, “Good Governance in Transition 
Economies: Comparing FSU with CEE Countries,” utilizes multiple 
governance measures to illustrate different dimensions of good gov-
ernance in transition economies. Section Five, “Good Governance in 
Transition Economies: Firms’ Perspective and Experience,” focuses on 
how firms view good governance. The final section offers a summary 
and concluding remarks. 
GOVERNANCE MEASURES 
How is governance—the process of decision making and decision 
implementation in the social, political, and economic realms—mea-
sured? Kaufmann and Kraay (2007) provide a straightforward analy-
sis of governance measurement issues. First, focusing on what is mea-
sured, they discuss the pros and cons of using inputs or outcomes to 
measure the quality of governance. Inputs include rules, regulations, 
institutions, and practices that have consequences for the processes of 
decision making and implementation. For example, rules-based gov-
ernance measures such as the Polity IV Project or the two prepared by 
the World Bank—1) the Doing Business Project and 2) the Database on 
Political Institutions—consider such things as legislation that prohibits 
corruption, formal disclosure requirements for public offi cials, partici-
patory elections, political competition, constraints on executive author-
ity, rules for registering property or employing workers, and the like. 
While it is relatively easy to count rules, regulations, agencies, 
and other inputs, governance measures based on input counts remain 
problematic. Little variation in rules-based measures occurs over time 
or across countries, which limits their explanatory power in empiri-
cal analyses of governance. Moreover, rules-based measures contain 
an inherent ambiguity: do a large number of rules or regulations or 
agencies signal good governance or simply underscore the likelihood 
of conflict among them? More importantly, the existence of a range 
of inputs does not guarantee their enforcement. Kaufmann and Kraay 
(2007) discuss issues associated not only with conflicting rules but also 








with the existence of an enforcement gap. They use this discussion as 
a way to introduce an alternative measure of governance that uses out-
comes (e.g., the Global Integrity Index), focusing on the enforcement 
of rules and the lack of corruption. Kaufmann and Kraay (2007), Arndt 
and Oman (2006), and others note that, given that perceptions and arbi-
trary scales are used in compiling these outcome measures, they too 
need to be treated and utilized with caution. 
In their analysis of governance measurement issues, Kaufmann 
and Kraay (2007) next address how governance might be measured. 
They discuss the role and relative merits of both perceptions (based on 
experts and survey responses) and objective data (counts of regulations, 
bribe payments, court cases, and so forth) in how governance measures 
are constructed. For example, while gathering information from experts 
(lawyers, nongovernmental organization (NGO) offi cers, government 
officials, executives, and commercial risk rating agencies) is a rela-
tively low-cost endeavor, this method introduces potential biases that 
may undermine the quality or accuracy of the governance measure. 
That is, assessments necessarily reflect experts’ views, and the data they 
elect to view informs their perceptions. Moreover, survey data collected 
from firms and individuals, the beneficiaries of good governance, may 
suffer from inaccurate responses (how does one elicit truthful answers 
about illegal activities?) or bias in either the responses themselves or 
the interpretation of those responses (how does one code a situation 
where a bribe is paid, but the benefit is sufficient relative to cost to 
result in the bribe not being perceived as an obstacle?). Yet, given that 
both formal and informal rules and institutions influence political, civil, 
economic, and financial transactions, perceptions provide more insight 
into the practice or process of good governance than simple counts of 
administrators, agencies, bribe payments, court cases, regulations, and 
the like. 
This analysis considers a range of governance measures to more 
fully depict the nature and scope of good governance in transition 
economies. 
The broadest, most comprehensive measure, and one where the req-
uisite data are collected from former socialist economies, Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI), is based exclusively on perceptions 
(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010). The WGI measure encom-
passes six dimensions of governance: 1) control of corruption, 2) gov-
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ernment effectiveness, 3) political stability, 4) regulatory quality, 5) rule 
of law, and 6) voice and accountability, using 30 indicators collected 
from 33 different organizations.5 The data used to construct the six WGI 
composite measures reflect the perceptions of experts (from both the 
public and private sectors and from NGOs) and include survey data col-
lected from thousands of individuals and hundreds of firms per country. 
For country comparison purposes, each of the six WGI composite mea-
sures is standardized to have a zero mean and unit standard deviation. 
Positive scores reflect good governance. 
Freedom House, a private nonprofit organization established in 
the early 1940s by Eleanor Roosevelt and Wendell Willkie, conducts 
an annual survey of more than 190 countries to determine how free-
dom is experienced by people and firms.6 The country ratings, based 
on questions targeting political rights (10 questions) and civil liberties 
(15 questions), are constructed by country specialists rather than from 
actual experiences of firms or individuals. The political and civil liber-
ties composite measures are averaged to determine an overall country 
status of “free,” “partly free,” or “not free.” Good governance is associ-
ated with “free” status. 
The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), produced by Transparency 
International for the first time in 1995, ranks 176 countries (including 
former socialist economies) and territories by their perceived level of 
public-sector corruption, based on opinion surveys and expert assess-
ments.7 The composite index is constructed from information collected 
from at least three sources (for some countries, up to 14 sources) and 
aggregated in such a way as to make the CPI composite more reliable 
than the individual scores covered in the composite (Saisana and Saltelli 
2012). The country mean value is derived from a standardization pro-
cedure that puts the composite index score between 10 (no corruption) 
and 0 (widespread corruption). Confidence intervals also are reported 
to underscore the uncertainty associated with the perceived corruption 
measures (Lambsdorff 2007). Good governance is associated with a 
high CPI. 
The Heritage Foundation, in collaboration with the Wall Street 
Journal, annually provides an Index of Economic Freedom (IEF), 
which is constructed using 10 components related to private property 
rights protection, limited government intervention in economic affairs, 
ease of starting and closing a business, worker protection regulations, 













and free trade; each component is averaged into a single score.8 This 
measure is used in governance studies because it includes dimensions 
that reflect the process of making, implementing, and enforcing deci-
sions and policies that affect individuals and firms. The IEF uses data 
compiled by such organizations as the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, and the Economist Intelligence Unit, generating a 
composite score for each country that ranges from 0 to 100, where 
100 conveys maximum freedom. The country score and ranking are 
designed to reflect the degree of economic freedom exhibited in more 
than 175 countries (including former socialist economies).9 Thus, good 
governance is associated with a high IEF score. 
An alternative way to assess good governance is from the perspec-
tive of the beneficiaries, such as firms. The European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (EBRD), in collaboration with the World 
Bank, began in 1999 conducting a Business Environment and Enter-
prise Performance Survey (BEEPS), which involves, in the most recent 
round (2008–2009), some 11,800 firms in 29 countries.10 The survey is 
designed to track changes in the business environment over time and get 
information from firms about the nature and scope of the state’s influ-
ence over private-sector activities. In particular, the survey addresses a 
number of factors related to perceptions of the quality of the business 
environment, the incidence and magnitude of corruption, and problems 
associated with corruption in transition economies. BEEPS data allow 
for the assessment of governance quality from the fi rm’s perspective.11 
For example, the microdata permit analysis of two basic types of cor-
rupt transactions: in one type of transaction, state agents obtain unwar-
ranted benefits from the private sector (“grabbing hand”); in the other 
type, private-sector agents obtain unwarranted benefits from the state 
(“state capture”) (Frye and Shleifer 1997; Hellman et al. 2000; Shleifer 
and Vishny 1998). 
COMPARING TRANSITION ECONOMIES 
How do transition economies fare with regard to good governance? 
Since the primary objective here is to document the nature and scope 
of good governance in transition economies, it is useful to consider two 
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groups of countries: 1) those that were part of the former Soviet Union 
(FSU)12 and 2) those located in central and eastern Europe (CEE).13 
The distinction between FSU and CEE countries stems in part from the 
duration of the socialist experience and in part from prior experience 
with a market economy.  
Except for the Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), 
FSU countries had very little experience with market-oriented institu-
tions before the transition began in the early 1990s. Most FSU coun-
tries had exhibited a tradition-oriented feudal-type economic structure 
before the socialist revolution introduced central planning as a way to 
organize production and distribution. Under Soviet socialism, neither 
markets nor scarcity prices were used to allocate resources, materials, 
labor, or goods. Private property, in the productive sense, was pro-
hibited. Formally, for over seven decades, economic decision mak-
ing was highly centralized. Transactions were governed by the state, 
with no regard for profi t motive and little, if any, regard for effi ciency. 
Informally, individuals and firms often acted in their own self-interest 
rather than the state’s interest, and they traded in ways that mimicked 
market-oriented outcomes. However, unlike most transactions in market 
economies, informal transactions in FSU countries, particularly Russia, 
were rarely quid pro quo. Instead, the culture of kinship and reciproc-
ity governed social, political, and economic transactions (Ledeneva 
1998; Volkov 2000). This culture, combined with widespread shortages 
in the Soviet economy of basic household goods and material inputs 
to firms, created conditions where those who held a monopoly posi-
tion (from bureaucrats to salespeople) routinely exploited that position 
(Shlapentokh 2013). 
CEE countries, obliged after World War II to terminate their market-
oriented institutions and adopt the Soviet centrally administered struc-
ture, experienced a shorter-duration and somewhat different variety of 
socialism than FSU countries. Poland, for example, retained private 
agriculture rather than impose Soviet-style collectivized agriculture. 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia continued to participate in international 
markets. In contrast to the highly centralized Soviet model, Yugosla-
via introduced greater decision making by worker collectives. When 
the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, CEE countries reestablished their market-
oriented institutions. Unlike FSU countries, from the very beginning of 
the transition process CEE countries were populated with individuals 








experienced not only in working within the legal and fi nancial infra-
structures that support a market economy, but also within a decentral-
ized social and political environment. 
Thus, the duration of the socialist experience and prior experience 
with market-oriented institutions provide a simple way to separate tran-
sition economies into two groups for good-governance comparison 
purposes. 
GOOD GOVERNANCE IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES: 
COMPARING FSU WITH CEE COUNTRIES 
How well do transition economies fare with regard to good gov-
ernance? How much difference is there over the course of the transi-
tion process? Is there a significant difference between FSU and CEE 
countries in terms of good governance? To address these questions, this 
section considers multiple governance measures. 
WGI Measures 
The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) encompass six cat-
egories of indicators that reflect different dimensions of good gover-
nance. Since each of the composite indicators of WGI is standardized 
to have a zero mean and unit standard deviation, a positive score reflects 
good governance, and a negative score reflects the opposite. As seen in 
Figure 4.1, which captures WGI scores for the six composite measures 
for 2011, CEE countries consistently score in the positive range and 
FSU countries consistently score in the negative range. The governance 
contrast between FSU and CEE countries is the greatest for voice and 
accountability,14 with CEE countries scoring relatively high (second 
only to regulatory quality), and FSU countries scoring relatively poorly 
(worse than in every category except control of corruption). Both FSU 
and CEE countries perform relatively poorly on the control of corrup-
tion composite measure.15 
Because good governance often is linked to anticorruption measures 
(Kaufmann 2005), and because corruption (bad governance) is well docu-
mented in transition economies (see Abed and Davoodi [2000]; Hamadi, 
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SOURCE: World Bank (2014). Data are for 2011; regional averages were weighted by 
population. 
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Rihab, and Lotfi [2009]; Hellman et al. [2000]; Shlapentokh [2013]; 
Steves and Rousso [2003]; and Tonoyan et al. [2010], for example), it 
makes sense to provide some discussion of this topic here. Perhaps most 
striking is the large literature related to corruption in former socialist 
economies: in April 2013, Google Scholar listed over 110,000 entries. 
In part, the literature is large because corruption involves a broad set of 
activities, varying by purpose16 and the agents or agencies involved.17 In 
part, the large corruption literature stems from ongoing efforts to mea-
sure and document corruption and estimate the costs it imposes. 
Corruption is costly from an opportunity cost perspective because 
public resources are not going to their highest-valued use, but instead are 
being diverted for personal gain (Mauro 1995). Corruption contributes 
to lower tax revenues, which in turn reduce public services provided to 
the society as a whole. Social welfare is lower than it otherwise need be; 
wealth disparities grow. Corruption weakens formal institutions (legal, 
financial), which undermines the development process generally and 
the pace of economic transformation for these former socialist coun-







tries. In particular, corruption undermines competition, which is one of 
the pillars of a market-oriented economy. 
Corruption also imposes direct financial costs on firms and house-
holds. For firms, operational and transactional costs are higher (Aidis 
and Adachi 2007; Aidis, Estrin, and Mickiewicz 2008; Johnson et al. 
2000). Estimates suggest that small firms in Russia pay over $500 mil-
lion in U.S. dollars (USD) monthly on bribes to officials, a fi gure that 
does not include payments made to organized crime; altogether, cor-
ruption payments are estimated at $10–$20 billion per year. For house-
holds, prices paid for goods and services include the cost of corruption 
(kickbacks, bribes, extortion). In Russia, corruption is estimated to add 
5–15 percent to prices paid by consumers (Levin and Satarov 2000). 
The general pattern of good-governance differences between FSU 
and CEE countries evident for the six WGI composite measures illus-
trated in Figure 4.1 also is evident, albeit on a smaller scale, in Figure 
4.2, which focuses on the levels and trends of control of corruption by 
country.18 CEE countries (shaded darker but not individually identified) 
tend to score higher as the transition process progresses, although, ini-
tially, half of these countries exhibit scores comparable to the majority 
of FSU countries (shaded lighter but not identified).19 
One explanation for the relatively small differences in control of 
corruption involves the nature and scope of formal and informal institu-
tions in FSU and CEE countries. 
Tonoyan et al. (2010) explain how formal institutions contribute to 
corruption: too many (and confl icting) economic and fi nancial regula-
tions create obstacles, which provide opportunities to engage in rent-
seeking behavior (corruption) as individuals and firms try to fi nd ways 
around these barriers. Failure to enforce the multitude of formal rules 
further contributes to rent-seeking behavior. 
Tradition, customs, and norms contribute to informal institutions 
that help to generate an environment in which corrupt behavior thrives. 
For example, in societies where kinship and reciprocity are impor-
tant cultural features, informal institutions tend to be more prevalent. 
However, informal institutions themselves need not contribute to cor-
ruption. In some instances, informal institutions complement formal 
institutions by strengthening efforts to comply with anticorruption 
agencies and regulations (Tonoyan et al. 2010). Where informal institu-
tions replace formal procedures, then corrupt behavior thrives. Dyker 
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(2012), Shlapentokh (2013), and others explain why the Soviet legacy 
of informal institutions is stronger in Russia and other FSU countries 
than in CEE countries. Moreover, the literature suggests that in societ-
ies where closed social networks predominate, and thus there is greater 
reliance on kinship or reciprocity, there will be a much greater likeli-
hood that corrupt behavior will be sustained. This is particularly true 
where social norms are governed by the belief that good ends justify 
means (or that whatever works is correct), and widespread (illegal) 
behavior is consistent with this belief (Ledeneva 1998; Volkov 2000). 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate differences in control of corruption for 
individual FSU and CEE countries, respectively. As seen in Figure 4.3, 
for the majority of FSU countries, there is no real improvement in con-
trol of corruption over time; in some instances, performance worsens 
on this governance measure. Levin and Satarov (2000) and Tonoyan et 
al. (2010) make the “path dependency” case: societies that start with a 
high level of corruption will find it hard to reduce it. 
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Why do FSU countries have a high level of corruption? The Soviet 
legacy of a seller’s market created conditions that obliged individuals 
and firms to circumvent official channels, which led to the widespread 
acceptance of the notion “the ends justify the means,” which further 
fueled corrupt (illegal) behavior. Shlapentokh (2013) focuses on the 
influence of feudal tendencies and big money as the driving force for 
corruption in FSU countries, particularly Russia. He also describes the 
strata of “little bribers” who extort money: medical personnel, educa-
tors, inspectors, clerks, traffic officers, and the like. The fact that so 
many in Russia benefit from corruption contributes to widespread toler-
ance of corrupt behavior.20 
In contrast, several CEE countries (Figure 4.4), likely infl uenced by 
European Union admission requirements, tended to improve corruption 
control as the transition progressed. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) 
develop a theoretical model to explain why some countries are more 
susceptible to “state capture”; the characteristics they include coincide 
more closely with cultural and other conditions in FSU countries than 
in CEE countries. 
The ability to exhibit good governance is influenced by susceptibil-
ity to “state capture,” which in turn has consequences for perceptions 
of government effectiveness.21 While FSU countries perform relatively 
well on this measure in comparison to other WGI measures (see Figure 
4.1), it appears to coincide with perceptions of firms and individuals 
that even though the “grabbing hand” of government is expensive, the 
benefits associated with informal payments are certain (Millar 1996; 
Shlapentokh 2013). As seen in Figure 4.5, with few exceptions, little 
change in perceptions of government effectiveness occurs among FSU 
countries over the course of the transition. Where perceptions improve 
(see Figure 4.6), it is mostly among FSU countries that have a positive 
score (exhibit relatively good governance on this dimension). Among 
CEE countries, two groups are evident: 1) those where government 
effectiveness is viewed relatively positively, and 2) those where the 
initial perceptions were negative, but over the course of the transition 
these perceptions improved (see Figure 4.7). 
The relative performance of FSU and CEE countries on a related 
governance dimension, regulatory quality,22 is illustrated in Figure 4.8. 
On this dimension, the majority of CEE countries (shaded darker) score 
relatively high, and consistently so. Among FSU countries (shaded 
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Figure 4.6  Government Effectiveness in FSU Countries 
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lighter), there appears to be a similar consistency over time for regula-
tory quality, but the countries fall into three groups in terms of general 
score on this measure (see Figure 4.9). CEE countries tend to exhibit an 
upward trend over the course of the transition (Figure 4.10). 
Figure 4.11 depicts rule of law for FSU and CEE countries. While 
there is some dispersion among CEE countries (darker) which contrib-
utes to their composite score being relatively low (see Figure 4.1), for 
all but three FSU countries (lighter), perceived rule of law is consis-
tently in the negative range. As seen in Figure 4.12, for some FSU coun-
tries, the measure declines in value. In contrast, among CEE countries 
(Figure 4.13), there appears to be an improvement on this governance 
dimension over the course of the transition. Differences between the 
two groups of transition economies, and trends in each over time, may 
reflect differences in the formal legal systems in the countries: even if 
the same laws are on the books, they may not be enforced in the same 
way (Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard 2003; Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer 
2000); judicial institutions may process different types of cases or 
with different priorities. For rule of law to prevail, judges, prosecutors, 
police, and court functionaries need to act honestly and autonomously 
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Figure 4.11  Rule of Law in FSU and CEE Countries 
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with regard to the state and private-sector agents (EBRD 1999). Dif-
ferences may also stem from country variation in commitment to sup-
porting the type of individual rights and fiduciary responsibilities that 
facilitate emergence of a competitive market environment. 
Differences over time between FSU and CEE countries on voice 
and accountability are depicted in Figure 4.14. A clear pattern of sepa-
ration is evident. Even among FSU countries, a clear pattern of separa-
tion is also evident (see Figure 4.15), with the Baltic republics scoring 
consistently higher. For many other FSU countries, the score on this 
governance measure tends to decline. A steady improvement over time 
among CEE countries is seen in Figure 4.16. 
Differences between FSU and CEE countries in the fi nal component 
of the WGI governance measures are illustrated in Figure 4.17: political 
stability.23 In comparison to the other five governance dimensions, there 
is more variability in political stability among CEE and FSU countries 
over the course of the transition. As seen in Figure 4.18, there is more 
dispersion among FSU countries on this measure as well. Not surpris-











1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
SOURCE: World Bank (2014). 






























SOURCE: World Bank (2014). 








SOURCE: World Bank (2014). 












Asefa & Huang.indb 73    5/21/2015 10:08:02 AM   
 
  
Good Governance in Transition Economies  73 










SOURCE: World Bank (2014). 










SOURCE: World Bank (2014). 
1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
FSU CEE 
















Asefa & Huang.indb 74    5/21/2015 10:08:02 AM     
74 Linz 
ingly, CEE countries exhibit a general improvement in political stabil-
ity over time (Figure 4.19). 
Political Rights and Civil Liberties 
Freedom House annually provides two composite governance-
related measures for FSU, CEE, and other countries. As seen in Fig-
ure 4.20, CEE countries (darker) scored substantially higher than FSU 
countries (lighter) on both the political rights and civil liberties com-
posite measures in 2012. Differences between FSU and CEE countries 
might be explained by different levels of commitment to bolstering 
democratic institutions, or by differences in the extent to which politi-
cal leaders (national, regional, local) obtain and retain power. Differ-
ences might also be explained by the nature and scope of education and 
health care reforms, for example, or by policies targeted at immigra-
tion or freedom of the press. Such differences were driven in part by 
European Union membership requirements; most CEE countries have 
either joined or are candidate countries. Beyond the Baltic states, FSU 
countries have not been targeted for admission to the European Union. 
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Corruption Perceptions Index 
Figure 4.21 presents the 2012 CPI scores for individual FSU coun-
tries (lighter) and CEE countries (darker). The construction of this index 
is explained on page 57. While in both groups only three countries have 
a score exceeding 50, among CEE countries there are eight that score 
over 40, in comparison to one of the FSU countries. Indeed, the Baltic 
republics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) account for three of the top four 
FSU countries. 
Index of Economic Freedom 
The final governance measure considered here is the Index of Eco-
nomic Freedom. Figure 4.22 presents the 2011 scores for FSU (lighter) 
and CEE (darker) countries; the higher the score, the more economic 
freedom. 
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The pattern exhibited between FSU and CEE countries is clear, and 
it is invariant to the governance measure considered. Another perspec-
tive of the quality of governance in transition economies is provided 
by firm-level data. Such data not only are instrumental in undertaking 
empirical analyses of “state capture,” but also to establish the time and 
financial costs imposed on firms by “bad” governance. 
GOOD GOVERNANCE IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES: 
FIRMS’ PERSPECTIVE AND EXPERIENCE 
Empirical efforts and measures to assess good governance in transi-
tion economies tend to focus on aspects related to reducing or elimi-
nating corruption. Similarly, studies of corruption in transition econo-
mies and elsewhere tend to focus on characteristics and policies of the 






Good Governance in Transition Economies  77 






























0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  
SOURCE: Heritage Foundation (2012). 
state, with particular attention paid to the extent of state intervention in 
economic transactions and the degree of discretionary power wielded 
by bureaucrats (the macro perspective). An important source of infor-
mation about the nature and scope of corruption, and thus the degree 
of good governance, comes from firms (the micro perspective). That 
is, the incidence and magnitude of corrupt activities that firms initiate 
(state capture) or are subjected to (grabbing hand), has direct conse-
quences for whether governance is deemed “good” or “bad.” Such data 
are invaluable in assessing the link between corporate governance and 
national governance (Hellman et al. 2000). 
Among transition economies, firm-level data related to governance 
are collected by the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey (BEEPS) (Brunetti et al. 1997, Hellman et al. 2000). Some of 
the questions relate to the efficacy of government institutions and poli-
cies,24 while others focus more explicitly on interactions between firms 
and state.25 The objective of this section is to summarize the most recent 
governance-related BEEPS data for FSU and CEE countries. 









Hellman et al. (2000) use star charts for each country to report 
responses that relate to governance quality—firms’ evaluation of the 
performance of major public institutions (central government, parlia-
ment, central bank, customs service, judiciary, police, and military). 
They provide similar information for firms’ evaluation of the overall 
quality and efficiency of services provide by utilities (telephone, elec-
tricity, and water), public health care, education, the post office, and 
transportation/roads. Generally, firms in CEE countries tend to have 
higher evaluations (perceive better governance) than firms in FSU 
countries.26 Here the focus is more narrow, on perception and experi-
ence of corruption among participating firms. 
Figure 4.23 reports the percent of firms in FSU countries (lighter) 
and CEE countries (darker) that report corruption (bad governance) as 
the biggest obstacle to doing business,27 while Figure 4.24 illustrates 
how big of an obstacle corruption is perceived to be. As seen in the two 
figures, while a greater proportion of FSU firms than CEE fi rms report 
Figure 4.23  Percentage of Firms Listing Corruption as Biggest Obstacle, 













SOURCE: World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS) data (World Bank 2015). 
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Figure 4.24  Percentage of Respondents Who Answered the Question 
“How Big of an Obstacle is Corruption?” in Each of Three 
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SOURCE: World Bank (2015). 
that corruption is a very severe obstacle to doing business, corruption 
is less likely to be viewed by FSU firms as the biggest obstacle. In part 
this can be explained by the efficacy of the informal institutions in FSU 
countries (particularly Russia) that effectively guarantee the receipt of 
designated benefits associated with corrupt transactions. While costly 
to the firm, corruption is sustained by the culture of kinship and reci-
procity, which promotes the informal institutions that enforce corrupt 
transactions, thereby reducing uncertainty associated with deriving 
benefits from such transactions. 
Corrupt transactions frequently involve bribe payments. Figures 
4.25 to 4.27 illustrate the type, frequency, and magnitude of bribe pay-
ments made by firms in FSU and CEE countries. Over 40 percent of 
the firms in the FSU sample report paying bribes for construction per-
mits (see Figure 4.25), and they report paying, on average, more than 
10 percent of the contract value (see Figure 4.27). Generally, a greater 





































    













    
    










    
    
    
















    





Figure 4.25  Percentage of Firms That Said Bribes Were Requested/ 












SOURCE: World Bank (2015). 
percentage of firms in FSU countries (lighter) report making bribe pay-
ments for routine business activities (obtaining an operating license, 
utility connections, and the like) (see Figure 4.25), so it is not surpris-
ing to discover FSU firms reporting a higher incidence of interactions 
with government officials to make bribe payments (Figure 4.26). Nor is 
it surprising that a similar amount of time is spent by senior-level man-
agement in dealing with regulations (Figure 4.28). To put these figures 
into perspective, Figure 4.29 identifies the number of FSU and CEE 
firms in the respective samples that applied for required permits and 
utility connections in the previous two years, with Figure 4.30 illustrat-
ing the average number of days required to obtain a particular service. 
Similarities between FSU and CEE countries in terms of general 
obstacles encountered are evident in Figure 4.31. Tax-related issues 
(see also Figure 4.32) and business licensing account for major sources 
of obstacles to doing business. The main difference between the two 
groups of countries involves labor regulations, which are perceived as 
more problematic in CEE countries than in FSU countries. 
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Figure 4.26  Bribe Frequency in Interactions with Government, CEE and 
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Figure 4.28  Time Tax: Percentage of Senior Management Time Spent 
Dealing with Regulations, CEE and FSU Countries 
SOURCE: World Bank (2015). 
Figure 4.29  Percentage of Firms That Have Applied for One of Six 
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Figure 4.30  Average Number of Days to Obtain One of Six Things, CEE 
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SOURCE: World Bank (2015). 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Governance involves the processes of decision making and deci-
sion implementation, and it takes place at the international, national, 
regional/local, and firm levels. Typically treated as a technical matter 
which can be solved by improved skill transfer, reorganizing struc-
tures, and providing additional resources, good governance is difficult 
to achieve. Good governance tends to emerge where there is bureau-
cratic competence, transparency, and predictability in the decision-
making and implementation processes, and when fi scal sustainability 
and accountability become the norm. 
Good governance is not an automatic outcome of democratiza-
tion and liberalization in transition (former socialist) economies. As 
Brӓutigam (2000) points out, good governance has some of the char-
acteristics of public goods: everyone benefits, and since no one can be 















Moderate Major Very severe 
SOURCE: World Bank (2015). 
excluded from the benefits, there is little incentive to pay (devote the 
resources necessary to promote good governance), and there may eas-
ily be obstacles to good governance among those who would lose their 
privileged position. Good governance is less frequently exhibited in 
FSU countries than in CEE countries. Partly this is explained by the 
institutional environment that existed in the countries before the social-
ist period began. Partly it is explained by the importance of kinship and 
reciprocity—i.e., the extensive reliance on social capital for completing 
routine transactions. Partly it is explained by initial conditions relat-
ing to corruption (bad governance): countries where corruption is high 
at the beginning of the transition process find it difficult to reduce or 
eliminate corruption over time. 
International assistance does not guarantee good governance, even 
when different aspects of good governance are conditions of receiv-
ing aid. In countries where institutions are weak (legal or banking, for 
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example), international assistance may even contribute to “bad” gov-
ernance: aid is diverted and corrupt individuals are not removed, local 
initiatives are “crowded out” as project managers and foreign experts 
oversee aid use, or countries embark on risky fiscal endeavors knowing 
that they likely will be bailed out, for instance. 
While the contribution of good governance to economic, political, 
and social well being has been established, a few issues remain unre-
solved. How good does good governance need to be; is there a thresh-
old level? At what level does good governance need to be exhibited: 
at the firm level, the local level, the national level, the international 
level—or at some combination of these? Resolving such questions will 
enable policymakers to more effectively implement good governance. 


















1. Williams and Siddique (2008) cite 85 studies that link governance quality to eco-
nomic outcomes. 
2. While the particular requirements may change over time or across countries, con-
ditionality is necessary in order to document to taxpayers or donors that the money 
provided by the aid-granting agency was “well spent.” At the same time, however, 
the governance literature points out the paradox that aid conditionality generates: 
aid to reduce poverty or promote social well-being requires good governance; 
countries where aid is most needed (i.e., where poverty conditions are most 
severe) exhibit limited ability to implement policies that promote characteristics 
of good governance. In a recent empirical study, Heckelman (2010) demonstrates 
that aid to transition economies did have positive consequences for some dimen-
sions of governance (judicial, electoral) but not others (media independence). 
3. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) data show that 
investment in the early 1990s was between 20 and 50 percent lower than pre-
transition levels in former socialist economies (EBRD 2010). 
4. While the literature is replete with studies that show that governance matters when 
it comes to economic performance, empirical studies that document causality pro-
vide mixed results (see, for example, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson [2001]; 
Arndt and Oman [2006]; Glaeser et al. [2004]; and Mauro [1995]). 
5. For a detailed description of the measures, see World Bank (2014). 
6. For more information, see Freedom House (2012). 
7. For more information, see Transparency International (2013). 
8. For a detailed description of the methodology used to construct the Index of Eco-
nomic Freedom, see Heritage Foundation (2012). 
9. “Economic freedom” is defined as “the fundamental right of every human to con-
trol his or her own labor and property.” See http://www.heritage.org/index/about. 
10. For more information, see http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/economics/data/ 
beeps.shtml. 
11. The Life in Transition Survey, conducted by the EBRD, collects information 
from individuals in transition economies about their perceptions and experience 
with corruption. See http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/publications/special/ 
transitionII.shtml. 
12. Former Soviet Union or “FSU” countries include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Krygyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. The Baltic republics (Estonia, 
Lavtia, and Lithuania), while grouped here as FSU, are sometimes included with 
CEE countries, because they chose not to join the post-Soviet Commonwealth of 
Independent States. Data are not always available for all countries in all years; 
hence, Figure 4.6 lists only 12 FSU countries, not 15. 
13. CEE countries include Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia. Data are not always available for all countries in all years; 
hence, figures may show a varying number of CEE countries. 
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 14. Voice and accountability is designed to capture not only the extent to which indi-
viduals are able to express their opinions and ideas before, during, and after gov-
ernmental decision making and implementation, but also their participation in 
making these decisions and the mechanism for imposing consequences associated 
with the decisions made. 
15. Control of corruption is designed to capture “perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests” (taken 
from the WGI site http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#faq). 
16. In some instances, the objective is to influence the content of rules/regulations/laws 
(public-sector outcomes), and the activity or transaction is initiated by private-
sector agents (“state capture”); in other instances, the objective of the activity or 
transaction is to use public-sector position for personal/private (fi nancial) gain 
(“grabbing hand”). 
17. Knack (2006) describes a variety of corrupt interactions: between fi rms, between 
households, between firms and government individuals/agencies, between house-
holds and government individuals/agencies, and so forth. 
18. Note that for Figures 4.2 through 4.19, the time intervals along the x axis change 
from two years to one year. This is because in 2003 Worldwide Governance Indi-
cators data began to be gathered on a yearly rather than a biennial basis. 
19. We note that comparative analyses based on governance measures derived from 
perceptions that involve longitudinal data are subject to two types of influences. 
First, differences over time may stem from changes in the composite measure: 
components added or subtracted, or new sources of information included. Second, 
events may occur at a point in time (election, financial crisis, public demonstra-
tions, for example) that causes perceptions to change. Accounting for these two 
dimensions, as WGI does, allows for more accurate assessments of change. 
20. According to Shlapentokh (2013), “hundreds of thousands of employees in private 
companies” receive not only their official salary but also a “salary in an envelope.” 
This practice of companies (reporting wages below what was actually paid to 
their employees) allows firms to reduce their tax bill, and it is readily accepted by 
employees. 
21. The WGI composite measure of government effectiveness is designed to cap-
ture “perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service 
and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s com-
mitment to such policies” (see http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index 
.aspx#faq).
 22. Regulatory quality captures individuals’ and firms’ perceptions of government’s 
ability to “formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private-sector development” (see http://info.worldbank.org/governance/ 
wgi/index.aspx#faq).
 23. The political stability composite measure is designed to capture “perceptions of 
the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconsti-
tutional or violent means, including politically motivated violence and terrorism” 
(see http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/faq.htm ). 
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24. Firms are asked to rate the quality of public services provided by central gov-
ernment, the judiciary (legal system), and such local authorities (institutions) as 
police and utilities, for example, in order to evaluate whether and which institu-
tions impose obstacles to doing business. 
25. Other questions focus on state intervention in firm operations (inspections, sub-
sidies, bribes, etc.) and on firms’ efforts to influence local or federal authorities 
(bribes, kickbacks, etc.). 
26. Hellman et al. (2000) note issues related to perception bias and the likelihood that 
individuals in a particular country might be subject to similar kvetching (complain-
ing) or kvelling (being overly optimistic). The survey design includes questions 
that can be verified or matched up with objective data (exchange rate variability 
and telephone infrastructure), thus Hellman et al. are able to undertake analyses to 
assess whether and where (which country) perception bias is problematic. 
27. Sample selection by country took place in such a way as to generate a represen-
tative sample of firms. For discussion of the sample selection process, and the 
characteristics of the participating firms, see Hellman et al. (2000). 
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Seema Jayachandran 
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Ensuring that its citizens have access to high-quality schooling and 
health care is among a government’s most important roles. Health and 
education—which enhance human capital—are widely believed to pro-
mote economic growth: schooling and health measures have both been 
linked to increased gross domestic product (GDP), and there are well-
grounded reasons to believe that health and education boost worker 
productivity and, in turn, income. In addition, bolstering the health and 
education of children from poor families is one of the most powerful 
ways to break the intergenerational transmission of poverty and allow 
families to rise out of poverty. Moreover, health and education are basic 
human rights of every citizen, and governments are responsible for 
safeguarding these rights (United Nations 1948, Articles 25 and 26). 
While there does exist private-sector provision of both health and 
education services in developing countries, the government is typically 
the main provider in these countries. In part, the government is fi lling in 
for a poorly developed private market, but there are also several reasons 
why governments have a natural role in these spheres, such as disease 
prevention or the externalities from having an educated population. Not 
only does the government account for a large share of the provision 
of services in the education and health care sectors, but education and 
health care also make up a large share of government spending. Health 
care and education account for over a third of the public-sector work-
force in developing countries (Clements et al. 2010). 
Unfortunately, governments in developing countries often do a 
poor job of delivering health care and education to their citizens. This 
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chapter will focus on the ways in which governance challenges reduce 
the quality of education and health care provision in developing coun-
tries. In particular, I will consider ways in which corruption and poor 
oversight of the workforce reduce the efficacy of these sectors. I will 
document the causes, different manifestations, and extent of these prob-
lems. I will also discuss a range of promising policy solutions that have 
been adopted to address the problems, such as financial incentives, 
leveraging technological advancements to improve monitoring, infor-
mation sharing through media outlets, and empowering stakeholders to 
improve accountability. 
HEALTH AND EDUCATION INDICATORS IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Despite the aforementioned reasons for governments to invest in 
the health of their populations, both health inputs and health outcomes 
tend to be much worse in poor countries than in rich countries. The 
highest neonatal and under-five mortality rates are found in develop-
ing countries. This finding is unsurprising, but what is staggering is 
the magnitude of the gap between rich and poor countries: under-five 
mortality rates in 2000 range from 241 deaths per 1,000 births to 4 
deaths per 1,000 births (World Bank 2014). Health inputs exhibit the 
same pattern as health outcomes. For example, the child immunization 
rate is highly correlated with a country’s GDP per capita. 
Education levels in developing countries are also low. In such 
countries, 37 percent of the population aged 25 and over has no school-
ing, compared to 4 percent in developed countries. A similar pattern is 
seen in the percentage of people with a secondary-school education or 
higher—27 percent in developing countries compared to 68 percent in 
developed countries (Barro and Lee 2001). 
The quality of available health and education services and not sim-
ply low take-up is at the heart of the problem. For example, those who 
do attend school in developing countries often receive a low-quality 
education. Schoellman (2012) uses U.S. census data to estimate returns 
to schooling for foreign-educated immigrants working in the United 
States. By comparing immigrants who were educated in, say, Nigeria 
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to those educated in France, he calculates how much money an extra 
year of schooling in Nigeria is worth in the U.S. labor market compared 
to an extra year of schooling in France. This estimate provides a met-
ric of school quality in the different origin countries. When this proxy 
for school quality is compared with GDP per capita, there is a strong 
positive relationship between a country’s GDP and school quality. 
Schoellman finds that differences in education quality are as important 
as differences in years of schooling when decomposing the variation in 
human capital accumulation across countries. 
Poor-quality education also negatively affects school enrollment 
rates: parents have less of a reason to send their children to a school 
where they are not learning, and students have less interest in attending 
a school where they are not engaged. An eye-opening report featured 
interviews with parents in India about their children’s schooling 
(PROBE 1999). In 8 percent of the cases where boys were withdrawn 
from school and 18 percent of the cases where girls were withdrawn 
from school, parents reported that the reason for their having taken their 
child out of school was poor teaching. Poor quality also stops parents 
from ever enrolling their children in school in the fi rst place for 8 per-
cent of boys and 1 percent of girls. One mother in the state of Madhya 
Pradesh explained why she had never sent her daughter, Rukmini, to 
school: “If we send the girl to school, we have to pay a labourer to 
replace her, and the girl learns nothing. What do we gain? See this other 
child who is in class 5. She knows nothing. My son Parkash studied till 
class 6—he knows nothing” (ibid., p. 27). 
The quality of health care is also often inadequate. One dimension 
of quality is the level of effort health care providers exert. A study in 
urban India investigated this aspect of quality by comparing providers’
actions in a hypothetical test environment to observed practices in the 
clinic (Das and Hammer 2005). The study interviewed and observed a 
representative sample of both public and private health care providers. 
The health care providers participated in “vignettes” in which trained 
research staff acted out various hypothetical health scenarios. Doctors 
were scored on the questions they asked the “patients,” diagnosis, and 
recommended treatment. Vignette scores were used to assign a com-
petence score to each provider—how much the provider knew. One 
month after this exercise, research staff observed providers in their 
actual practice for a full working day and scored each patient interac-







tion based on the amount of time the health care provider spent with 
the patient, questions the provider asked the patient, examinations, and 
recommendations. These scores were then compared to the vignette 
scores to create a measure of provider effort. A main finding is that 
providers’ actual performance was well short of their potential perfor-
mance: providers knew what to do but did not do it in practice. Among 
providers with a medical degree, those in the private sector completed 
only 60 percent of the activities they knew to be important, and those 
in the public sector completed only 33 percent. Thus, the problem was 
particularly acute for public health care providers. Differences in effort 
were most salient in poor neighborhoods, where patients appeared to be 
better off visiting private providers rather than public providers, despite 
the fact that public providers were more qualified and presumably less 
expensive. 
GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS IN THE HEALTH AND 
EDUCATION SECTORS 
As described above, in many cases governments in developing 
countries are failing to provide high-quality health care and education. 
One important factor is poor governance, which I define as the inef-
ficient management and use of the available resources, often owing to 
malfeasance or shirking by government employees. While governance 
does not account for all of the problems in the health care and edu-
cation sectors—the available financial and human resources are often 
very limited—it plays a central role. The governance problems run the 
gamut, from graft and bribery to absenteeism and indolence among 
employees. 
Graft 
Perhaps the simplest type of governance problem is theft of financial 
resources. A well-known World Bank study in Uganda “followed the 
money” to document the extent of graft by local bureaucrats (Reinikka 
and Svensson 2004). The central government in Uganda disbursed edu-
cation grants to individual schools based on the number of students 
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enrolled. By tracking the disbursements and then the amount received 
by the schools, the study found that schools received on average only 
20 percent of the amount they were entitled to. The median percentage 
of the federal grant received was 0 percent! The missing money appar-
ently was captured by local bureaucrats and was not reallocated to other 
public uses but rather was stolen for personal use. While this is just one 
specific example, it is representative of what is widely believed to be a 
prevalent problem: bureaucrats skim off some of the money that should 
be spent to buy supplies, maintain facilities, and pay teachers and health 
care workers. 
Informal Payments 
Government employees can also enrich themselves by demanding 
“informal payments” for services that should be rendered for free or 
at a specified rate. Essentially, the government employee is extracting 
a bribe in exchange for performing a service that he is contractually 
obligated to provide even if this bribe is not paid. Lewis (2007) reviews 
the literature on informal payments in the health sector and highlights 
the prevalence of the practice across countries for basic services such 
as admission to the hospital or receipt of subsidized medications. She 
reports on a survey in Bangalore, India, by Gopakumar (1998) that 
found that 51 percent of community members surveyed had paid bribes 
in government hospitals, while 89 percent had paid bribes in hospitals 
in small towns. In one of the more egregious examples cited, individu-
als reported having to pay bribes to nurses in maternity homes so that 
mothers could see their newborns. 
A related phenomenon is seen in schooling, though perhaps less 
frequently. In crowded classes, teachers sometimes ask parents to pay a 
fee so their child can sit in the front of the classroom and get more atten-
tion. It is also not unheard of for a teacher to demand payment in order 
to advance the student to the next grade or give high marks. 
Absenteeism 
Worker absenteeism is a major challenge in both the health care 
and the education sectors: employees simply do not show up to work. 
Banerjee, Deaton, and Duflo (2004) document absence rates in health 






care facilities using survey data from public and private medical pro-
viders, as well as traditional healers, in a poor, rural district of India. In 
the public sector, absence rates were verified by weekly, in-person visits 
(random spot checks) to public health facilities over the course of one 
year. Subcenters and aid posts (the lowest-tier health facilities) suffer 
from the highest rates of absenteeism: those performing the spot checks 
found that 56 percent of facilities were closed during normal working 
hours. In contrast, primary and community health centers (PHCs and 
CHCs) were closed only 3 percent of the time when the spot checkers 
showed up. However, when facilities were open, both subcenters and 
PHCs/CHCs were understaffed: the fraction of allocated medical staff 
found during a visit averaged 55 percent for subcenters and 64 percent 
for PHCs/CHCs. One perilous consequence of this low-quality govern-
ment care is that it drives patients to private care. In rural India, private 
health care providers are often severely underqualified. In the area stud-
ied by Banerjee, Deaton, and Duflo, 82 percent of private providers 
reported that they had no medical training whatsoever. 
This pattern of absenteeism is supported by cross-country data 
from Chaudhury et al. (2006). Survey teams in six countries made two 
to three in-person visits to a (nearly) nationally representative sample 
of primary schools and primary health centers. On average, the educa-
tion sector suffered from an absence rate of 19 percent, while the health 
sector had an absence rate of 35 percent. Absence rates declined as per 
capita income increased, especially in the education sector. 
Shirking 
The absence rates described above may understate the severity of 
just how poor the provision of service may be, in that providers who 
are present may not actually be working. Chaudhury et al. (2006) 
found that in India teachers who were present during spot checks were 
actually teaching only 45 percent of the time. Even this statistic may 
overestimate effort, as teachers were counted as teaching in instances 
where they were only keeping the class in order and not actually teach-
ing. Data from secondary schools in Nepal show a similar, though less 
severe, pattern: 18 percent of teachers failed to teach for the entire class 
period (Jayachandran 2014). 
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Perverse Incentives as a Contributing Factor 
Government workers’ lack of effort may merely stem from the lack 
of positive incentives to work hard, but in some cases there are per-
verse incentives that reward teachers or health care workers for poor 
performance. Jayachandran (2014) studies the prevalent phenomenon 
of after-school tutoring in government schools in which schoolteachers 
provide for-profit tutoring to their own students outside of the normal 
school day. The possibility of extra income from tutoring may incentiv-
ize teachers to teach less material during the normal school day, thereby 
increasing the likelihood that their students will need to attend tutoring. 
Jayachandran uses data from a national survey in Nepal to investigate 
the effect of a secondary school offering tutoring on teacher effort and 
student academic achievement. Students in private and public schools 
were asked to report whether they received tutoring, whether or not 
their teacher taught for the entire class period, and other subjective 
information on teacher performance. These data were then linked with 
students’ scores on the national secondary-school exam. After-school 
tutoring in public schools was found to reduce the likelihood that teach-
ers taught for the entire class period by 7 percentage points, a significant 
reduction. Less teaching translated into a lower student performance 
on the secondary-school exam. This finding did not carry over to pri-
vate schools, which is not surprising when one considers that private 
schools, unlike public schools, face a financial hit if they teach inad-
equately during the regular school day, since they will lose students and 
hence school-fee revenues. The students hurt most by this practice of 
“self-dealing” are those whose families are too poor to afford tutoring; 
these students are taught less during school than the teacher could have 
feasibly covered, but are not able to learn the missed material by taking 
the tutoring classes. 
Reverse or perverse incentives are also found in the health care sec-
tor. Doctors whose wages are linked to the number of medicines, tests, 
or procedures they recommend are more likely to prescribe unneeded 
treatments. This phenomenon is widespread in China, where the anti-
biotic prescription rate is almost double that of other countries. Doctors 
are incentivized to overprescribe by their hospitals, which make money 
from setting higher prices for certain drugs, and also by pharmaceuti-
cal companies, which provide doctors with bonuses to increase sales. 






A randomized audit study showed that doctors were signifi cantly less 
likely to prescribe antibiotics to patients who signaled they had some 
knowledge that antibiotics might not be needed to treat their symptoms 
(39 percent of such cases received antibiotics) compared to patients 
that did not (64 percent of such cases received antibiotics). Patients 
who demonstrated knowledge about antibiotics were also less likely to 
be prescribed multiple drugs or more expensive drugs (Currie, Lin, and 
Zhang 2011). 
In both of these examples—tutoring and overprescription of 
drugs—the problem is worse than bribery. Not only are government 
workers extracting money from citizens, but here, in the pursuit of addi-
tional money for themselves, government workers intentionally provide 
what they know to be lower-quality service, be it less teaching during 
class or unnecessary medicines. 
Why Do These Governance Problems Exist? 
There are fundamental reasons why governance problems are 
severe in developing countries and are pervasive in the health care and 
education sectors. Many other government services are based primarily 
in cities or towns, but schools and health clinics are located throughout 
a country. That geographic spread is one underlying reason that moni-
toring workers is difficult. Many schools and health posts are located 
in remote villages, causing a twofold problem. First, poor-quality roads 
and inadequate public transportation make it difficult for government 
workers to reach their place of work. Second, these same conditions 
also hinder supervisors or auditors from traveling to conduct spot 
checks and worker evaluations. Thus, there is often little monitoring of 
the performance of government workers. 
Another contributing factor is that government workers earn a low 
salary by worldwide standards (though they are often well paid relative 
to their skill group in their countries). Many health care and education 
workers moonlight at other jobs to supplement their income. Workers 
with multiple jobs are more likely to be absent if their jobs have con-
flicting schedules, and they may also exert less effort—for example, a 
teacher might have less time to prepare a lesson. 
A third important factor that exacerbates these issues is that consum-
ers are less able to monitor service provision and enforce high quality 





Governance Challenges in Education and Health 101 
than they are in wealthier countries. Parents with limited education may 
lack the ability to gauge what their child is learning in school or how 
their local school’s performance compares to other schools in the region 
(Dizon-Ross 2014). Similarly, patients tend to have little knowledge of 
whether or not a health care provider is performing the needed tests, 
asking the appropriate questions, and making an accurate diagnosis. 
Even when stakeholders are aware that services are inadequate, they 
may not have sufficient leverage or social standing within the commu-
nity to hold providers accountable. It is much more likely that a parent 
in a developing country has less education and status compared to her 
child’s teacher than would be the case in developed countries, simply 
because teachers have a higher position in the society-wide distribu-
tion of schooling attainment in developing countries than in developed 
countries. 
Finally, it is often diffi cult to fire government employees, so govern-
ments have few tools to enforce job requirements and punish shirkers 
even when they are able to monitor workers adequately and would like 
to improve the effort level of the workforce. 
Beyond Governance: Limited Resources 
It is important to note that there are many factors other than gover-
nance challenges that contribute to poor health and education outcomes 
in developing countries. The amount of available government revenue is 
lower, which means fewer resources for education and health care. This 
translates into larger class sizes and inadequate teaching aids or faulty 
hospital equipment and lack of medicine. Infrastructure is also poor, 
with many facilities lacking water and electricity. These other prob-
lems may very well exacerbate the governance challenges described 
above. In an analysis of cross-country data, teacher absence rates fall 
by 2.7 percentage points with a one standard deviation increase in an 
index measuring school infrastructure. A similar pattern is observed in 
the health care sector, where the availability of potable water at the 
facility significantly decreases the absence rates of health care workers 
(Chaudhury et al. 2006). 





SOME PROMISING APPROACHES TO ADDRESSING 
GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES 
Governments are typically ineffective at monitoring workers and 
enforcing performance standards. While these are difficult problems 
to overcome, there has been progress recently through innovative 
approaches by governments to incentivize good performance, monitor 
their workers, and empower citizens to monitor government workers. 
Incentive Schemes 
A basic but powerful idea in economics is that an employer can 
align workers’ incentives with the employer’s objectives by means of 
pay for performance. Recent pilot programs have shown the benefits 
of incentive schemes in improving teacher performance and reducing 
absenteeism in schools. A nonprofit foundation collaborated with the 
state government in Andhra Pradesh, India, to conduct a randomized 
evaluation of performance pay for teachers in rural primary schools. 
Two schemes were assessed: group bonuses tied to school performance 
and individual bonuses tied to teacher performance. The schemes were 
evaluated over the course of two years, during which student perfor-
mance was assessed at the end of each school year (Muralidharan and 
Sundararaman 2011). Bonuses were awarded if average test scores 
(either for the school or for the individual teacher) increased by at least 
5 percent. The researchers evaluating the program conducted unan-
nounced spot checks to measure student and teacher attendance as well. 
The program, including both schemes, significantly improved student 
performance: scores in language increased by 0.17 standard devia-
tions, and math scores increased by 0.27 standard deviations. As judged 
against other policy innovations in education, these were impressively 
large impacts on student test scores. Muralidharan and Sundararaman 
conclude that the improvements in test scores were due to increased 
teacher effort rather than improved teacher or student attendance. An 
innovative feature of the study is that student performance was mea-
sured in subjects such as science and social science, where performance 
was not factored into teacher pay. One concern about teacher incentive 
pay is that teachers might “teach to the test,” and other types of learn-
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ing might suffer. In this case, performance in all subjects improved, 
presumably because the teacher put in more effort across the board, 
or because better student learning in math and language had spillover 
benefits to other subjects such as science and social science. 
Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan (2012), whose study is discussed in more 
detail below, analyze another incentive program in schools and fi nd that 
linking incentives for teachers to their attendance improved student test 
scores. 
Technology 
A second potential solution to shortcomings in the health care and 
education sectors is to use technology to improve staff monitoring. 
High rates of absenteeism may be due, in part, to the fact that there 
is no accountability for providers. By leveraging advances in tech-
nology, it may be possible to reduce some of the barriers that prevent 
governments from actively monitoring attendance and performance. 
A nongovernmental organization (NGO) in India attempted to reduce 
teacher absences by using cameras to document attendance. Teachers 
were given a digital camera with a tamper-proof date and time stamp 
and were instructed to have a student take one photograph at the begin-
ning of the school day and one at the end of the school day. To be 
considered valid, photographs had to be taken at least five hours apart, 
and both photographs had to have at least eight children pictured with 
the teacher. A randomized evaluation assessed the effectiveness of this 
program using data from unscheduled spot checks by the survey team, 
teacher photos, and student test scores (Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan 2012). 
The program was found to significantly reduce absence rates in cam-
era schools (where the rate fell to 21 percent) compared to noncamera 
schools (where the absence rate was 42 percent). Student test scores 
in schools with cameras were also significantly higher (by 0.17 stan-
dard deviations), which led to more students from these schools passing 
competency exams to continue their schooling. This positive impact 
on student achievement is an important result because it indicates that 
teachers did not “game the system” and simply show up to work but not 
teach. Rather, the incentive to show up to work increased their teaching 
and, in turn, student learning. 







Even more advanced technology is now being leveraged in the 
health care sector. The state government in Karnataka, India, recently 
launched something known as the Integrated Medical Information and 
Disease Surveillance System (IMIDSS), in which biometric devices 
record health care worker attendance using thumbprints. Attendance 
data is sent in real time to monitors in government headquarters using 
cellular or radio networks. This monitoring is linked to both incentives 
and penalties for the health care workers. A randomized evaluation of 
the effectiveness of this program finds that it both increases health care 
worker attendance and improves patient health outcomes (Dhaliwal and 
Hanna 2014). 
Citizen Empowerment 
Improving citizens’ knowledge can be an important first step 
toward increasing government accountability. Media outlets offer a 
means to increase citizens’ awareness. This approach was used by the 
central government in Uganda in response to learning that grants for 
schools were being siphoned off by local government officials, as dis-
cussed above. Prior to the intervention, the average school in the sample 
received only 24 percent of the grant money to which it was entitled. 
In an attempt to increase accountability, the Ugandan government 
launched a newspaper campaign to disseminate information to parents 
and teachers about the federal grants their local school was entitled to. 
Two public-expenditure tracking surveys administered six years apart, 
one pre- and one postintervention, were used to assess the effectiveness 
of the campaign. Data indicated that head teachers’ knowledge of the 
grant programs significantly increased with proximity to a newspaper 
outlet, both in terms of the funding rules and the timing of the release 
of funds (Reinikka and Svensson 2005).1 Increased knowledge led to 
more money reaching schools. With each standard deviation increase 
in head teachers’ knowledge of entitlements, the funds received by the 
school increased by an average of 44 percent. In addition to reducing 
the capture of public funds by larcenous local officials, the campaign 
had a positive effect on student enrollment: A one-standard-deviation 
increase in the school’s share of received funding resulted in an increase 
of 297 more students per school. 
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While citizens are aware of their personal experiences, there is 
often no way for them to measure quality of services in terms of aggre-
gate outcomes in the community. An intervention in Uganda in 2004 
aimed to empower citizens by providing such aggregated information 
to the community, in this case about health care. Rather than using mass 
media, this intervention brought together local government health care 
workers and community members to disseminate the information and 
discuss how to improve health care provision. The program was found 
to have significantly improved health care delivery and health outcomes 
(Björkman and Svensson 2009). First, researchers surveyed both com-
munity members and health care providers to collect data on health 
outcomes (verified by medical records when possible), health facility 
characteristics, and provider performance. This information was used 
to create a unique report card for each village health care facility, and 
the information on the village’s report card was presented at community 
meetings by local NGOs. These report cards were used as a conver-
sation starting point for community representatives and providers to 
develop action plans for improving service delivery and monitoring. 
The randomized evaluation of the intervention found that health care 
service delivery and health outcomes improved in several significant 
ways: Average waiting time decreased by 12 minutes, from 131 to 
119 minutes, and there was a 0.56 standard deviation increase in the 
index used to measure facility conditions (cleanliness of fl oors, walls, 
furniture, and so forth). Absence rates among service providers also 
declined. Most strikingly, the intervention resulted in several improved 
health outcomes such as child weight and child survival. 
An important cautionary note is in order, specifically about com-
munity information interventions, but also more broadly about the 
universal applicability of any type of solution. While the results of the 
Ugandan community intervention are promising, other community 
empowerment programs have been found to be less successful. Kremer 
and Holla (2009) outline the null findings of evaluations in two dif-
ferent countries that aimed to empower education stakeholders. One 
intervention in India sought to improve the performance of community 
monitoring committees for schools, which had been ineffective from the 
outset. Survey results showed that few households were aware of these 
committees. Tests were also administered to children to assess school 
quality. Results indicated that parents had an inaccurate understand-






ing of how much their children were learning. To solve this problem, 
officials fashioned an intervention that was aimed at informing the com-
munity about the following areas: school performance, state-mandated 
school requirements, funding, and the responsibilities of the preexist-
ing monitoring committees. Despite the fact that almost 30 percent of 
households attended these meetings, monitoring committees in villages 
that received the intervention were no more effective than committees 
in villages with no intervention. Teacher and student absences were also 
unchanged. 
Two programs in Kenya also targeted community monitoring 
bodies for schools. Of note, while the majority of teachers in Kenyan 
schools are directly employed by the government, schools or moni-
toring committees sometimes hire contract teachers to work with the 
government-employed teachers. The first intervention attempted to 
empower these committees by providing prizes which committees 
could bestow on teachers to incentivize them and by facilitating meet-
ings between parents, committee members, and civil-service teachers. 
Results echo those of the empowerment intervention in India—there 
was no effect on teacher absence or student achievement. 
The second program in Kenya aimed to improve committee moni-
toring of contract teacher attendance. While the program did not change 
attendance among contract teachers (which was already relatively high), 
the program did somewhat improve the attendance of civil-service 
teachers, though the results were not statistically significant. Despite 
the fact that there was no significant change in teacher attendance, the 
program did improve student attendance and performance in the class-
rooms of civil-service teachers. 
Thus, while the approach of citizen empowerment had remarkable 
impacts on the health care sector in Uganda, the same approach was 
relatively ineffective on the education sector in Kenya and India. One 
hopes that policymakers, NGOs, and researchers will go back to the 
drawing board and devise other approaches to solve the problem of 
poor-quality education in these latter settings where the first attempt 
failed. These examples serve as a reminder that there is no one-size-fits-
all solution, and that the process of improving governance in developing 
countries will be laborious and often frustrating. 
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CONCLUSION 
The majority of funding in the health care and education sectors 
is spent on provider salaries. For example, 80 percent of India’s health 
care budget is dedicated to provider compensation (Das and Hammer 
2005). A similar pattern is observed in education budgets, where, on 
average, 75 percent of funding goes toward teacher salaries in develop-
ing countries (Kremer and Holla 2009). Thus, improving the quality 
of health and education hinges on improving the performance of the 
workforce. 
There are several basic features of poor countries that create gov-
ernance challenges in monitoring public workers and incentivizing 
them to perform well. Thus, governance problems are pervasive in the 
education and health care sectors and act as a barrier to high-quality 
education and health care services. The lack of high-quality education 
and health care services in turn obstructs educational attainment and 
good health outcomes. While no panacea exists, innovative solutions 
are being developed and tested: redesigning incentive schemes, using 
technology to monitor workers, and empowering citizens with informa-
tion, often disseminated through mass media. There is still much work 
to be done to solve these governance problems, but the problems are 
well worth tackling given the importance of human capital for reducing 
poverty and promoting economic growth in developing countries. 
Notes 
I can be reached at the Department of Economics at Northwestern University and 
by e-mail at seema@northwestern.edu. I am grateful to Jaye Stapleton for excellent 
research assistance. 
1. A “head teacher” in Uganda is similar to what in the United States or Great Britain 
would be called a “headmaster,” except that a head teacher often has regular teach-
ing duties in addition to part-time administrative ones. 
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Governance Problems and 
Priorities for Local Climate 
Adaptation and Poverty Alleviation 
Stephen C. Smith 
George Washington University 
This chapter begins by reviewing the encouraging progress that has 
been made against poverty over the past three decades, but then it con-
siders some reasons for concern as to why further progress may be diffi-
cult. Two key constraints are environmental stress and poor governance. 
Governance failures slow economic growth and often particularly affect 
the poor; they may also lead to violent conflict, with particular harm to 
people living in poverty. Environmental degradation can cause poverty 
and indirectly lead to conflict. Adaptation on the parts of both govern-
ment and the private sector is an essential response to climate change, 
and people who successfully adapt may also be less vulnerable to vio-
lence, as well as less likely to provoke conflict. But without good gov-
ernance, actions people take to try to adapt to climate change may in 
themselves trigger conflict. Thus, it is essential to improve governance 
for adaptation, both in terms of government’s overall planned adaptation 
responses and in its facilitation of successful, harmonious, and autono-
mous adaptation in the private sector and civil society. 
PROGRESS AGAINST POVERTY: THE GLASS IS HALF FULL
Clear Progress on Poverty since 1980 
Since 1980, the fraction of the world’s population living on less 
than $1.25 a day has fallen from over 40 percent down to just over 20 
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percent. Indeed, given that some have put forward higher estimates of 
the number living in poverty in China in 1980, the global incidence of 
extreme poverty in that year may have been closer to 50 percent. The 
World Bank reports that its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
target of halving the fraction of people that were living in poverty in 
1990 (about 40 percent that year) by the year 2015 had already been 
achieved by 2010 (United Nations 2012). Moreover, 6 of the 10 fastest-
growth economies since 2005 have been in Africa, the region with the 
greatest fraction in poverty (World Bank 2013). On the other hand, with 
the commodity price declines coinciding with the growth slowdown 
in China, the sustainability of this higher growth level is called into 
question. 
There has also been impressive improvement in most health indica-
tors (Smith 2005). Life expectancy has risen, under-five mortality has 
fallen, and maternal mortality has been reduced. Education enrollments 
have also risen, along with basic literacy. While it remains in dispute 
as to whether incomes are converging globally, there is little doubt that 
there has been convergence in education and health levels in recent 
decades, and the international convergence of health and of education 
are mutually reinforcing (Sab and Smith 2002; UNDP 2012). 
Improved governance is foundational to successful development 
(North 1990), and there has been an impressive spread of democracy 
and of government transparency (UNDP 2012). 
Remaining Poverty Challenges 
But some of the important MDG targets—such as halving world 
hunger—will not be achieved by the 2015 deadline (World Bank 2011). 
There is a growing concentration of poverty in confl ict-affected 
states and regions with deteriorating environments—precisely where 
progress is most difficult (World Bank 2010a, 2011; World Resources 
Institute et al. 2011). 
And environmental decay is proceeding at a pace few had predicted 
20 years ago. Among other things, this is posing serious threats to the 
natural-resource-based livelihoods that so many of the global poor 
depend upon (World Resource Institute et al. 2011). 
Thus, much remains to be done—although the glass is half full, it 
remains half empty. 
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About 1.2 billion people currently subsist on less than $1.25 a day 
(the adjusted level, still known as the “dollar a day” level), and about 
2.7 billion—nearly two-fifths of the world’s population—live on less 
than $2 a day. At least 300 million people live in chronic extreme pov-
erty (Todaro and Smith 2011, Chapter 5). 
Unfortunately, sub-Saharan Africa has shown far less progress than 
other developing regions. While the fraction living in poverty has gone 
down somewhat in the past decade, the head count (number) of individ-
uals living in poverty rose dramatically in the 1981–2010 period, from 
about 205 million to about 414 million. The concentration of poverty 
may make it more difficult to redress. In most countries, the poverty gap 
has gone down along with the poverty head count. But between 1981 
and 2010, the average income of the extremely poor hardly increased 
in sub-Saharan Africa, remaining near an appalling 70 cents per person 
per day (World Bank 2013). 
This stagnation is closely connected to the lack of a sustained Green 
Revolution in Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa has very little irrigation, a 
factor that worsens constraints as climate change accelerates. World 
Bank research reveals that in 2007 only about 4 percent of farmland 
in sub-Saharan Africa was irrigated. Africa’s risky, rain-fed agriculture 
contrasts with 39 percent irrigation incidence in South Asia and 29 per-
cent incidence in East Asia and the Pacific. Moreover, despite progress, 
more than three-quarters of cereal-producing farmland in sub-Saharan 
Africa uses unimproved seeds, often in unfertilized, depleted fields, 
with yields dependent upon increasingly unreliable rainfall (see World 
Bank 2007). 
The Multiple Dimensions of Poverty 
Global poverty is about more than income, and is not automatically 
solved through economic growth. Poverty is characterized by early 
death, poor health, denial of education, and indeed the loss of child-
hood (Smith 2005). Thus, poverty is multidimensional and is character-
ized by health problems, undernutrition, child labor, illiteracy, under-
five mortality, degraded environment, disempowerment, and social 
exclusion. Nearly 1.7 billion people live in multidimensional poverty, 
according to the multidimensional poverty index (MPI) constructed by 
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the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 2012). In sum, 
poverty problems are not readily solved with higher income alone. 
Poverty is pervasiveness of early death. Kofi Annan said, “This 
[extreme poverty] is a poverty that kills” (United Nations 2005, p. 7). In 
some countries—Afghanistan, Chad, the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, 
Niger, and Sierra Leone—about one-fifth of all children die before age 
five from preventable causes. Life expectancy in sub-Saharan Africa 
is just 53. In South Asia, nearly 1 child in 12 dies before age fi ve. The 
under-five mortality rate is 118 per 1,000 in low-income countries, 51 
per 1,000 in middle-income countries, and 7 per 1,000 in high-income 
countries (World Bank 2011). Every day, an average of nearly 20,000 
children in developing countries die from preventable causes. This 
amounted to over seven million in 2012 alone. 
Poverty is hunger and poor health. The International Classifi-
cation of Diseases includes “Code Z59.5—extreme poverty” (Smith 
2005). About 900 million people are classified as hungry (undernour-
ished) by the United Nations’ World Food Organization (WFO). There 
are many other severe health deprivations. Micronutrient malnutrition 
affects nearly two billion; children may face lifelong disabilities (see, 
e.g., Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey [2006]). Women with nutritional 
deficiencies are more likely to deliver smaller babies, who are at risk of 
having poor growth and development. In many poor countries, parasites 
are widespread. In developing countries, a woman dies during child-
birth nearly every minute—very few of these women would have died 
if they had lived in a developed country. It has been estimated that as 
many as 3,000 children in Africa die from malaria each day. 
Poverty is the denial of the right to a basic education. As of 2012, 
there were about 776 million illiterate adults in the world (UNESCO 
2014). Nearly 40 percent of all adults in South Asia are illiterate. Often, 
students go to school only to find the teacher is absent: “teacher tru-
ancy” is a major scourge in South Asia and is also common in Africa. 
A child in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia can expect to receive less 
than five years of schooling. In at least 12 sub-Saharan African coun-
tries, a child is more likely to die before the age of five than to attend 
secondary school. 
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Poverty is the loss of childhood. According to the International 
Labour Organization, there are at least 215 million child laborers (ILO 
2010), and 115 million of these children are engaged in what the ILO 
classifies as “hazardous work.” Approximately 91 million working chil-
dren are under 12 years old. Millions of child laborers are trapped in 
slavery, trafficking, debt bondage, prostitution, pornography, and other 
abhorrent conditions. 
Special Challenges for Poverty Reduction 
It is well established that growth and development, although they 
are not a panacea, can reduce poverty. But the causality appears to run 
in both directions: it is also becoming increasingly understood that suc-
cessful poverty reduction can cause growth. Failure to address poverty 
produces constraints on prospects for development, for at least four 
reasons: 
1) Poor health, nutrition, and education lower the economic pro-
ductivity of people in poverty, leading directly and indirectly 
to slower growth. 
2) Higher income for the poor raises demand for locally produced 
goods (albeit of lower quality). 
3) The poor often lack access to credit, which constrains growth. 
In particular, the result can be lost opportunities for entrepre-
neurship that might benefit society. It can also render the poor 
unable to finance their children’s education, thus limiting the 
skilled labor force needed for development. 
4) Poverty creates incentives for high fertility as a source of old-
age financial security; high fertility is associated with a slower 
rate of economic growth (Todaro and Smith 2011, Chapter 5). 
The Role of Good Governance 
Good governance—which, as the editors of this volume point out 
in the introductory chapter, is also multidimensional—plays an essen-
tial role in achieving multidimensional poverty-reduction goals. The 
relationship between economic growth and effective poverty reduction 
is not inevitable, but it is possible. Economic growth helps to reduce 
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poverty in most places, most of the time. As is well known, good gov-
ernance—or at least avoidance of actively bad governance—is essential 
to increase growth rates and keep them high. Particularly to the extent 
that growth is not sufficient to reduce poverty, governance is needed to 
design and implement active public policies and effective, accessible 
basic services and social programs to attack poverty directly. Good gov-
ernance plays a critical role in preventing coercion and exploitation of 
the poor. It provides for two-way channels of communication between 
the poor and both national and local government. A voice for the poor is 
essential to bring both longstanding and new problems—such as nega-
tive climate change impacts—to government and (more broadly) citi-
zen attention. 
Another key function of good governance is the provision of rel-
evant and reliable information. Globally, more than two-thirds of the 
poor live in rural areas, and many of them are smallholder farmers 
using outmoded and no longer appropriate technology. Poor farmers 
can greatly benefit from government-provided agricultural extension 
information (such as has benefited farmers in the United States since 
the nineteenth century). Government also plays a key role in encour-
aging the use of improved seed varieties and other Green Revolution 
practices, including the expansion of irrigation. Such assistance will be 
all the more important as climate change becomes large enough to cre-
ate conditions outside the range of farmers’ experience. 
Again, development itself can be constrained by a high incidence 
of poverty, adding to the significance of good governance in achiev-
ing more narrowly defined economic objectives, as Sisay Asefa and 
Wei-Chiao Huang assert in the introduction to this volume. 
Why is it so difficult for the poorest of the poor to make further 
progress? One reason is the presence of poverty traps, which poor gov-
ernance often exacerbates. 
Addressing poverty traps. Poverty traps occur at both macro 
and micro levels. The notion of poverty traps goes back to the early 
days of post–World War II development economics. Nobel laureate 
Gunnar Myrdal called it a problem of “circular and cumulative cau-
sation” (Myrdal 1968, p. 1875). To overcome macro poverty traps, a 
“big push” may be needed, a concept pioneered by Paul Rosenstein-
Rodan (1943), who first raised some of the basic problems that can 
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underpin a poverty trap, such as lack of coordination among investors. 
High-fertility traps can exist because of a different kind of coordina-
tion problem: if all families had lower fertility, all would be better off, 
but as long as most other families are having many children, it is too 
economically risky for a family to be a “pioneer” in having only two 
children (Dasgupta 1993). Population pressures also figure in classic 
Malthusian traps, in which a society cannot escape from subsistence 
income because additional resources only go to maintain larger popu-
lation sizes (Urdal 2005). Many of these concepts have been formal-
ized in more recent years (Todaro and Smith 2011, Chapter 4). Another 
coordination failure is at work in the low-skills trap: workers who want 
skills that employers can use and employers who want equipment that 
workers can use may each be better off waiting for the other parties to 
invest first—but the result is that there are no modern jobs in a region. 
Collier et al. (2003) find that countries are prone to civil war when 
faced with a combination of low income, slow growth, and dependence 
on primary commodity exports. We return to this problem, which the 
authors describe as part of a “conflict trap,” later in the chapter. 
Many of these traps can also be found at a subnational level, or even 
at a district scale, including low-skill traps. Others are found primarily 
at the micro and even individual levels. 
A well-known example is the undernutrition trap, in which workers 
are unproductive because they have insufficient energy, and as a result 
they earn too little income to purchase sufficient calories and protein to 
improve their levels of energy (e.g., Dasgupta [1993]). This trap may 
not be common outside of famine conditions, but it may become a more 
serious concern if it interlocks with other traps to make the cycle more 
vicious. Similar cycles of individual deprivation can be caused by, or 
aggravated by, health problems that one is too poor to address, which 
may include mental health problems triggered or accentuated by stresses 
associated with living in poverty. They may also be caused by poor hous-
ing traps, in which bad housing (if not homelessness) prolongs illness, 
produces exposure to crime, leads to chronic sleep deprivation, and so 
on. Working-capital traps lead small vendors to maintain low invento-
ries, which in turn yield low sales and result in an inability to accumulate 
capital to allow for a larger inventory. Microfinance has developed in 
part to address this problem—almost 200 million people have partici-
pated, but that leaves hundreds of millions more who might also benefit. 
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Environmental degradation can also figure into poverty traps. In 
common-property resource traps, overuse of resources that lack well-
defined property rights or effective community management (Ostrom 
2005) can lead to poverty: lakes are overfished, forests are not managed 
sustainably, land is overgrazed. Part of the problem is that community 
management of common resources has broken down. This is often a 
legacy of greedy colonial practices, now all too often imitated by post-
colonial regimes. Once it has broken down, responsible use of shared 
resources is difficult to restore. Under some conditions, well-regulated 
privatization can be beneficial, providing an incentive to a recognized 
owner to monitor and maintain the value of these resources. 
But in many situations, the result is merely the disenfranchisement 
of the poor, and the loss of their access to the natural resources on which 
their livelihoods have depended. In many cases, local conditions make 
it impossible to privatize common property efficiently, let alone equita-
bly. Effective community management of the commons is an important 
priority for improved local and community governance with assistance 
from regional or national government levels—increasingly so as cli-
mate change threatens the productivity of these resources. 
Another example is the farm erosion trap, in which the poor face 
such urgent need to grow more food that they have to overuse their 
land, even though in many cases they are aware that the result will be 
reduced soil fertility—hence, reduced productivity in future seasons. 
As a result, farmers may be trapped in a downward spiral, in which 
productivity gains from learning new techniques are undermined by the 
poorer quality of the soil. There is evidence of poverty-trap problems 
among farmers in Ethiopia, particularly in the impoverished region that 
grows enset (a type of root crop that resembles a small banana tree) 
(Kwak and Smith [2013]; see also Deressa [2007]). 
TWO RELATED CONSTRAINTS TO ENDING POVERTY: 
1) ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND 
2) POOR GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT
Two core problems in ending global poverty (when commentators 
speak of “ending” global poverty they generally mean reducing it to 
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“frictional” amounts, perhaps 100 to 300 million people) are 1) envi-
ronmental degradation and 2) severe governance problems (including 
overt conflict). These dimensions of environmental and governance 
breakdowns are increasingly intertwined. 
Conflict and Threats to Natural Resource–Based Livelihoods 
Natural resource–based livelihoods are counted on in most antipov-
erty strategies as potential “pathways out of poverty” (World Resources 
Institute et al. 2005). In low-income countries, there is high dependence 
on natural resources: agriculture, animal husbandry, fi shing, forestry, 
hunting, and foraging. But access to the benefits of resources is often 
very inequitable: in some regions, the poor have been losing control of 
natural-resource common areas on which they depend. Village com-
mon lands may be “spontaneously” privatized (or, to put less of a fine 
point on it, stolen). Many of the poor lack even basic capital, including 
farmland, forests, cattle, boats, and equipment. Government officials 
may overlook (or be paid to ignore) companies that log, fish, and mine 
without regard to local inhabitants or traditional rights. Governments 
may also designate lands as “protected,” thus banning local people from 
earning a livelihood, while corruption remains; the result is that the poor 
have no incentive to take part in environmental protection. A solution 
to this is the principle of “pro-poor governance,” which simply means 
empowerment of people living in poverty. Failure to provide pro-poor 
governance can worsen poverty, trigger conflict, or both (Todaro and 
Smith 2011, Section 14.5). 
Consequences of Conflict 
Violent conflict harms well-being in ways both obvious and unex-
pected, extending well beyond the immediate effects of death, injury, 
and destruction. People not involved in violence can be affected almost 
immediately, as parents lose their livelihood or become refugees and 
children are forced to work. Recovery from the consequences can take 
many years. Conflict can cause children to miss out on schooling in their 
most formative years, harming their well-being over the course of a life-
time (see, e.g., Barron [2010]; Blattman and Annan [2010]; Blattman 












and Miguel [2010]; Bundervoet, Verwimp, and Akresh [2009]; Li and 
Wen [2005]; Messer, Cohen, and Marchione [2001]; and Seitz [2004]). 
When armed conflict first breaks out in a country or a region, more 
men die than women, primarily as a result of the fighting itself. But over 
time, more women die, as they suffer lingering consequences. Maternal 
mortality (dying from complications of pregnancy or childbirth) can 
reach about 3 percent in conflict areas such as the Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo. The long-term effects of conflict fall most heavily 
on women, as these effects diminish their access to health, social wel-
fare services, and education (Plümper and Neumayer 2006). Rape is a 
weapon of terror used to destroy communities and family bonds. Many 
victims die in rape attacks, and many more suffer long-term health con-
sequences, including AIDS and chronic depression. Refugee children 
and women are at risk of rape and sexual exploitation. Refugee tent 
camps can spread infectious diseases such as diarrhea, measles, acute 
respiratory diseases, malaria, and sexually transmitted diseases, includ-
ing HIV/AIDS. Refugees die of diseases at high rates—more might 
survive with better nourishment and rest. Evidence suggests that each 
additional international refugee leads to an extra 1.4 malaria cases in 
the host country. Meanwhile, government health spending falls, just 
when public health support is most needed. 
Development in reverse. Violent conflict destroys capital; some 
that is not destroyed is diverted from productive to destructive activi-
ties (Murdoch and Sandler 2004). Additional wealth is often shipped 
abroad. On average, about one-tenth of a country’s wealth is transferred 
abroad between the beginning of a conflict and its end, largely because 
of capital flight (Collier et al. 2003). 
Countries consumed by conflict have an estimated average annual 
growth of −3.3 percent, constituting what is known as “development 
in reverse.” Incomes following a civil war average 15 percent lower 
than before the war. This translates to approximately 30 percent more 
people living in extreme poverty. The loss of human capital is sub-
stantial: when children lose out on their education, it has permanent 
effects in many cases, even though some students later return to school. 
Spending on education falls during conflicts, severely exacerbating the 
problems. The torn social fabric is, in itself, destructive to development 
opportunities. 
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Theories of the causes of conflict vary, including the presence of 
horizontal inequalities (Stewart 2000, 2008), severe scarcity of basic 
resources, as in some interpretations of the Darfur conflicts (UNEP
2007), commitment problems between government and (potential) reb-
els (Powell 2006), and the struggle to control valuable natural resources 
for export (Collier 2007). 
Climate Stressors as a Trigger for Conflict 
Evidence is emerging that climate stressors are also important trig-
gers for conflict. In particular, although climate change may be neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient cause for conflict, climate can be a contribut-
ing and triggering stressor, acting in concert with other political, social, 
or economic variables. This is of growing concern, given the range of 
dire consequences for Africa and some other regions of the develop-
ing world predicted under most climate-change scenarios (Cline 2007; 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007; NOAA 2010; 
Parry et al. 2007; World Bank 2010a), including prolonged droughts, 
expanded desertification, increased severity of storms, higher tempera-
tures and more severe heat waves, deteriorated water resources, and 
reduced crop yields. 
Climate change may endanger livelihoods, intensify conflicts over 
resources, and induce greater migration within, and across, national 
boundaries. In countries with weak governments and institutions, these 
added stresses may lead to greater instability. Countries with greater 
societal resilience are likely to withstand these stresses better, as well 
as to build greater resilience to climate change. Moreover, a growing 
literature documents a link between rainfall levels and violence, as well 
as between high temperatures and violence or civil conflict (Burke et al. 
2009; Miguel 2013). 
Adaptation Responses and Their Impacts on Confl ict Risk 
Most discussion about climate change has been focused on 
approaches to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. But most low-income 
countries emit relatively small amounts of greenhouse gases (although 
the burning involved in deforestation and the resulting decrease in 
carbon dioxide absorption are significant contributors). And for low-
income developing countries, climate change impacts are already arriv-






ing and must be responded to. Thus, the central focus in these countries 
is on adaptation to current and anticipated adverse climate change (see, 
e.g., Adger et al. [2007]; Dinar et al. [2008]; Malik and Smith [2012]; 
Mendelsohn [2012]; World Bank [2010b]; and World Resources Insti-
tute et al. [2011]). 
There are two basic approaches to adaptation. Planned (or policy-
driven) adaptation is undertaken by governments. In contrast, autono-
mous adaptation is undertaken by individuals, families, and communi-
ties; Malik and Smith (2012) give some key examples, including altering 
crop or livestock varieties, changing livelihoods, increasing exploitation 
of common pool resources, moving locally (such as to higher ground), 
and migrating temporarily or permanently, either within a country or 
internationally. Almost certainly, autonomous adaptation will be the pre-
dominant form of adaptation. Good governance acts as a complement 
for autonomous adaptation (and, at least, avoids thwarting beneficial 
responses). But governments have little experience with this role, and in 
some cases their incentives may lie in implementing policies that have 
the effect of undermining otherwise constructive adaptation measures in 
poor communities, such as removing control of natural resources from 
communities and placing it in the hands of officials who mismanage or 
misuse that control. 
PERSPECTIVES ON GOOD GOVERNANCE 
FOR ADAPTATION 
General Considerations 
Policy effectiveness, economic efficiency, and equity may be 
improved to the extent that seven conditions are in place. Policymakers 
want to ensure that
 1) a flexible, well-designed approach to interaction is imple-
mented between adaptation policy and the autonomous adap-
tation setting; 
2) they gain an improved understanding of how agents adapt 
in the absence of planned adaptation, and how adaptation is 
likely to change in response to planned adaption policies; 
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3) the moral hazard of agents in response to planned adaptation is 
addressed; 
4) those autonomously adapting have a voice in adaptation poli-
cies that affect them; 
5) planned adaptation does not reduce opportunity for autono-
mous adaptation, and that planned adaptation accounts for 
indirect impacts (for example, the diversion of water resources 
from areas with traditional rights to cities or irrigated districts 
with political clout, and an accounting for the impacts of gov-
ernment restrictions on development in low-lying areas); 
6) negative externalities of autonomous adaptation are addressed 
effectively—e.g., lowered water tables, salination, and wors-
ened sanitation in neighboring areas; and 
7) positive externalities of autonomous adaptation, such as learn-
ing across neighboring communities, are effectively encour-
aged and augmented. 
Climate Change Adaptation through Migration 
Threats to natural resource–based livelihoods are expected to 
increase the rate of rural-to-urban migration (see, e.g., Hatton and 
Williamson [2003]; Marchiori, Maystadt, and Schumacher 2011; 
McLeman and Smit [2006]; Naudé [2010]; and Warner et al. [2009]). 
Lower productivity increases the wedge (or gap) separating urban and 
rural incomes, spurring migration that may eventually include hundreds 
of millions of people. Migration on such a scale would result in compe-
tition for resources and employment that would heighten the potential 
for conflict and instability. A case in point is reported from Bangladesh, 
where economic competition between “climate migrants” and residents 
of destination areas has led in some cases to violence. Among the causes 
of tension between the two groups was a drop in wages—especially 
wages in the informal sector—that was due to the influx of migrants. In 
another case in point, this one from Sudan, environmental and farming 
changes led to changed seasonal migration routes, worsening tensions 
among pastoralists (those who raise and herd livestock) and between 
pastoralists and farmers. 











Governance challenges of heightened competition for resources. 
The absence of established institutions for managing natural resources 
in areas newly settled by different ethnic groups has led to environ-
mental degradation; in turn, the resulting degradation has exacerbated 
resource scarcity, fueled tensions, and led to violent conflict (see, e.g., 
Barnett and Adger [2007]; Bronkhorst [2011]; Hsiang, Meng, and Cane 
[2011]; Sayne [2011]; Stark, Mataya, and Lubovich [2009]; Theisen 
[2008]; and UNEP [2007]). Conflict is more likely to emerge in the 
absence of a well-defined or well-enforced system of property rights: 
traditional inhabitants of an area may stake customary claims to land 
that formally may be (has been declared to be) open-access public 
land. Good-quality formal governance must at least take traditional 
governance into account in planning and policy. As a case in point 
from Nigeria, feed and water shortages caused partly by drought and 
desertification induced pastoralists to move south, outside their tradi-
tional seasonal grazing patterns. In turn, sedentary farmers responded to 
weather-related changes by cultivating more land. This left pastoralists 
with little uncontested land on which to graze and water their animals, 
leading to violent conflicts between identity groups fi nding themselves 
in contested territory, such as farmers and herdsmen (pastoralists). As a 
second case in point, in Kenya, increased drought induced pastoralists 
to adopt more sedentary livelihoods, settling near water sources that 
farmers also relied upon and that were already at risk. 
A related challenge is that in the process of both autonomous and 
planned adaptation to climate change, traditional access to natural 
resources can be restricted, and the result can heighten tensions. With-
out effective formal or traditional institutions to deal with these conse-
quences, autonomous adaptation can increase the risk of confl ict. A case 
in point comes from coastal Bangladesh, where water from tube wells 
became more prone to saltwater contamination, which in turn induced 
inhabitants of affected areas to draw water from unaffected wells in 
neighboring areas. This, of course, fueled tensions—and led to episodes 
of violent conflict—with the inhabitants of these areas. 
Planned adaptation, government policies, and conflict. Planned 
adaptation (and, more generally, government policy) can increase the 
risk of conflict when it acts to restrict feasible autonomous adaptation 
(Malik and Smith 2012). For example, policies to vacate densely popu-
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lated areas that have become subject to inundation increase pressures 
on adjacent land; this can clearly give rise to conflict. In contrast, con-
structing barriers such as floodgates to protect vulnerable land might, in 
some circumstances, avoid conflict risk. But building such barriers may 
also have unintended consequences, such as harming the livelihoods of 
others by eroding coastlines and reducing fi shing opportunities along 
adjoining areas of the coast. 
To cite another example, policies restricting migration within 
or across countries could avoid tensions and reduce the risk of con-
flict. But restrictions could also increase the risk because migration is 
a safety valve that itself represents an important form of autonomous 
adaptation. 
Government influence in preventing communal confl icts depends 
on two key factors. 
First, it depends on whether government is strong enough to protect 
people and communities from external threats—i.e., strong enough to 
enforce property rights and impose needed regulations on communities. 
If government is weak, property rights cannot be protected, and effec-
tive planned adaptation is infeasible; hence, the possibility of conflict 
between the two communities cannot be avoided. 
Second, while government must have sufficient authority and 
strength to enforce the peace, the poor may be subjected to equal or 
greater harm when government is unduly coercive, biased, or unwill-
ing to decentralize authority. The quality of governance relationships 
between the central government and local communities (or regions) 
is of critical importance. At one extreme, government repression may 
trigger conflict. However, if national or regional government neglects 
a community, this may also trigger conflict when the community per-
ceives the government to be ineffective, if not hostile. Poor gover-
nance responses to climate change can hinder autonomous adaptation 
rather than complement it, also resulting in confl ict. The situation can 
be aggravated if government is seen as siding with one community 
over another. For example, conflict may result if government prevents 
migration from a severely climate-affected community to an area less 
affected that may be perceived as unfairly privileged. International peer 
review of governments can play an important role in improving indi-
vidual country governance practices; a good example is the New Part-
nership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), an activity of the African 
Union (see http://www.nepad.org/). 





In these ways, good governance plays a central role in poverty 
reduction in general, and particularly in response to looming develop-
ment problems caused by climate change. By anticipating and construc-
tively responding to these problems, good governance can lessen the 
harmful effects of climate change on a government’s people. 
Note 
This chapter is based on a Sichel Lecture of a similar title in the series on the Politi-
cal Economy of Good Governance, which was delivered on the campus of Western 
Michigan University on April 10, 2013. The presentation drew on joint work with Arun 
Malik, with input from Elizabeth Chacko, Marie Price, and Jonathan Rothbaum; these 
contributions greatly benefited the preparation of this chapter. I would also like to thank 
participants of the Sichel Lecture for excellent discussions, particularly Sisay Asefa and 
Wei-Chiao Huang. Research assistance from the Institute for International Economic 
Policy at George Washington University is gratefully acknowledged. Any errors are 
my own. 
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UNDERSTANDING AND MEASURING GOOD GOVERNANCE 
FOR SUSTAINABLE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
The World Governance Indicators (WGI) project, which can be 
found at www.govindicators.org, defines “governance” as consisting of 
“the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exer-
cised” (World Bank 2014, p. 1). This includes how governments are 
selected, monitored, and replaced, including their capacity to formulate 
and implement sound policies, provide public services, and earn the 
respect of citizens and institutions that determine economic and social 
interactions (Kaufmann 2010). WGI identifies the following six core 
governance components: 1) voice and accountability, 2) political stabil-
ity and the absence of violence, 3) government effectiveness, 4) regula-
tory quality, 5) rule of law, and 6) control of corruption. 
Based on these measures, Nordic states in Europe such as Sweden, 
Denmark, and Norway have a high standard of governance. 
Good governance is rare in Africa, but it exists in a few countries 
such as Botswana, Mauritius, Senegal, and Ghana. From a development 
perspective, good governance is a major means for promoting sustain-
able development, reducing poverty, and maintaining peace. Countries 
with good governance are efficient in delivery of public services, follow 
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the rule of law, and have inclusive institutions responsive to the needs 
of citizens. They are transparent and promote participation as well as 
show respect for citizens and allow for a free press and for overall free-
dom of expression. Some typical characteristics of good governance are 
listed in the diagram shown in Figure 7.1. Autocratic and dysfunctional 
governments are unable to meet all or some of these commitments. 
Good governance also reduces poverty, which can be measured in at 
least two ways. The income approach is simply based on the number of 
people below global poverty standards, defined as $1.25 a day in U.S. 
dollars. Another, more comprehensive recent innovation in measuring 
poverty is the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), which disaggre-
gates three components of human development: 1) health, 2) education, 
and 3) standard of living, as described below: 
• Health (measured by two indicators with equal one-sixth weight 
on the MPI scale): whether any child has died in the household, 
and whether any adult or child in the family is malnourished. 
• Education (measured by two indicators with equal one-sixth 
weight on the MPI scale): whether no household member com-
pleted five years of schooling, and whether any school-aged 
child is out of school for grades one through eight. 
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rule of law
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• Standard of Living (measured by six indicators with equal one-
eighteenth weight on the MPI scale): These deprivations include 
the lack of electricity; insufficiently safe drinking water; inad-
equate sanitation; inadequate flooring; unimproved cooking 
fuel; and the lack of more than one of the following assets—tele-
phone, radio, TV, bicycle, and motorbike. 
Table 7.1 compares MPI and income poverty for select countries, 
including the African nations of Ethiopia, Angola, the Congo, Ghana, 
Kenya, Niger, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, along with other developing 
countries in Asia and Latin America. By MPI ranking, Ethiopia’s score 
of 103 is at the bottom, just above Niger’s 104, with 90 percent of its 
population considered to be multidimensionally poor. 
GOVERNANCE, DEVELOPMENT, AND MULTIDIMENSIONAL
POVERTY INDEX (MPI) RELATIONSHIPS 
Governance, human development, and MPI indicators are linked. 
Poor governance leads to low MPI; low Human Development Index 
(HDI), which measures achievement in terms of having a long and 
healthy life, being knowledgeable, and having a decent standard of liv-
ing; and high corruption, as measured by the Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI). The following table shows the level and relationships of 
human development, governance, and the Ibrahim Index of African 
Governance (IIAG), along with two measures of poverty—1) income 
and 2) MPI. The measurement ranges are as follows: HDI: 0–1 (0 being 
the lowest); IIAG: 1–100 (1 being the lowest, 100 the best); and CPI: 
10–1 (10 being the lowest, 1 the best) (Table 7.2). 
For the African countries listed, Botswana has the best governance 
ranking (No. 3 by the IIAG measure), while Somalia has the worst gov-
ernance, with a rank of 52. Using MPI, Ethiopia is multidimensionally 
the poorest. The HDI for Ethiopia is just above that of Eritrea, 0.36 to 
0.35. This means that claims of rapid growth in Ethiopia have not trans-
lated into human development and poverty reduction. 
IIAG is a comprehensive measure of governance focused on African 
states based on 57 variables categorized into five indices that include 
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Table 7.1  Comparative Income Poverty and Multidimensional Poverty Measures 
Income povertyMultidimensional poverty 
$1.25 a day $2 a dayA (average (proportion of poor) (proportion of poor)MPI HM (proportion intensity of 
Country Year MPI value rank of poor) deprivations) Value Rank Value Rank 
Kazakhstan 2006 0.002 7 0.006 0.369 0.031 23 0.172 29 
Thailand 2005 0.006 16 0.016 0.385 0.020 1 0.115 20 
Ecuador 2003 0.009 24 0.022 0.416 0.047 26 0.128 23 
Mexico 2006 0.015 29 0.040 0.389 0.020 1 0.048 16 
Brazil 2003 0.039 39 0.085 0.460 0.052 29 0.127 21 
Colombia 2005 0.041 40 0.092 0.441 0.160 42 0.279 35 
Dominican 2000 0.048 42 0.111 0.433 0.050 28 0.151 27 
Republic 
China 2003 0.056 44 0.125 0.449 0.159 41 0.363 41 
Vietnam 2002 0.075 50 0.143 0.525 0.215 50 0.484 51 
Indonesia 2007 0.095 53 0.208 0.459 0.075 31 0.490 52 
Ghana 2008 0.140 57 0.301 0.464 0.300 57 0.536 56 
Zimbabwe 2006 0.174 60 0.385 0.452 
Bolivia 2003 0.175 61 0.363 0.483 0.196 46 0.303 38 
Nicaragua 2001 0.211 64 0.407 0.519 0.158 40 0.318 40 
Laos 2006 0.267 68 0.472 0.565 0.440 46 0.768 73 
Pakistan 2007 0.275 70 0.510 0.540 0.226 53 0.603 59 
Yemen 2006 0.283 71 0.525 0.539 0.175 43 0.466 49 


















   
   
 
   135 
India 2005 0.296 74 0.554 0.535 0.416 64 0.756 70 
Kenya 2003 0.302 76 0.604 0.500 0.197 47 0.399 43 
Haiti 2006 0.306 77 0.573 0.533 0.549 76 0.721 67 
Côte d’Ivoire 2005 0.320 78 0.522 0.614 0.233 55 0.468 50 
Nepal 2006 0.350 82 0.647 0.540 0.551 77 0.776 76 
Tanzania 2008 0.367 84 0.653 0.563 0.885 93 0.966 93 
D.R. Congo 2007 0.393 88 0.732 0.537 0.592 79 0.795 77 
Madagascar 2004 0.413 91 0.705 0.585 0.678 86 0.896 87 
Angola 2001 0.452 93 0.774 0.584 0.543 89 0.900 88 
Ethiopia 2005 0.582 103 0.900 0.647 0.390 62 0.775 75 
Niger 2006 0.642 104 0.927 0.693 0.659 85 0.856 85 
NOTE: “MPI” = Multidimensional Poverty Index. 
SOURCE: World Bank (2014). 
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Table 7.2  Comparative Measures of Governance and Poverty for
Selected African States 
Income poverty 
Country HDI CPI IIAG (%)       (MPI) (%) 
Ethiopia 0.36 2.7 33 (47) 40 (89) 
Eritrea 0.35 2.5 49 (33) — 
Sudan 0.41 1.6 48 (33) — 
Somalia — 1.0 52 (7) — 
Djibouti 0.43 3.0 49 (49) 19 (29) 
Ghana 0.54 3.9 7 (15) 30 (31) 
Kenya 0.51 2.2 24 (53) 20 (49) 
Botswana 0.63 6.1 3 (78) 30 (—) 
Tanzania 0.47 3.0 58 (59) 33 (65) 
Nigeria 0.46 2.4 43 (42) 55 (55) 
Uganda 0.44 2.4 55 (19) 29 (72) 
NOTE: “HDI” stands for “Human Development Index.” “CPI” stands for “Corrup-
tion Perceptions Index.” “IIAG” stands for “Ibrahim Index of African Governance.” 
“MPI” stands for “Multidimensional Poverty Index.” — = data not available. 
SOURCE: World Bank (2014). 
tion; 3) sustainable economic development; 4) participation and human 
rights; and 5) human development (education, health, and income). 
Table 7.3 provides a ranking of scores that are assigned grades based 
on groups of countries in terms of quality of governance in percentages 
(ranging from 10 to 100). 
THE ROLE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE IN SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT AND POVERTY REDUCTION 
Good governance plays an essential role in achieving multidimen-
sional poverty-reduction goals. Economic growth helps to reduce pov-
erty only in good governance states in most cases. Rapid and narrow 
growth driven by foreign aid can create misery and repression under 
autocratic governance. Promoting rapid growth cannot reduce pov-
erty unless there is good governance present to design and implement 
inclusive development policies and social programs to attack poverty 
directly. Economic development involves economic growth plus struc-
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Table 7.3  2006 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) Scores for
African States 
Scores: 100–66 Scores: 65–58 Scores: 57–51 Scores: 50–47 Scores: 46–18 
Good: grade A Above average: Average: grade C Poor: grade D Failed/rogue: 
grade B grade F 
Mauritius 85.1 Malawi 63.9 Mozambique 57.1 Ethiopia 50.9 Eritrea 46.5 
Seychelles 79.8 Lesotho 63.3 Mali 55.9 Mauritania 50.8 Gabon 45.6 
Cape Verde 74.7 Benin 62.5 Niger 55.5 Zimbabwe 50.4 Central African 
Rep. 43.6 
Botswana 74.1 Comoros 61.9 Cameroon 55.4 Swaziland 50.2 Angola 43.3 
South Africa 71.5 Tanzania 61.6 Djibouti 55.2 Burundi 50.0 Sudan 34.2 
Namibia 70.9 Madagascar Gambia 55.2 Equatorial Chad 33.9 
60.4 Guinea 49.2 
Ghana 70.1 Kenya 59.1 Congo 53.3 Sierra Leone Congo 29.8 
49.1 
Gabon 69.4 Rwanda 59.1 Togo 53.0 Liberia 48.7 Somalia 18.9 
São Tomé and Uganda 58.3 Guinea-Bissau Nigeria 48.5 
Principé 68.3 51.9 
Senegal 66.1 Burkina Faso Guinea 47.8 
58.3 
Zambia 58.3 
SOURCE: Rotberg and Gisselquist (2007). 
tural change toward diversification and a broader participation of citi-
zens in the growth process, including integrated market development. 
Taking steps away from permanent dependence on subsistence agricul-
ture requires good governance policies such as land reform that secures 
land ownership for citizens and farmers as well as providing neces-
sary extension services such as farmer education, credit, and improved 
farming inputs. Positive economic transformation is impossible until 
a transformation occurs in which political leaders and citizens support 
socioeconomic and political transformation by cooperation. 
ADDRESSING POVERTY TRAPS AND DEVELOPMENT
COORDINATION FAILURE WITH GOOD GOVERNANCE 
A cross-cutting primary reason for the persistence of poverty and 
food insecurity traps in Ethiopia and Africa is poor governance at both 
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the macro and micro levels. The idea of poverty traps goes back to post-
war development economics. Swedish Nobel laureate Gunnar Myrdal 
(1968) called it a problem of “circular and cumulative causation.” A
country can find itself in a high fertility trap with rapid population 
growth that adds to problems of poverty. Population pressures lead to 
a Malthusian trap, in which a society cannot escape from a subsistence 
economy because of lack of additional resources necessary to main-
tain larger population sizes. For example, Ethiopia is the second-largest 
populated country in Africa; it has more than 90 million people and is 
growing at an annual rate of 3 percent (Todaro and Smith 2014, p. 4), 
yet it has a very low ranking on poverty scales. Low-quality expan-
sion of education at all levels creates a low-skills trap that prevents 
employers from finding skilled workers. Good governance promotes 
employment by focusing on high-quality education and by creating 
effective partnerships between employers and universities and colleges 
through programs such as training internships. Furthermore, requiring 
better pay for lecturers and teachers helps to retain high-quality teach-
ers, which can transform the quality of education at all levels. 
POOR GOVERNANCE AS THE DRIVER OF CONFLICT AND 
POVERTY TRAPS 
The conflict trap, analyzed by Collier (2007), shows how certain 
economic conditions make a country prone to civil war and to the ensu-
ing cycle of violence, from which it is difficult to escape. His study 
found that countries are prone to civil war when faced with a combina-
tion of low income, dependence on primary commodity exports, and 
poor governance that is not inclusive, along with high income inequal-
ity. A study conducted by the Oslo Peace Research Institute projected 
peace and conflict patterns globally until 2050. The estimates show a 
decrease in worldwide violence in general, except in a few countries, 
which include African states such as Ethiopia and Nigeria. Ethiopia is 
considered vulnerable on the basis of security, ideological, socioeco-
nomic, religious and ethnic conflicts and how the state responds to these 
conflicts. Good governance in Africa and Ethiopia can proactively pre-
vent future conflicts and wars. Nigeria suffers from religious-based 
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extremism waged through violent acts perpetrated by a group called 
Boko Haram. Its edicts call for no western education for Nigerians, 
especially women, and the group wants to turn Nigeria, by far the larg-
est country of Africa with a population of 170 million, into an Islamic 
state. Recently Boko Haram captured 250 girls from a school to sell as 
modern slaves. Nigeria is rich in petroleum and other natural resources 
and just surpassed South Africa in terms of gross national product 
(GNP), but it is one of the most corrupt African states; it cannot even 
protect its citizens from this violent extremist group, and its survival as 
a state is in doubt (Gates 2014). 
Another development trap is the hunger and health trap, where 
workers are unproductive because they have insufficient energy, and 
they earn too little income to purchase sufficient calories and protein to 
improve their levels of energy and productivity. These traps also lead 
to hunger and famine, which become more severe if they interlock with 
other traps to make the cycle more vicious. Cycles of human deprivation 
can be caused by health problems that the poor cannot address, includ-
ing mental health problems triggered by stresses associated with liv-
ing in absolute poverty, hunger, and inadequate housing, which causes 
exposure to crime. Lack of working capital and credit access traps small 
business vendors and farmers. This is also a major problem, given that 
70 percent of Africans make their living in agriculture. In states such 
as Ethiopia, the percentage can reach as high as 85. This leads to low 
sales and income and an inability to acquire financial capital and credit 
because of the lack of effective microfinancing necessary to address 
this problem. Still other forms of traps can be caused by community or 
citizen powerlessness, driven by repressive and autocratic governance 
(Todaro and Smith 2014). 
Environmental and natural resource depletion, including soil and 
land degradation, also contribute to poverty and conflict traps. In the 
case of common property resources, overuse of resources because of 
a lack of secured ownership of property and land rights for farmers 
and a lack of effective community management of common resources 
can produce poverty and conflict (Ostrom 1990). Lakes and rivers may 
be overfished, forests may be destroyed, and pasture land overgrazed. 
Traditional community management of common resources can break 
down if foreign private investors are driven by or aligned with dicta-
torial regimes. The land or soil erosion and deforestation trap is one that 
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the poor encounter because of an urgent need to grow more food, and it 
may lead to overuse of the land or the soil, even though they are aware 
that the result will be reduced soil fertility, hence a decrease in produc-
tivity in future seasons. Thus, farmers may be trapped into a cycle of 
low productivity, which is exacerbated by the lack of appropriate sus-
tainable technology. This results in a practice called “soil mining,” in 
which they have no choice but to deplete that resource. 
Government support for improved technology and research could 
ameliorate this dilemma. For example, there is evidence of a poverty 
trap among farmers in Ethiopia, particularly in the banana-growing 
region and the densely populated highlands, and to a lesser extent even 
in the pastoral communities of the lowlands. It is vital that research con-
tinue to uncover a pattern of natural land degradation and deforestation 
that has taken place since the widespread confiscation of land in 1975 
by a military junta. 
LACK OF GOOD GOVERNANCE AS A DRIVER OF
CORRUPTION TRAPS 
Promoting good governance that is accountable, transparent, hon-
est, and participatory, that guarantees economic freedom—i.e., the right 
of citizens to freely exchange goods and contract with each other in 
business—and that is based on secured property rights, including land 
rights, is crucial for the progress of Ethiopia and for all of Africa. This is 
only possible by moving forward with constitutional reforms that place 
limits on government officials to prevent the abuse of power, guaran-
tee economic freedoms, and control the negative incentives that drive 
corruption. A clear legal delineation and separation of public politi-
cal activities from private economic activities is necessary to reduce 
corruption. 
Corruption can be defined as postconstitutional opportunism aimed 
at getting benefits for individuals or a group at the expense of soci-
ety. Once a constitution is adopted, there is an incentive on the part of 
groups to benefit through capture of the state’s redistributive power. 
One form of corruption, called “rent seeking,” occurs when individu-
als and groups expend resources to negatively affect the distributional 
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outcome. Effective control of corruption must be based on institutional 
and constitutional reforms to constrain the ability of the state actors to 
intervene in private and market transactions. Tackling the problem of 
corruption, or the abuse of public trust for private gain, is not possible 
by simply jailing corrupt individuals without changing the incentives 
for corruption. It is imperative to create a constitution with checks and 
balances and rule of law. Where corruption exists, the effects typically 
fall disproportionately on the poor, since the cost of bribes is felt more 
severely by the poor than by the rich, and on small firms, since they feel 
the pinch more than large firms do (Figure 7.2). 
Overall, the reasons that states with poor governance fail stem from 
many factors. Failing states may be more rigid in decision making, 
and they may lack the capability to administer detailed plans. Bureau-
cratic obstacles may block private-sector initiatives and innovation. It 
is hard to replicate a private-market incentive system within a govern-
Figure 7.2  Disproportionate Effects of Corruption on Small vs. Large 
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SOURCE: Kaufmann, Zoido-Lobatón, and Lee (2000). 







142 Asefa and Huang 
ment. Branches of government may also be poorly coordinated and lack 
effective oversight. Excessive state controls may cause black markets 
to expand through increased incentives for rent seeking and corruption. 
Development planning may be manipulated by small, privileged 
groups for their own benefit. Combinations of the above factors make it 
very diffi cult for a state to function effectively and to maintain a sense 
of societal order. 
BUILDING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 
FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE 
Effective and inclusive institutions provide “rules of the political 
and economic game” of human interaction. They provide foundations 
of a market economy, including secured property and land rights, con-
tract enforcement, economic coordination, restriction of coercive or 
fraudulent behavior, and provision of access to opportunities for the 
broad participation of citizens. They do this by constraining the oppor-
tunist power of elites through the use of checks and balances. Success-
ful governance includes managing conflict, providing social insurance, 
and fostering predictable macroeconomic stability. The conditions of 
well-functioning, inclusive market institutions for good governance 
include the following: clear and secured property rights, effective laws 
and courts, freedom to establish businesses, a stable currency, public 
supervision of natural monopolies to manage externalities (i.e., positive 
or negative spillover effects), transparent provision of credible public 
information to citizens, stable monetary and fiscal policy instruments, 
and social safety nets for those on the street, such as the homeless and 
beggars. 
Political parties are necessary but not sufficient for good gover-
nance. No society can expect stability and democracy in a place where 
autocratic government derives its power through ethnically, racially, or 
religiously exclusive membership motivated by divide-and-rule poli-
tics. The historic experiences of countries and societies who have ruled 
by such groupings make this clear. A case in point in Africa was a racial 
or ethnic minority-rule system known as “apartheid,” which collapsed 
in South Africa in 1994 after having created serious socioeconomic 
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inequality in wealth and education. South Africa today is struggling to 
be a multiethnic democratic state and to overcome that legacy of divide-
and-rule. Although the majority-black South Africans may have politi-
cal power because of free elections, the legacy of income and wealth 
inequality persists and contributes to serious property-related crimes, 
such as violent robbery and murder along racial and ethnic lines. 
Social science studies show that the best way to manage a potential 
ethnic conflict is through a representative civic-based democracy, one 
that is open to inclusive participation of citizens in politics. In such an 
open democratic society, Barack Obama, a man with roots in Africa, 
has risen to become president of the most powerful democratic nation 
in the world, in a place where much wealth was created through African 
enslavement. 
In Eastern Europe, the former Soviet state of Yugoslavia collapsed 
amid ethnic and political conflict. Yugoslavia, under former president 
Josip Broz Tito, was a viable and progressive Eastern European state 
before its own collapse and the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 
1991. But when ethnic and religious identity politics were unleashed 
after the fall of Tito, a vicious ethnic civil war took place, in which the 
Serbs engaged in ethnic cleansing against Muslims. This was eventually 
stopped only by the intervention of European powers, led by the United 
States. Nevertheless, the damaging politics of ethnic and religious iden-
tity took their toll. “Revolutionary democracy” is a term that has some-
times been applied to the Balkan conflict, as well as to unrest in Egypt 
and Ethiopia, but there is no such thing as “revolutionary democracy” 
in practice, since democracy by its very nature is evolutionary. Democ-
racy is a result of civilized compromise among responsible citizens and 
politicians over key policies and issues of human development at both
the national and local levels. Social democracy, such as the governing 
system in Sweden, requires a highly educated population with highly 
developed human capital and takes a long time to achieve. It is unlikely 
to work in an income-poor country with no middle class or a weak 
private sector and civil society, and where ethnic and religious con-
flicts are unsettled. Liberal democracy, adapted to local culture, has the 
best chance of giving political choices to citizens if two things happen. 
First, it must be promoted from the bottom up. Second, a middle class 
economy must grow up to support a strong civic society and private 
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sector. A country in Africa that has effectively adopted liberal democ-
racy is Botswana. 
Botswana today has the best-rated governance on the continent, 
with the best-managed economy and minimal corruption, resulting in 
the top per-capita income and Human Development Index in Africa. 
There are others, such as Ghana, Tanzania, Mozambique, Malawi, 
Benin, and Senegal, that are moving forward along this line. Multi-
ethnic developing countries such as India, Malaysia, and South Africa 
have opened to democratic majority rule. Ethiopia must learn from these 
large multiethnic countries. A model for Ethiopia may be India, a large 
multiethnic Asian country that achieved democratic unity under ethnic 
and religious diversity, and whose political leaders are freely elected in 
competitive national and local elections. India’s democracy, given its 
ethnic and religious diversity, has allowed the country to become an 
emerging economic giant that may compete with China, where political 
freedom is comparatively less. 
Most African rulers oppose liberal democracy for self-serving rea-
sons, since this form of democracy erodes their monopolistic power and 
forces them to compete and compromise, provided there are checks and 
balances provided by democratic institutions. “Democratic institutions” 
are legal and constitutional entities that provide checks on power, such 
as a free press, an independent judiciary, and competing parties loyal to 
the nation or its people, with term limits on key power holders. Amartya 
K. Sen, the Indian Nobel laureate in development economics, was cor-
rect when he wrote that “no famine has historically taken place in a 
country with a free press” (Sen 2006, p. 34). 
There are few countries that practice liberal democracy in Africa. 
As mentioned above, a rare example is Botswana, which is the most 
economically developed and well-governed country on the continent, 
with the highest per-capita income, at $8,000 a year, and the highest 
human development index (HDI) in Africa. HDI is a composite index 
of quality of human life that includes income, education, and health. 
Botswana today is the beneficiary of hundreds of medical and health 
professionals from Ethiopia and other African countries because of its 
democratic good governance. Botswana used wealth from diamonds to 
enhance human development and avoided the “resource curse” problem 
(the tendency for the finding of rich deposits of mineral resources in a 
country governed badly or by a dictator to lead to strife and corrup-
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tion in that country over control of the resource), whereas other Afri-
can countries, such as Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Sudan, Liberia, and the 
Congo, have suffered from conflicts fought over natural resources. 
Botswana stands tall next to neighboring Zimbabwe, which is in 
shambles because of the abuse of power. Its president, Robert Mugabe, 
is a 91-year-old dictator who refuses to yield power by accepting defeat 
by the opposition in the last election, and who has held onto rule for 28 
years. Zimbabwe is one of the saddest cases of abuse of power by long-
term, one-man rule in Africa. Mugabe continues to blame the coun-
try’s one-time British colonial masters in the former Rhodesia for what 
is actually damage inflicted by his own government on the people of 
Zimbabwe. Mugabe could have used his power to make early political 
and economic reforms, such as land reform. However, in 1988, shortly 
after taking office, he abolished the main opposition party, headed by 
former independence fighter Joshua Nokomo, and formed a monopoly, 
his Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) party. 
The British colonial rulers departed from Zimbabwe in 1980, leav-
ing the country with a modern infrastructure of standards close to those 
of Europe, including a vibrant agricultural economy that produced sur-
plus food crops such as maize. The agriculture was based on modern 
farms and gave food aid to Ethiopia during the famine of 1984–1985. 
But after Mugabe and his associates took power in 1987, their policies 
wreaked havoc on Zimbabwe’s agricultural economy and its human 
capital assets. Today, Zimbabwe’s economy is destroyed and its cur-
rency is worthless; the country has abandoned its national currency and 
is now using U.S. dollars. Millions of citizens are exiled as refugees to 
border countries such as Botswana and South Africa. 
In general, ethnic-, clan-, and religious-based political parties are 
not viable in promoting democracy or good governance. They are likely 
to create both intraethnic and interethnic political confl icts. They can-
not be democratic by the very nature of their formation, since they are 
exclusive and prone to conflict, both within themselves and with other 
ethnic parties. For example, each ethnic party in Ethiopia today is split 
into two or more antagonistic groups, which are variously either aligned 
with the ruling party, exiled, or in rebellion. In contrast, enlightened 
political leaders can provide effective leadership in cooperation with 
other multiethnic nationals. 
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Political groups that continue to exploit the divisions that emerge 
with the breakup of large African states are likely to create massive 
destruction. Doing so could risk all that has been built up through the 
centuries by the successful historic evolution into a nation state. One 
example is the state of Ethiopia, with its ancient civilization. Ethiopia 
was the only African country never colonized by European powers. For 
politicians and leaders, the challenge is to bridge these deep historical 
and cultural connections for the benefit of all. To act in the narrow inter-
ests of one’s party can lead to failure. Consider what occurred in Egypt, 
for example, where the recently elected government of the Islamic 
Brotherhood, led by President Mohamed Morsi, was overthrown by 
the combined forces of the military and the citizenry. One reason for 
his party’s failure is that it was not perceived as being inclusive of all 
Egyptians, such as women, based on its name. Indeed, the very name 
connotes religious affiliation, which may have caused Egyptians to fear 
that Morsi would turn Egypt into an Iranian Islamic–style theocracy. 
Regardless of policy, parties based on religious, ethnic, or clan affili-
ations will fail in any nonhomogeneous society by creating a divisive 
environment. Political parties must be inclusive of all citizens in order 
to succeed. 
Elections are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for good 
governance. Today, the overwhelming majority of Africans strive for 
better education and health, and they yearn to be free from top-down 
rule by the political elite. In Ethiopia, there was the experiment of eth-
nic federalism imposed from the top; this system uses the institutions of 
the former totalitarian state of the military dictator Col. Mengistu Haile 
Mariam, which collapsed in 1991 (Mariam 2011). 
Ethnic federalism is a form of federalism based on dividing a coun-
try along ethnic and linguistic lines. It retards market integration and 
communication among citizens that share a common culture and heri-
tage. There are powerful pan-Ethiopian traits among the 80-some eth-
nic groups in Ethiopia, but these traits have been compromised since 
the 1991 collapse of rule of the military junta. The vast majority of 
Ethiopians, about 85 percent, make their livelihood in agriculture and 
want security of land so they can engage in land transactions and use 
land as collateral to get credits or loans. They desire to be real owners 
of their landholdings and to get necessary improved inputs, training, 
credit, agricultural extension, marketing, and technology to improve 
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agricultural and food productivity. However, they cannot get credit, 
since they do not meet the legal requirement of land ownership, which 
would allow them to use land as collateral to get loans. In other devel-
oping countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and India, private 
ownership of farmland and flexible free land transactions, including 
tenancy, have been properly regulated under the rule of law and have 
created agricultural revolutions. This has transformed agriculture not 
only by attracting capital and technology but by optimizing farm sizes 
through flexible markets that promote equity and agricultural produc-
tivity and protect natural resource degradation. 
GOOD GOVERNANCE FOR EFFECTIVE GLOBAL
ENGAGEMENT, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, AID, AND TRADE 
All African states, including Ethiopia, can benefit from the kind of 
good governance that fosters effective regional and global engagement 
and cooperation. The second-most populated African state, Ethiopia is 
home to the African Union, the Economic Community of Africa, and 
a large diplomatic community of national embassies and international 
organizations such as United Nations offices, as well as nongovern-
mental organizations, or NGOs. Using good governance, Ethiopia can 
improve relations with other regional powers, particularly countries in 
Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Good governance in Ethiopia and 
attempts to reach out to these other powers will help prevent con-
flict driven by dictatorships, assuming the partners also practice good 
governance. 
Since it is landlocked because of the breakaway by Eritrea in 1993, 
Ethiopia could benefit by promoting good trade relations and cross-
border movement of people, commodities, and investment, as well as 
promoting the regional public good through human security. 
For instance, a positive relationship and trade with Somalia would 
open up the coastline of Africa all along the Indian Ocean for the benefit 
of both Eritrea and Ethiopia and the entire Horn of Africa. 
Furthermore, Ethiopia and other African states can use their large 
diaspora population of skilled individuals, who can constructively 
engage their homeland through remittances, investment, and transfer-
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ring knowledge and skills through creative academic and business part-
nership programs. If the diaspora can be enlisted in this way, a major 
source of human capital will be created that can inject investment and 
knowledge into all sectors of the economy. Moreover, the diaspora 
should be encouraged to invest beyond just bonds, into areas such as 
dam construction, banks, insurance companies, and other sectors like 
industry, tourism, information technology, and agriculture. 
Since around 1991, with the end of the Cold War, some African 
states, including Ethiopia, opened up to the West and Asia, including 
the Middle East, North America, and Europe. This reestablished the 
strong historic U.S.-Ethiopia tie that had been interrupted during the 
rule of the Soviet-influenced military junta between 1974 and 1991. 
It is important to remember that, until the time of the junta, the U.S.-
Ethiopia partnership was strongly beneficial for both countries from its 
beginning in 1903, during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, through 
the next 70 years. Strong national organizations, such as Ethiopian Air-
lines and the defense forces, including the air force and the navy, ben-
efited from this partnership, which included a large Peace Corps con-
tingent and student exchange programs from which Ethiopians of that 
generation benefited in terms of a high-quality education. Ethiopia was 
respected in Africa and throughout the world. The nation was relatively 
peaceful and united until 1974, when Ethiopia fell under the sway of 
Soviet Cold War geopolitics and was taken over by a military junta. 
This junta collapsed in 1991, the same year that the Soviet Union did. It 
may be possible to reestablish that former U.S. partnership through cre-
ative exchanges between Americans and Ethiopians with genuine lead-
ership on both sides. Current and future U.S. governments should invest 
more in helping to build good governance, institutions for democracy, 
education, peace, and conflict resolution in Ethiopia, as well as high-
quality education and improvements in human rights. Ethiopian aca-
demics from the diaspora can transform education and health if allowed 
an opportunity to do so under creative partnerships.
In terms of the relationship between economic development and 
foreign aid, there are three main perspectives scholars have expressed 
on the way foreign aid affects development. The first is that foreign aid 
has an overall positive impact on economic development, with some 
exceptions. The second is that aid has little or no effect on develop-
ment, and in some cases may actually be a hindrance. For example, 
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the effect of food aid lowers domestic food prices and displaces local 
food production. The third perspective sees the effect of foreign aid 
as conditional on the level of good governance. For instance, aid has 
been beneficial to countries like Botswana, where good governance is 
high. However, Table 7.4 shows that African countries attract by far the 
largest amount of global aid, both in dollar amount and in percentage 
of GDP, and yet that aid has not translated into economic progress. For 
example, food aid creates dependency by reducing local food produc-
tion. In particular, the food aid accepted by Ethiopia has impaired that 
country’s local agriculture and food production; consequently, it stands 
to reason that accepting such aid should be avoided unless there is an 
emergency. 
Ethiopia ranks just above Zimbabwe and below Liberia in the 2012 
Legatum Index, a comprehensive measure of governance that includes 
eight broad indicators of human progress: 1) economy, 2) entrepreneur-
ship opportunity, 3) governance, 4) education, 5) health, 6) safety, 7) 
personal freedom, and 8) social capital. The complex contributors to 
low investment and entrepreneurship include corruption, low human 
capital, fiscal instability, bad infrastructure, low levels of domestic sav-
ings, and poor coordination. By enabling entrepreneurship, good gov-
ernance helps to overcome the lack of productivity from the low invest-
ment trap. 
Table 7.4  Global and Regional Foreign Aid Distribution 
Millions Percent Dollars 
of US$ of GDP per person 
Sub-Saharan Africa 24,144 6.0 34 
South Asia 6,169 0.8 4 
East Asia and Pacific 7,140 0.4 4 
Europe and Central Asia 10,465 0.8 22 
Middle East and North Africa 7,628 1.0 24 
Latin America and Caribbean 6,153 0.4 12 
Low income 32,135 3.0 14 
Lower-middle income 21,775 0.5 8 
Upper-middle income 3,778 0.2 11 
High income 1,273 0.0 1 
World Bank (2014). 
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THE CASE OF CHINA—EXCEPTION TO THE RULE? 
In the past three decades China has made impressive economic 
progress, exhibiting stellar economic growth rates coupled with a sig-
nificant reduction in poverty and rapid advances in many human devel-
opment dimensions. On the surface, it seems that China has achieved 
good governance outcomes even while defying those criteria or indices 
of good governance mentioned in our earlier analysis and delineated by 
the World Bank and other organizations. Especially in the areas of voice 
and accountability and the rule of law, it does seem that China does 
not meet the criteria of good governance. In addition, the China case 
appears to counter the common prescriptions that development schol-
ars recommend to developing countries for successful governance and 
for avoiding potential ethnic conflict and instability—namely, to pursue 
a liberal democratic institution that is representative and open to the 
inclusive participation of citizens in politics. 
Indeed, China is ruled by an authoritarian regime governed by a sin-
gle party (the Chinese Communist Party, or CCP) that restricts and sup-
presses civic participation and elections, political freedom of expres-
sion and assembly, and freedom of the press. 
However, if we examine the case of China more carefully, we find 
the principle of voice and accountability actually exists, and that of the 
rule of law as well, only in different forms rooted in Chinese culture and 
its long history and civilization. Zhang Weiwei, director of the Center 
for China Development Model Research, Fudan University, and direc-
tor of the Institute of China Studies, Shanghai Academy of Social Sci-
ences, argues that China practices economic accountability. Govern-
ment in China, at all levels, is held accountable for promoting economic 
growth and job creation, Weiwei (2014) contends, since an offi cial can-
not be promoted unless the area under his governance performs well 
economically. 
There is also political and legal accountability (and, to the extent of 
such accountability, rule of law) because the officials are held account-
able and demoted or punished for accidents, such as fires that could 
have been averted by following proper precautions and regulations. 
Other crimes, disasters, missteps, policy mistakes, and corruption cases 
are routinely being exposed. 
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Weiwei also points out that China’s neodemocratic centralism may 
have some advantage over a collective decision-making process in 
terms of governing effectiveness. China has institutionalized a proce-
dural accountability for its democratic centralism. Under such a system, 
a major decision like determining the nation’s five-year plan for devel-
opment takes well over a year of extensive and interactive consultations 
at various levels of the Chinese state and society. This decision-making 
process receives inputs from thousands of think tanks, government 
agencies, universities, prominent scholars, and professionals. The 
recently adopted decision by the Third Plenum on deepening reforms 
is a good example in this regard. China’s socioeconomic plan-drafting 
group, chaired by President Xi Jinping himself, solicited opinions from 
well over 100 institutions across the country and received 2,500 sugges-
tions over a period of six months. About half of these suggestions were 
accepted. During the consultation process, all of the nation’s seven top 
leaders travel to different regions and provinces of China to make inves-
tigations in preparation for the deliberations on the final decision and 
to learn the opinions of local people. As a result, the decision reflects 
the broad consensus of Chinese society on many issues such as public 
health reform, adjustment of the one-child policy, deferred retirement 
age, banking sector reform, and education reform. China’s system of 
accountability performs better than that of most states around the world, 
and it achieves this in a country that is rapidly moving toward becoming 
the world’s largest economy in the twenty-fi rst century. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Good governance for sustainable human development is a multi-
dimensional process involving socioeconomic and political transfor-
mation of societies; it is aimed at enhancing human progress in all its 
dimensions, including freedom of political and economic choice. A
program of good governance, along with education on how to achieve 
peaceful transformation and conflict resolution, should be instituted 
across schools, universities, and colleges to teach citizenship, the quali-
ties of a civil society, and responsible ethical conduct. 
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In their book Why Nations Fail, mentioned in the introduction, the 
leading institutional economists at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, examine the stark con-
trast in living conditions between the two Koreas, North and South, and 
also delve into the reasons why Botswana has risen while its neighbor, 
Zimbabwe, is sinking. Beyond that, Acemoglu and Robinson (2011), 
looking toward the future, give suggestions for ways in which larger 
nations like the United States and China can build more sustainable and 
egalitarian political and economic institutions. 
While the issues involved in bringing about positive changes in 
countries are complex, positive economic development does not in fact 
have a secret formula. Simply put, successful development requires 
good governance. Positive instances can be found in East Asia, Europe, 
North America, and elsewhere. Unfortunately, Botswana is one of the 
few examples of development through good governance in Africa. The 
question remains: why have African countries lagged behind other 
developing nations, such as those of Asia? It is not for lack of natural 
resources, good climate, or a hard-working people. Most African states 
plagued by poverty suffer because of government repression. These 
leaders rely on the instruments of fear and coercion to prevent honest 
dialogue and freedom of expression. They have, by and large, failed 
to learn the lessons of the past, both from their own history and from 
that of successful nations. We hope political leaders will make a differ-
ent, positive choice, one of building inclusive economic, political, and 
social institutions in the twenty-first century. The single comprehensive 
factor that can take Africa as well as states in Asia, the Middle East, and 
Latin America out of poverty and conflict is democratic good gover-
nance, which will positively affect all sectors of the economy. 
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